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Kurzfassung 
Der automobile Entwicklungsfokus verschiebt sich von der Entwicklung von Fahreras-
sistenzsystemen (FAS) hin zu (hoch-)automatisiertem Fahren (HAF), wie der Tagespresse 
entnommen werden kann. Dabei sind sich Experten einig, dass Fahrsimulatoren (FS) bei 
der Absicherung von HAF eine noch wichtigere Rolle zukommen wird, also schon bei 
FAS. Der Stand der Technik der FS befindet sich in Bezug auf die Wiedergabequalität 
von Beschleunigungen jedoch in einer Sackgasse, da die gestellten Dynamikanforderun-
gen nicht ökonomisch erfüllt werden können, was die Validität der im FS erzielten Ergeb-
nisse beeinträchtigt und somit ein bahnbrechendes, neues Konzept auf den Plan ruft.  
Deshalb wird hier das Konzept eines selbstfahrenden Fahrsimulators (WMDS) unter-
sucht, um bei mindestens gleichwertiger Immersion des Probanden und reduzierten Kos-
ten den Stand der Technik zu ersetzen. Diese Arbeit beleuchtet das übergeordnete Pro-
jektziel des Machbarkeitsnachweises von WMDS unter zwei Gesichtspunkten: Ist die 
selbstfahrende Plattform praktisch in der Lage die gleiche Horizontaldynamik, wie sie in 
einem realen Fahrzeug auftritt, in Bezug auf Leistungsbedarf, Energiebedarf und Bewe-
gungslatenz abzubilden, sowie welche Funktionen und Überwachungsmaßnahmen sind 
erforderlich, um das von einem WMDS ausgehende Risiko auf ein akzeptables Niveau 
zu reduzieren? 
Die erste Forschungsfrage wird mittels Fahrversuchen mit dem skalierten WMDS-
Prototyp MORPHEUS untersucht. Da aufgrund der begrenzten Fahrfläche für 
MORPHEUS keine unskalierten Stadtfahrmanöver durchführbar sind, wird ein Leis-
tungs-/Energiemodell entwickelt, parametrisiert und validiert, mit dem ein unskalierter 
Energiebedarf sowie der Leistungsbedarf in Abhängigkeit des Skalierungsfaktors simu-
liert werden. Der Leistungs- und Energiebedarf sowie die Anforderungen an die Bewe-
gungslatenz sind nachweislich mit dem Stand der Technik erfüllbar. 
Die zweite Forschungsfrage wird untersucht, indem eine Gefahren- und Risikoanalyse 
durchgeführt wird und daraus Sicherheitsanforderungen abgeleitet werden. Eine Sicher-
heitsarchitektur wird entworfen, wobei ein autarkes Notbremssystem das Kernelement 
darstellt. Eine exemplarische Ausführung der Architektur wird auf die erreichte Risikore-
duktion sowie auf neuerlich generierte Gefahren durch die dem System hinzugefügten 
Komponenten und Funktionen untersucht und weist nach, dass keine unakzeptablen Ri-
siken mehr vorhanden sind.  
Zusammenfassend liefert die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift den nächsten Baustein zum 
Machbarkeitsnachweis von WMDS und damit zur Revolution der FS-Technologie.  
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Short Summary 
The automotive development focus shifts from advanced driver assistance systems to-
wards automated driving, as can easily be concluded from daily news. While the valida-
tion and verification of driver assistance systems is already challenging, the question of 
how to validate automated driving is still unanswered. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed 
that the importance of Driving Simulators (DS) for the validation of driver assistance 
systems will increase even further for the validation of automated driving. Still, state-of-
the-art DS are in a deadlock when it comes to providing the demanded quality in motion 
representation because larger workspaces are needed but cannot be provided economi-
cally, thus, impeding validity of DS results and calling for a ground-breaking concept.  
A Wheeled Mobile DS (WMDS) is researched at FZD to replace state-of-the-art DS while 
providing an at least equal immersion to the test person with reduced costs. Therefore, 
this thesis investigates the superordinate project goal of proving feasibility of WMDS 
from two viewpoints: Firstly, is the wheeled motion base practically capable of providing 
the horizontal dynamics as they would occur in a real car in the aspects power demand, 
energy demand, and motion latency. Secondly, what measures are needed to reduce the 
risk that arises from the unbound system to an acceptable level and how are these 
measures triggered and monitored, ergo: How would a safety architecture need to look 
like for a WMDS? 
The first research question is addressed by conducting driving manoeuvres with the scaled 
WMDS prototype MORPHEUS. As unscaled urban driving manoeuvres cannot be driven 
with MORPHEUS, since the available driving areas are not large enough, a power/energy 
model is developed, parameterised, and validated, enabling the simulation of the unscaled 
energy demand and of the power demand in dependence of the scaling factor. Concluding, 
the requirements to power and energy demand as well as motion latency can be fulfilled 
by state-of-the-art technology. 
To answer the second research question, a state-of-the-art hazard and risk analysis has 
been conducted and safety requirements have been derived. An overall safety architecture 
is designed for these safety requirements, whereas the core element is an autarchic emer-
gency braking system. An exemplary design of this safety architecture is investigated and 
evaluated in terms of risk reduction and additional hazards arising from the newly intro-
duced functions and components, yielding that no unacceptable risk is inherited in the 
system. 
Concluding, the herein presented work provides the next building block towards proving 
general feasibility of WMDS and, thus, towards revolutionising DS technology.  
  
1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
As already mentioned in the summary, the automotive development focus shifts from 
advanced driver assistance systems (SAE Level 0-21) towards automated driving (SAE 
Level 3-51) and the importance of Driving Simulators (DS) for the validation of advanced 
driver assistance systems2,3,4,5,6 as well as of automated driving7,8,9 is undisputed, espe-
cially for urban applications. Not to mention other areas of application that will remain 
relevant in near future such as driver behaviour analysis, Human-Machine Interface 
(HMI) development and validation, and dimensioning of chassis components3,4,6,10. This 
continuing interest in DS is due to its key advantages reproducibility, e.g. in studies in-
volving many test subjects undergoing the same driving scenario, safety for the subject, 
e.g. when investigating safety critical driving manoeuvres such as an emergency evasion, 
and – of course – cost and time reduction in the development process due to the early 
availability of virtual prototypes. 
When looking back at the historic development of DS, a trend towards more realistic – in 
terms of motion feedback – driving simulation becomes evident: In the late 1950s the first 
fixed-base DS were developed, succeeded by dynamic DS with Stewart platforms in the 
late 1960s. It was not until the end of the 20th century that highly dynamic DS were de-
veloped, employing xy-rails for a better representation of high frequent and/or sustaining 
                                                 
1 SAE: Terms Related to Automated Driving Systems (2014). 
2 Zeeb, E.: Daimler’s New Full-Scale, High-Dynamic DS (2010). 
3 Baumann, G. et al.: How to Build Europe’s Largest Eight-Axes DS (2012). 
4 Blana, E.: A Survey of DS Around the World (1996). a: pp. 4-7. 
5 Chapron, T.; Colinot, J.-P.: The New PSA Advanced DS (2007). 
6 Schöner, H.-P.: Erprobung und Absicherung im dynamischen DS (2014). 
7 Richter, A.; Scholz, M.: The Surveyor’s Guide to Automotive Simulation (2016). 
8 Boer, E. R. et al.: The Role of DS in Developing and Evaluating AD (2015). 
9 Maurer, M. et al.: Autonomes Fahren (2015). p. 446. 
10 Schöner, H.-P.; Morys, B.: Dynamische DS (2015). p. 140. 
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translational accelerations11. Many efforts were undertaken after that to increase the qual-
ity of the acceleration representation and therefore the immersion as well. However, large 
workspaces are required to provide the equal acceleration sensation as in a real car, with 
urban driving – which requires the highest developmental effort for automated driving – 
being the worst-case application scenario12. This dilemma was accurately summarised by 
Zeeb, former head of Daimler DS, in 2010: “To induce a much better longitudinal motion 
sensation with a scaling factor close to 1:1 for all possible acceleration and deceleration sce-
narios even a several ten meter long sledge would not be sufficient, but would increase the 
technical and financial effort tremendously, especially when the […] mandatory requirements 
for drive dynamic experiments have to be fulfilled”13. 
The prescribed controversy – the increasing importance of highly realistic DS for automotive 
research and development vs. the dynamic limitations of state-of-the-art highly dynamic DS 
– calls for a ground-breaking new concept. Thus, this work focuses on the advancement and 
proof of feasibility of the Wheeled Mobile Driving Simulator (WMDS) that is investigated 
by the Institute of Automotive Engineering (Fachgebiet Fahrzeugtechnik FZD) at Technische 
Universität Darmstadt since 2010.  
1.2 Wheeled Mobile Driving Simulator Research 
at FZD 
This section gives a brief overview of the WMDS research and its methodology at FZD. 
The herein described hypotheses are used throughout the entire project and will partially 
be investigated in this thesis. Thus, this section will enable the reader to rank the scientific 
merit of this thesis among FZD’s overall WMDS research scope. 
1.2.1 Overall Project Goal 
Because setting up a WMDS is a tremendous effort – in economical and labour terms – 
the feasibility of the concept must be proven beforehand. Thus, the overall project goal is 
to demonstrate that FZD’s WMDS concept can replace state-of-the-art DS with equal or 
higher immersion of the test person while costs are decreased compared to enhanced 
Stewart motion base DS (e.g. DS with compound slides). For being able to scientifically 
research feasibility, this overall project goal is stipulated as the main hypothesis H1: 
                                                 
11 Blana, E.: A Survey of DS Around the World (1996). 
12 Betz, A. et al.: Motion Analysis of a WMDS (2012). pp. 5f. 
13 Zeeb, E.: Daimler’s New Full-Scale, High-Dynamic DS (2010). p. 162. 
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H1: FZD’s WMDS concept is able to provide equal or higher immersion to the test 
person while acquisition and maintenance costs are decreased compared to state-of-
the-art enhanced Stewart motion base DS. 
The hypothesis succeeds if all attempts of falsification fail. The soundest falsification test 
is to build a WMDS, evaluate the immersion in a representative study with test persons, 
and calculate the costs. Unfortunately, as initially described, the stakes for conducting this 
test are high and the outcome is uncertain. Therefore, criteria must be identified that bear 
the potential to falsify the main working hypothesis in theory and practical applications. 
Thus, the risk of bad investments is reduced. These criteria are referred to as falsification 
aspects and must be researched in worst-case scenarios so that no trivial verifications (e.g. 
comparing the high-fidelity WMDS concept with a low-fidelity DS) are conducted. If the 
aspects’ investigations fail to falsify the hypothesis in theory or practical application, the 
concept is considered feasible. 
1.2.2 Initial Situation 
Previously conducted work at FZD, conducted by Betz14, analysed the following five fal-
sification aspects: 
1. Power demand (theoretical) 
2. Energy demand (theoretical) 
3. Friction coefficient (practical application) 
4. Motion control (theoretical) 
5. Safety architecture (exemplary practical application of an emergency braking sys-
tem) 
Whereas the falsification aspects power and energy demand as well as motion control 
have been analysed theoretically in a virtual prototype (cf. section 5.2), the friction coef-
ficient and the safety architecture were investigated with a hardware prototype that was 
designed and manufactured in the author’s master’s thesis15 and is described in detail in 
chapter 3. While the aspect friction coefficient was not able to falsify the working hy-
pothesis, the safety concept has only been exemplarily demonstrated by an emergency 
braking system integrated into the hardware prototype. Neither risk has been assessed, 
nor the triggering and fault monitoring mechanism has been set up. Thus, the falsification 
aspect of a safety architecture has not been sufficiently investigated, yet. 
                                                 
14 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). 
15 Wagner, P.: Master's thesis, Aufbau und Inbetriebnahme eines WMDS (2013). 
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1.2.3 Working Hypotheses 
Besides Betz’ five falsification aspects, two additional falsification aspects are identified, 
whereas the aspect of vertical dynamics is analysed by Zöller, who already published 
parts of his findings16,17: 
6. Latency 
7. Vertical dynamics  
Concluding, the seven falsification aspects are transferred into working hypotheses that 
are derived from the main hypothesis and must be researched within the overall project 
scope. Again, this thesis covers neither all hypotheses nor all falsification aspects. 
1.2.3.1 Wheeled Motion Base  
The working hypothesis H1.1 is adapted from Betz and addresses the five falsification 
aspects power demand, energy demand, friction coefficient, motion control, and motion 
latency:  
H1.1: “The wheeled motion base of [FZD’s] WMDS [concept] with its dynamics lim-
ited by friction forces can simulate the horizontal dynamics of urban traffic for normal 
driver behaviour considering common scaling factors”18. 
“The two restrictions of the hypothesis concerning normal driver behaviour and common 
scaling factors are stipulated because no effort is desired that causes higher requirements 
than necessary. First, the driving experience that is intended to be reproduced in the DS 
is limited in its dynamics due to the driving behaviour of normal drivers. In other words, 
no expert or race car drivers are considered, and the road traffic regulations are obeyed. 
Second, advantage is gained from the common scaling factors as they are found in litera-
ture because human perception may be fooled in certain ranges without causing disturbing 
losses in the perceived driving experience [(further details can be found in sections 2.1.4 
to 2.1.6 and 2.5.2)]”18. 
1.2.3.2 Safety Architecture 
Hypothesis H1.2 addresses the falsification aspect of a suitable safety architecture: 
H1.2: FZD’s WMDS concept does not bear an unacceptable risk to a human under any 
environmental conditions and in any use case. 
                                                 
16 Zöller, C. et al.: Tire Concept Investigation for WMDS (2016). 
17 Zöller, C. et al.: Tires and Vertical Dynamics of WMDS (2017). 
18 Cf. Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 4. 
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FZD’s WMDS concept is characterised by its ability to move freely on a planar surface, 
which excludes stop dampers from being used, as it is currently done in highly dynamic 
DS. An unacceptable risk is context-dependent and is “judged to be unacceptable [..] ac-
cording to valid societal moral concepts”19. For technical systems, various approaches 
exist that evaluate the risk based on risk parameters determined in a thorough analysis 
(section 2.3). Thus, the WMDS and its safety architecture must comply with state-of-the-
art norms (e.g. IEC 61508) and guidelines (e.g. VDI 2221). Humans interacting with the 
WMDS must be considered in the design of the safety architecture. Hypothesis H1.2 in-
cludes the operation and maintenance of the WMDS and, therefore, subjects such as test 
persons, maintenance personnel, and bystanders. 
1.2.3.3 Vertical Dynamics  
Hypothesis H1.3 addresses the falsification aspect of the vertical dynamics excitation re-
sulting from the tire road contact: 
H1.3: FZD’s WMDS concept can simulate urban driving scenarios on any driving sur-
face, which is commonly driven on with WMDS, without impairing the test person’s 
immersion. 
Common driving surfaces for the application of WMDS must be defined because the con-
cept is unprecedented worldwide. Potential users of WMDS can help by considering on 
which surfaces they would use a WMDS. In this hypothesis’ context, the immersion refers 
to vertical excitations that do not disturb the overall driving experience of the test person. 
Values can be found in literature or in experiments. 
1.3 Overall Methodology and Structure of the 
Thesis 
This thesis researches the falsification aspects of practical power demand, energy de-
mand, and latency of hypothesis H1.1 and the theoretical falsification aspect of a safety 
architecture, hypothesis H1.2. The aim is to identify the worst-case for each aspect under 
the given constraints (e.g. normal driver behaviour) and with state-of-the-art technology 
to conduct a most rigorous falsification. 
                                                 
19 ISO TC 22/SC 32 Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects: ISO 26262 (2011). 
p. 18. 
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1.3.1 Wheeled Motion Base 
The research questions that are investigated for the falsification of hypothesis H1.1 are:  
1. Power demand: Is FZD’s WMDS concept capable of providing the maximum 
power demanded with state-of-the-art components (actuators, on-board power 
supply systems, tires, suspension, etc.)? 
2. Energy demand: Are state-of-the-art on-board energy storage systems capable of 
providing the energy required for driving simulation as described by hypothesis 
H1.1? 
3. Latency: Which motion latency from the driver’s input to the provided accelera-
tion cue must be undercut and is FZD’s WMDS concept capable of providing cues 
within this latency in order to represent the same motion sensation as in standard 
passenger cars? 
Sections 2.4 to 2.5 describe the state-of-the-art of accumulators and human motion per-
ception. This knowledge allows to extrapolate from the capabilities of the hardware pro-
totype to what can be achieved, defining the worst-case requirements and constraints for 
the experiments (sections 4.1 to 4.3, in which the detailed methodology with the experi-
mental setup and evaluation criteria can be found). A bottom-up methodology is applied 
for identifying the worst-case power demand, energy demand, and latency of FZD’s 
WMDS concept. The investigation is done with real driving of the hardware prototype, 
starting from simple manoeuvres evolving into more complex manoeuvres, section 5.1. 
Because not all falsification experiments can be conducted on a 1:1 scale, the investiga-
tion is supported by a virtual prototype, section 5.2. If the required outputs of the virtual 
prototype are validated with the hardware prototype, the simulation results can be extrap-
olated, section 6. If these aspects cannot be falsified, they are practically feasible.  
1.3.2 Safety Architecture 
For the falsification of hypothesis H1.2, the worst-case risks any human is exposed to in 
all possible use cases, as defined in hypothesis H1.1, must be determined. Then, the re-
search question is if these risks can be reduced to an acceptable level by a safety archi-
tecture. Relevant functional safety standards are described in section 2.3. The safety ar-
chitecture itself is deduced from a top-down methodology. This implies that the safety 
architecture development is started by identifying all hazards (section 7.1.2, methodology 
section 4.4.2). Based on the identified hazards, risk is assessed (sections 7.1.3 and 7.2, 
methodology sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4). All hazards with significant risk are included in a 
safety requirement list and a safety architecture design per state-of-the-art norms and 
guidelines (section 2.3) is proposed (section 7.3). The risk reduction as well as new haz-
ards introduced to the system are evaluated for an exemplary application (section 7.3.3). 
Finally, an outlook to a safety architecture for full-scale WMDS is given (section 7.4). 
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2 State-of-the-Art and Scientific Research 
This chapter starts with clarifying the used DS specific terminology (section 2.1, compat-
ible with Betz’20 definitions), followed by a brief overview of different types of DS with 
a detailed description of wheeled mobile DS (section 2.2). Finally, the required basic in-
formation (i.e. requirements) for investigating the falsification aspects safety architecture 
(section 2.3), energy demand (section 2.4), and latency (section 2.5) is addressed.  
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Coordinate System (COS) 
The Coordinate System (COS) is chosen per DIN ISO 885521a, where the index E repre-
sents the earth-fixed COS and V represents the vehicle’s (in this context virtual vehicle) 
COS. Additionally, in this work the indices DS for the DS’ COS and W for the wheel’s 
COS are introduced. The translational Degrees Of Freedom (DOF) are denominated 𝑥 for 
surge, 𝑦 for sway, and 𝑧 for heave. The rotational DOF are denominated 𝜃 for pitch, 𝜑 
for roll, and 𝜓 for yaw. 
 
Figure 2-1: COS per DIN ISO 885521b 
                                                 
20 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). pp. 9-12. 
21 Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V.: ISO 8855 (2013). a: - ; b: p. 11. 
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2.1.2 Simulator Orientation 
The x-direction of the DS (𝑥DS) is the direction the test person’s seat is facing. According 
to DIN ISO 885522, the lateral direction (𝑦DS) is positive to the left and the vertical direc-
tion (𝑧DS) upwards. The steering and drive units are numbered (1 to 3) clockwise, starting 
at the unit faced by the test person’s seat, cf. Figure 2-2: 
 
Figure 2-2: DS orientation 
2.1.3 Motion Cue / Motion Cueing Algorithm (MCA) 
Synonyms for the term cue are reference, indication, or information. When working with 
humans, this term is commonly used for describing a sensory information that is pro-
vided23,24. Therefore, the term motion cue describes a sensory information that is per-
ceived and interpreted by the test person as motion. Because motion is primarily per-
ceived through the vestibular sensory organ (cf. section 2.5.1), the term motion cue is 
used within this thesis for describing a vestibular stimulus that is presented to the subject. 
The algorithm that translates motion cues of a real car into the motion cues of the DS is 
referred to as the Motion Cueing Algorithm (MCA).  
2.1.4 Scaling 
Scaling describes the process of proportionally reducing the acceleration amplitudes 
within a DS, e.g. when the acceleration amplitude of 4 m/s² of a real car is to be simulated 
                                                 
22 Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V.: ISO 8855 (2013). 
23 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 10. 
24 Fischer, M.: Diss., MCA für eine realitätsnahe Bewegungssimulation (2009). p. 5.  
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in a DS with a scaling factor of 0.5, the simulated DS acceleration would be 2 m/s². Scal-
ing reduces the amplitude uniformly across all frequencies25a and not necessarily impedes 
the subject’s immersion26. Commonly used scaling factors are 1, 0.7, and 0.5, depending 
on the manoeuvre that is to be simulated and on available workspace limiting the accel-
eration amplitude in dependence on the acceleration frequency26,27a,28. As stated by Betz29, 
it is not clear whether the yaw motion should be scaled as well. On the one hand scaling 
the yaw motion would match the scaled lateral acceleration, on the other hand the un-
scaled visual cues would contradict the scaled yaw motion. Therefore, an unscaled yaw 
motion is used here, resulting in a conservative investigation of WMDS. 
2.1.5 Tilt Coordination (TC) 
Tilt Coordination (TC) basically describes a measurement error that can occur with hu-
mans and sensors if perception is based on the measurement of inertia forces. If the sensor 
(vestibular organ for a human) is tilted relative to the gravitational force vector, the sine 
portion of the gravitational force is perceived as horizontal acceleration25b,27b,29. This phe-
nomenon is applicable up to certain ranges of tilt angles, tilt rates, and tilt accelerations, 
often described as stationary perception thresholds (section 2.5.2). Nevertheless, this 
technique is predestined for application in DS since almost all dynamic DS use motion 
systems with six DOF or more that can tilt the subject. Thus, low frequent accelerations 
may be well presented through TC. The frequencies are partitioned by the MCA. The 
delusion may be perceived by the subject if the vestibular channel does not match the 
cues from other sensory channels. Therefore, especially visual cues must adapt to TC. 
2.1.6 Washout 
The washout aims at minimising the required workspace. This is achieved by moving the 
DS back into its initial position below human perception thresholds or by masking the 
washout motion with TC27b. Usually this is done filter-based within the MCA, therefore, 
the term washout is also often used for referring to the (classical) MCA25c,30. 
                                                 
25 Reid, L. D.; Nahon, M.: Flight Simulation MCA (1985). a: Appendix B.1; b: 1.1; c: - .  
26 Greenberg, J. et al.: Lateral Motion Cues During Simulated Driving (2003). 
27 Fischer, M.: Diss., MCA für eine realitätsnahe Bewegungssimulation (2009). a: pp. 57f.; b: pp. 6f. 
28 Groen, E. et al.: Psychophysical Thresholds of Linear Acceleration (2000). 
29 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 11. 
30 Nahon, M.; Reid, L. D.: Simulator MCA - A Designer's Perspective (1990). 
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2.1.7 Simulator Sickness 
Simulator sickness must be avoided in driving simulation experiments and refers to an 
illness-like condition whose symptoms can be nausea, vomiting, cold sweating, and pal-
lor. The most widely accepted theory behind simulator sickness is the sensory conflict 
theory31, according to which simulator sickness occurs if the cues perceived by the ves-
tibular receptors, the eyes, or the non-vestibular proprioceptors mismatch. Reason and 
Brand31 divide simulator sickness into two classes: The first class is caused by mismatch-
ing cues between the eyes and vestibular receptors, whereas the second class is caused by 
mismatching cues between the semi-circular canals and the otoliths within the vestibular 
organ (cf. section 2.5.1). While the second class is mainly influenced by a properly tuned 
MCA, the first class is influenced by delayed or missing representation of one of the 
aforementioned cues32. Whereas completely missing cues can be system inherent if an 
insufficient or no motion system at all is used in the DS, simulator sickness induced by 
delayed cues is caused by latency in either the visual representation system or the motion 
system. These delayed cues are primary responsible for simulator sickness according to 
literature33. Latency is dealt with in more detail in section 2.5.3. 
2.2 State-of-the-Art Driving Simulators 
The motion capabilities of DS have changed dramatically in the latter half of the 20th 
century but did not improve much since then. This section gives a brief overview of these 
motion capabilities and corresponding areas of application. The DS are ranked in the or-
der of increasing motion capability. The exemplary designs that are chosen represent top 
of the class DS in terms of available acceleration amplitude and sustained acceleration. A 
more in-depth analysis has been conducted by Schöner and Morys34 or more complete 
analyses by Blana35 or Slob36. 
                                                 
31 Reason, J. T.; Brand, J. J.: Motion Sickness (1975). 
32 Hettinger, L. J.; Riccio, G. E.: Visually Induced Motion Sickness (1992). p. 306. 
33 St. Pierre, M. E.: Diss., The Effects of Latency on Simulator Sickness in a HMD (2012). pp. 16-18. 
34 Schöner, H.-P.; Morys, B.: Dynamische DS (2015). 
35 Blana, E.: A Survey of DS Around the World (1996). 
36 Slob, J. J.: State-of-the-Art DS (2008). 
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2.2.1 Fixed Base DS 
Fixed base simulators origin back to early flight simulators in the beginning of the 20th 
century, inheriting the very basic element of a simulator: The HMI. DS in the 1960s al-
ready showed visual representation, audition was represented by the 1970s37. Therefore, 
visual and audible feedback constitute the second and third basic elements of a DS. 
2.2.2 Stewart Motion Base DS 
A Stewart Platform – based on the universal tyre test machine by Gough38 – consists of 
two platforms that are connected by six linear actuators39 and is nowadays usually re-
ferred to as hexapod. The setup allows motion in all six translational and rotational DOF. 
Applied to a fixed base DS, the test subject can be moved, which results in an increased 
immersion and, therewith, motion cues constitute the fourth basic element of a DS. How-
ever, due to the limited stroke of the actuators and in dependence on the acceleration 
amplitude, only short acceleration cues can be represented. More advantageous, the rota-
tional DOF allow to tilt the test subject and, therefore, enable TC with sustaining accel-
eration cues but limited frequency. 
2.2.3 “Robocoaster” Motion Base DS 
The Robocoaster motion base DS is based on the Robocoaster robot arm for entertainment 
purposes that in turn is based on a KUKA robot arm for industrial purposes40. The use of 
a robot arm increases the available motion compared to a hexapod and therewith also the 
immersion of the test subject. Nevertheless, accelerations still cannot be represented for 
all frequencies and amplitudes that occur while driving a car. Advantageous – compared 
to Stewart motion bases – is the increased yaw angle. The Max Planck Institute for Bio-
logical Cybernetics extended its Robocoaster by a linear track that adds 9.88 m of motion 
envelope41. This adds to the immersion but still limits the DS in its capabilities to repre-
sent sustaining high amplitude accelerations. Further disadvantages of the concept are the 
complex control and safety architecture.  
                                                 
37 Blana, E.: A Survey of DS Around the World (1996). pp. 4-7. 
38 Gough, V. E.; Whitehall, S. G.: Universal Tyre Test Machine (1962). 
39 Stewart, D.: A Platform with Six DOF (1965). 
40 Teufel, H. et al.: MPI Motion Simulator (2007). 
41 Nieuwenhuizen, F. M.; Bülthoff, H. H.: The MPI CyberMotion Simulator (2013). p. 124. 
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2.2.4 Centrifuge Motion Base DS 
Desdemona Ltd. developed the Desdemona simulator based on a centrifuge. The complex 
design allows translational motion as a hexapod, whereas rotational motion is possible up 
to over 360°42. Combined translational and rotational motion can create sustaining accel-
eration cues with high amplitudes. Nevertheless, also unwanted acceleration cues are gen-
erated, especially when initialising or ending a manoeuvre with sustained acceleration: 
The DOF are interdependent, which makes the control – in terms of the MCA – complex.  
2.2.5 Cable Robot DS 
In 2015, the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics introduced their cable robot 
DS. This DS is suspended by eight cables, each driven by an individual electric motor, 
enabling the usage of the entire room (5 x 8 x 5 m³)43. Advantageous are the light concept 
and high acceleration amplitudes. Disadvantageous are elasticities of the cables that can 
result in vibration or latency in acceleration representation. Furthermore, to represent sus-
tained high amplitude acceleration, the room and with that the length of the cables must 
be increased, worsening the elasticity issue. These disadvantages impede the use of cable 
robots for (nearly) unscaled high-fidelity driving simulation. 
2.2.6 Enhanced Stewart Motion Base DS 
Today’s high-fidelity DS still employ a hexapod that is either carried on compound slides 
or by air cushions enhanced by further actuators. For the air cushion solution, linear ac-
tuators are used that connect to the hexapod motion base. Compound slide solutions may 
also use rotary actuators. Whereas the hexapod is used for TC and rotational movement 
of the car, the additional actuators are used to represent high frequency accelerations, i.e. 
accelerations that cannot be represented by TC due to the human motion perception 
thresholds (see section 2.1.5 and 2.5.2). Of course, adding a slide increases the weight of 
the DS significantly and, even worse, adding a crossbeam for the second slide exponen-
tiates this issue since the first slide(s) must be moved together with the hexapod, cabin, 
etc. Power and energy demand are affected by the weight increase, too. Therefore, a nat-
ural trade-off between DS fidelity and economy seems to be given, as confirmed by 
Zeeb44 (citation section 1.1). For comparatively smaller solutions, the hexapod can be 
carried by air cushions instead of slides, which reduces the moving mass. For spanning 
                                                 
42 Wentink, M. et al.: Design and Evaluation of MCA for Desdemona Simulator (2005). p. 2. 
43 Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics: CableRobot with Passenger (2015). 
44 Zeeb, E.: Daimler’s New Full-Scale, High-Dynamic DS (2010). p. 162. 
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large workspaces, the stiffness of the actuators’ pistons becomes critical. Nevertheless, 
more and more enhanced Stewart motion base DS are built around the world as can be 
seen in the selection of Table 2.1, proving the persistent demand of highly dynamic DS: 
Table 2.1: Overview of enhanced Stewart motion base DS 
Organisation  Motion  
envelope  
DOF  Moving 
mass  
Peugeot Société Anonyme (PSA)45  10 m x 5.5 m  8 DOF  unknown  
Renault ULTIMATE46 6 m x 6 m 8 DOF unknown 
Swedish National Road and Transport Research 
Institute (VTI) Sim IV47 
2.5 m x 2.3 m 8 DOF unknown 
University of Iowa48 20 m x 20 m  13 DOF 80 t  
University of Leeds49 5 m x 5 m 8 DOF unknown 
Toyota50 35 m x 20 m  12 DOF 80 t51 
Daimler51 12.5 m  7 DOF unknown  
Research Institute of Automotive Engineering 
and Vehicle Engines Stuttgart (FKFS)52 
10 m x 7 m  8 DOF unknown  
VI-grade Driver-in-Motion (DiM) 25053; in ap-
plication, inter alia, at Honda54, Danisi Engineer-
ing53, Volvo53, Lamborghini53, Porsche53 
1.6 m x 1.5 m 9 DOF unknown 
2.2.7 Summary of State-of-the-Art DS 
For proving that state-of-the-art DS are not capable of representing a sufficient accelera-
tion sensation as it could be perceived when driving in a real car in an urban environment, 
the calculation of the frequency gaps between the tilt and translation mechanisms is 
                                                 
45 Chapron, T.; Colinot, J.-P.: The New PSA Advanced DS (2007). 
46 Dagdelen, M. et al.: MPC based MCA (2004). p. 228. 
47 VTI: VTI's simulator facilities. 
48 Clark et al.: NADS Motion System (2001). 
49 University of Leeds: University of Leeds DS (2016). 
50 Murano, T. et al.: Development of High-Performance DS (2009). 
51 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 29. 
52 Baumann, G. et al.: The New DS of Stuttgart University (2012). 
53 VI-grade: VI-grade DiM (2017). 
54 Honda Deutschland: Honda R&D DS (2017). 
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stressed55: It is assumed that a longitudinal, harmonic excitation with an amplitude |?̂?| of 
5 m/s² is to be presented. The translation system is then limited by the available work-
space, resulting in the lower limit frequency for translation, where 2𝑏 is the available 
workspace: 
𝑓trans,lim >
1
2𝜋
√
|?̂?|
𝑏
 (2-1) 
The tilt system (namely the hexapod) is then limited by the tilt rate threshold ?̇?threshold, 
resulting in the upper limit frequency for tilting: 
𝑓tilt,lim ≲
1
2𝜋
𝑔
|?̂?|
?̇?threshold (2-2) 
To be able to represent the acceleration demand, the lower limit frequency for the trans-
lation system must meet the upper limit frequency for the tilt system. Obviously, the hu-
man perception threshold for tilt rate cannot be changed. Therefore, if scaling is left out, 
the only available parameter to be changed is the workspace 𝑏, yielding for 𝑓trans,lim =
𝑓tilt,lim 
𝑏 =
|?̂?|3
𝑔2?̇?threshold
2
 (2-3) 
Applying the tilt rate threshold that is used throughout the project of 6 °/s yields (sec-
tion 2.5.2), whereas the workspace must be provided for acceleration and deceleration as 
well, yields: 
𝑏(?̇?threshold = 6 
°
s
, |?̂?| = 5 
m
s²
) = ±118.4 m (2-4) 
It can be clearly seen that a workspace of ±118.4 m is economically impossible to achieve 
with a compound slides motion base DS56. Tüschen comes to a similar result of ±161 m, 
using a more restrictive tilt rate threshold of 5 °/s57. Figure 2-3 illustrates the frequency 
gaps that cannot be represented in dependence on the available translational workspace. 
The only reasonable approach to overcome this dilemma is an unbound system limited 
only by the environment it is moving in.  
                                                 
55 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). pp. 20-23, 125. 
56 This value differs from the workspace calculated by Betz, who – inconsistently – used the tilt rate thresh-
old of 3 °/s for the calculation of the frequency gaps instead of 6 °/s that were used throughout the rest 
of his thesis. 
57 Tüschen, T. et al.: Suspensions Design of a WMDS (2016). p. 6. 
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Figure 2-3: Frequency gaps of state-of-the-art DS (Hexapod ±1 m, compound slides motion base 
DS ±10 m, unrestricted ±118.4 m)58 
2.2.8 State-of-Research: Wheeled Motion Base DS 
2.2.8.1 BMW Patent 
The first concepts of a wheeled motion base for DS were patented by Donges/BMW in 
200259a respectively Hüsing/BMW in 200360. Their concept proposes an at least 
three-wheeled platform topped by a dome, in which a complete car or mock-up can be 
fitted. The wheel units may consist of single or twin wheels. The steering angle is limited 
to ±180°. Energy is supplied by a cable suspended from the ceiling, cf. Figure 2-4: 
 
Figure 2-4: BMW wheeled motion base DS59b 
                                                 
58 Cf. Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 22. 
59 Donges, E.: Fahrsimulator (2001). a: - ; b: pp. 6f.  
60 Hüsing, K.: Fahrsimulator (2001). 
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The safety architecture is described as an infrastructural element that obstructs the move-
ment of the DS as soon as the workspace is left. Betz61 described the drawbacks of 
BMW’s concept. Firstly, it is unclear why the steering angle is limited to ±180°. Because 
the cabin’s yaw angle and the DS’ trajectory are dependent on each other, the limitation 
of the steering angle reduces the capabilities of the washout algorithm that drives the DS 
back into its initial position. Furthermore, the described safety architecture bears a signif-
icant infrastructural effort, because the whole workspace must be framed, and the safety 
infrastructure must cope with any impact speed and angle of the DS. Also, when it comes 
to mobile applications, e.g. on outdoor testing grounds, an infrastructural safety architec-
ture is unsuitable.  
2.2.8.2 Eindhoven University of Technology/Bosch Rexroth62a 
The Eindhoven University of Technology researched together with Bosch Rexroth a 
24-wheeled motion base DS whose wheels are grouped into four wheel carriers consisting 
of three twin wheels each. Solid tires are used. The dome can carry a complete vehicle 
and can be tilted, pitched, and heaved by a three-crank mechanism. Energy is supplied 
via a cable that is suspended from the ceiling. 
 
Figure 2-5: Wheeled motion base DS of Slob et al.62b 
The publication is mainly focused on the wheel kinematics with the aim of representing 
acceleration cues instantaneously. Therefore, caster is used at each wheel set, Figure 2-6. 
                                                 
61 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 39. 
62 Slob, J. J. et al.: The Wall is the Limit (2009). a: - ; b: p. 299. 
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Figure 2-6: Wheel set design of Slob et al.63a  
Longitudinal acceleration is generated by rotating the two wheels of a wheel set equally. 
In case of counterrotating those two wheels, a reaction torque is generated around point A 
(theoretical axis of rotation without caster, Figure 2-7). When a sufficient support torque 
around point A is provided, a lateral force at point P (wheel set’s axis of rotation, Figure 
2-7) is generated, resulting in instantaneous lateral acceleration. 
 
Figure 2-7: Wheel set kinematics of Slob et al.63b 
                                                 
63 Slob, J. J. et al.: The Wall is the Limit (2009). a: p. 299; b: p. 301. 
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In theory, this concept can provide accelerations up to 7 m/s², Table 2.2, wherein the cal-
culated overall weight of the DS is 11.1 t.64a 
Table 2.2: Motion capabilities of wheeled motion base of Slob et al.64b 
Non-simultaneous  Acceleration  Velocity Displacement  
Surge (x)  ±7 m/s²  ±4 m/s  ± wall  
Sway (y)  ±7 m/s²  ±4 m/s  ± wall  
Heave (z)  ±5 m/s²  ±0.4 m/s  ±0.2 m  
Roll (θ)  ±5.2 rad/s²  ±0.7 rad/s  ±0.4 rad  
Pitch (φ)  ±5.2 rad/s²  ±0.7 rad/s  ±0.4 rad  
Yaw (ψ)  ±1.4 rad/s²  ±1.1 rad/s  ±1.2 rad  
The safety architecture of this concept is not addressed within the paper, only the need 
for a positioning system is formulated. For control, an inverse kinematic algorithm is set 
up, neglecting nonlinearities of the tire behaviour.  
One disadvantage of this concept is the energy supply via cable because mobile applica-
tions become impossible (as with the BMW patents). Furthermore, the paper aims at con-
trolling the DS’ trajectory, whereas the representation of acceleration is crucial for driving 
simulation. This is because humans are not able to perceive translational velocity directly 
(cf. section 2.5.1). The wheel caster approach overcomes the disadvantages of nonho-
lonomic wheels, as Betz65 already stated. Nevertheless, this problem occurs only in stand-
still. With moving wheels, lateral forces may be generated at any time. The paper does 
not address if the additional control effort with wheel caster weighs up the nonholonomic 
constraint of conventional wheels. Also, the nonlinear tire characteristic as well as cross 
influences through horizontal wheel forces, wheel load, and steering torque are not con-
sidered. 
2.2.8.3 TNO VeHIL66,67,68 
The Vehicle Hardware In the Loop (VeHIL) is a self-propelled platform used by TNO for 
evaluating vehicle sensors and their data processing as well as advanced driver assistance 
systems and automated driving. The test setup includes a chassis dynamometer on which 
                                                 
64 Slob, J. J. et al.: The Wall is the Limit (2009). a: p. 306; b: p. 298. 
65 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 42. 
66 Gietelink, O. et al.: VEHIL: A Test Facility for ADAS (2004). 
67 van der Meulen, S. H.: Validation of Moving Base Simulation Model (2004). 
68 Ploeg, J. et al.: High Performance Automatic Guided Vehicle (2002). 
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the vehicle under test is mounted, so that it is stationary in the earth-fixed COS. Then the 
VeHIL platform, representing a vehicle within the trajectory of the vehicle under test, 
performs the inverted relative motion between those two vehicles. The wheels of the      
VeHIL platform are independently steerable, enabling omnidirectional movement. For 
positioning, odometry as well as a magnet grid integrated into the hall floor in combina-
tion with four linear antennas (“rulers” on the outside bottom edges of VeHIL, Figure 2-8) 
are used69. The accumulator allows for a 15-minutes test drive70. The technical specifica-
tions of the VeHIL platform are listed in Table 2.3: 
Table 2.3: Technical specifications of TNO VeHIL platform70 
Property Unit Value 
Mass kg 450 
Maximum speed km/h 50 
Maximum acceleration m/s² 10 
Maximum steering angle ° ±350 
Accumulator ./. 288 NiMH D-cells, 346 V (DC), 2.2 kWh 
 
Figure 2-8: TNO VeHIL and the vehicle under test (background)71 
The main difference between the TNO VeHIL platform and DS is that no subject is in-
volved. This might explain why no references to the safety architecture of the platform 
can be found. In addition, the use of velocities and positions in the control architecture 
rather than accelerations results from the different application. Nevertheless, the VeHIL 
platform’s horizontal motion behaviour is quite like that of wheeled motion base DS, 
whereas vertical excitation plays a minor role when compared with DS where ideally no 
                                                 
69 van der Meulen, S. H.: Validation of Moving Base Simulation Model (2004). p. 13. 
70 Ploeg, J. et al.: High Performance Automatic Guided Vehicle (2002). p. 128. 
71 TU Delft: Validation Methodology for Fault-Tolerant ADAS (2014). 
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(non-artificial) road excitation must be perceived by the subject. Also, the concept proves 
that even accumulator technology from the year 2004 is an adequate energy supply for 
wheeled motion platforms. 
2.2.8.4 Technische Universität Dresden/AMST-Systemtechnik GmbH 
The Dresden institute of automobile engineering (Institut für Automobiltechnik Dresden, 
IAD) at Technische Universität Dresden started their wheeled motion base DS research 
in 2012 together with AMST-Systemtechnik GmbH. The main conceptual difference to 
the concept as investigated by FZD of Technische Universität Darmstadt is the use of 
four twin wheels instead of three single wheels and the use of a yaw turntable (ring bear-
ing), cf. Figure 2-9. The simulator is powered by an on-board accumulator with the aim 
of mobile applications. Instead of a real car, a simplified and generic mock-up is used72,73. 
 
Figure 2-9: IAD’s wheeled motion base DS74 
                                                 
72 Tüschen, T.; Prokop, G.: Development of a Highly Dynamic DS (2013). 
73 Tüschen, T.: Diplomarbeit, MCA für einen WMDS (2013). pp. 9-12. 
74 Tüschen, T. et al.: Suspensions Design of a WMDS (2016). p. 9. 
 
2.2 State-of-the-Art Driving Simulators 
21 
The yaw turntable constitutes a redundant DOF because the motion platform itself is also 
capable of yawing. To overcome the limitation of the non-holonomic constraint of the 
tire, the motion platform is constantly rotating while the dome is counterrotating. Thus, 
the subject will not notice the platform’s rotation75a. The idea is that the wheels will never 
get into standstill so that lateral forces may be built up anytime. This is important because 
– without camber – tires build up lateral forces through generating a slip angle, which on 
the other hand means that the wheel needs to have a velocity vector that can be rotated. 
Nevertheless, none of Technische Universität Dresden’s publications addresses how to 
avoid situations where the superposed rotation of the motion platform is cancelled out by 
the primary trajectory of the motion platform that is generated by the MCA. The likeli-
hood of this event happening at one wheel is not negligible but becomes insignificant to 
happen for more than one wheel simultaneously76. Still, cancelling out the superposed 
rotation can lead to undesired motion cue latency and, therefore, false cues. 
Another difference is the Motion Control (MC). Because the concept uses four sets of 
twin wheels, no explicit solution for calculating wheel loads and therewith horizontal 
target wheel forces exists. Therefore, the MC uses an inverted two-track vehicle model. 
From the two-track model, potential wheel forces are derived and handed over to an in-
verted tire model, where the wheel hub torques are calculated from Pacejka’s magic for-
mula75b,77, Figure 2-10. 
 
Figure 2-10: Control architecture of IAD’s wheeled motion base DS75c 
The suspension is designed as a passive two-stage double-wishbone suspension, Figure 
2-11. Requirements to the suspension are identified to be isotropy (i.e. equal deflection 
behaviour in all directions), avoidance of pitch and roll movement (not to be noticed by 
                                                 
75 Tüschen, T. et al.: Suspensions Design of a WMDS (2016). a: pp. 10f.; b: pp. 12f.; c: p. 12. 
76 Glatzki, F.: Bachelor's thesis, Trajektorienüberlagerung und Lenkleistungsbedarf eines WMDS (2016). 
77 Tüschen, T.; Prokop, G.: System Design of a Highly Dynamic DS (2014). 
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subject), good driving comfort (i.e. road excitation transmission to the subject below per-
ception thresholds), and good driving dynamics (i.e. low variation in wheel load, explic-
itly no wheel lift-off). Especially the last two requirements are conflicting goals. This 
conflict is to be resolved by the two-stage suspension concept, whereas the lower double-
wishbone suspension ensures good driving comfort and the upper double-wishbone sus-
pension ensures good driving dynamics78a. 
 
Figure 2-11: Dual suspension kinematics of IAD’s wheeled motion base DS78b 
The safety architecture of the unbound DS is addressed briefly in a patent that is held by 
AMST-Systemtechnik GmbH and Technische Universität Dresden together79. The main 
consideration is to bring the DS to an emergency stop, whereas the patent advises to build 
the trigger logic and trigger mechanism in a safe design. Three emergency braking meth-
ods are described: 
1. Conventional wheel brakes: If the maximum friction coefficient is ought to be 
used and steering is not possible, wheel caster is required to provide course sta-
bility of the wheels. If the sliding friction coefficient is sufficient, on the one hand, 
the DS is not steerable in case of an emergency stop but on the other hand, a wheel 
caster does not influence the driving behaviour. 
2. Brake plate: The wheels must not have contact to the driving surface. This can be 
done in two ways: By pressing the brake plate to the driving surface so that the 
simulator is lifted off the ground or by actively retracting the DS’ wheels. The 
                                                 
78 Tüschen, T. et al.: Suspensions Design of a WMDS (2016). a: pp. 15-18; b: p. 17. 
79 Tischer, W.; Prokop, G.: Selbstfahrender, hochdynamischer Fahrsimulator (2014). pp. 27f. 
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friction coefficient of the brake plate and the driving surface must be designed so 
that the DS cannot fall over in an emergency brake situation.  
3. Braking bags: One or more inflatable braking bags are inflated in a short time, 
making contact to the driving surface and thus generating friction force. This 
method may be used alone or in combination with the first and second method. 
2.2.8.5 Technische Universität Darmstadt, Department of Control Systems 
and Mechatronics  
Technische Universität Darmstadt’s department of control systems and mechatronics 
(Fachgebiet Regelungstechnik und Mechatronik, rtm) researches an alternative approach 
to WMDS based on omniwheels. Omniwheels (similar to Mecanum wheels) have cylin-
ders located over their circumference, whose axis of rotation coincides with a wheel’s 
corresponding tangent. Therefore, a drive torque can be supported in the wheel’s tangen-
tial direction, a wheel load in radial direction, but no lateral force in axial direction. Thus, 
the non-holonomic characteristic of conventional wheels is overcome, yielding omnidi-
rectionality. A scaled, prototypical platform has been designed and built at rtm to research 
control strategies, Figure 2-12: 
 
Figure 2-12: Left: CAD model of rtm's omnidirectional platform80a; Right: CAD model of rtm's 
wheeled motion base DS concept81a 
Publications deal with the control structure with respect to high dynamic requirements, 
addressing tire characteristics, electrical components80b, optimal control approaches81b, as 
well as the replacement of the (classical) washout by two control loops82 – one for TC 
and one for the platform – and comparing the novel approach to model predictive control 
MCA83. Figure 2-13 shows rtm’s proposed control architecture: 
                                                 
80 Gong, Z.; Konigorski, U.: Dynamic Modeling and Controller Design of WMDS (2016). a: p. 1533, b: - . 
81 Gong, Z.; Konigorski, U.: Modeling and Control of a WMDS (2017). a: p. 962; b: - . 
82 Gong, Z.; Konigorski, U.: Model-Based Control of a WMDS (2016). 
83 Gong, Z.; Konigorski, U.: Comparison of Different MCA in a WMDS (2017). 
2 State-of-the-Art and Scientific Research 
24 
 
Figure 2-13: Hierarchical integrated control architecture of rtm’s wheeled motion base DS84 
The outcome of rtm’s research proves that control architectures for unbound systems such 
as wheeled motion base DS exist and fulfil the dynamic requirements of driving simula-
tion. Furthermore, they even bear the potential to gain an edge over state-of-the-art MCA 
approaches85. Unfortunately, the results are limited to omniwheels and cannot be directly 
transferred to non-holonomic wheels. Safety of wheeled motion base DS is not addressed 
by any of rtm’s publications. Due to the principle of omniwheels, only 50 % of the avail-
able friction potential can be used, because not all wheels are oriented in driving direction. 
Thus, the force vector applied at the misaligned wheels contributes only partially to over-
coming driving resistances. Given that with common rubber tires on common driving 
surfaces a friction coefficient of 1 is usually reached, an omniwheeled concept could only 
accelerate with 5 m/s², which is insufficient for unscaled, urban driving simulation. Fur-
thermore, the discontinuous contact point at the wheels, which jumps from one cylinder 
to the next, is expected to cause vertical excitation, impeding the test person’s immersion. 
2.3 Functional Safety 
Of course, design engineers want to construct safe systems. Two questions arise from this 
statement: Firstly, what does safe mean, and, secondly, how can a design engineer guar-
antee that the (possibly very complex) system is safe regarding the safety standard that 
must be defined to answer the first question. Many standards have been worked out for 
answering these questions and to give design engineers a guideline towards designing 
                                                 
84 Gong, Z.; Konigorski, U.: Modeling and Control of a WMDS (2017). p. 962. 
85 Gong, Z.; Konigorski, U.: Comparison of Different MCA in a WMDS (2017). 
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safe systems. All safety standards have in common that the establishment of functional 
safety is partially rather intuitive and in general an iterative process. Graubohm et al. 
adopted their systematic design model for automated driving from the V-model presented 
in ISO 26262, Figure 2-14: 
 
Figure 2-14: Systematic design model for automated driving functions86 
Starting in the concept phase, use cases are established and the item is defined, followed 
by the Hazard And Risk Assessment (HARA). From here, safety goals are established, 
and a functional safety concept is developed that is broken down into functional require-
ments. Considering human factors and the market, a system architecture is developed, 
finally resulting in a technical safety concept. Instead of continuing the traditional path 
(system design and validation), Graubohm et al. added “shortcuts”. Because detailed 
knowledge about the Equipment Under Control (EUC) is needed for the HARA, estab-
lished safety goals are specific for the current version of the EUC, although the system 
design is preliminary. When the safety goals result in design changes, the HARA must be 
adapted, causing a tremendous effort if done after the validation phase. Therefore, these 
shortcuts help to accelerate the functional safety design process and make it more flexible.  
                                                 
86 Graubohm, R. et al.: Systematic Design Considering Functional Safety Aspects (2017). p. 4. 
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Concluding, three axioms can be postulated for the design of functional safety: 
1. Hazard identification is rather intuitive. 
2. The design of functional safety is iterative. 
3. A preliminary system design and understanding is needed for performing the 
HARA, although the goal of the process is to design a safe system based on the 
safety goals established from the HARA. 
In the following, the most important functional safety standards with focus on the 
IEC 61508 will be described, preceded by the basic terminology that is needed for under-
standing the risk assessment process. 
2.3.1 Terminology87 
Consequence The consequences and order of events triggered by an initiating failure 
Controllability  Ability to avoid a specified harm or damage through the timely reac-
tions of the persons involved, possibly with support from external 
measures 
Element A system or part of a system including components, hardware, software, 
hardware parts, and software units  
Exposure State of being in an operational situation that can be hazardous if coin-
cident with the failure mode under analysis 
Failure  Termination of an element to perform a function as required 
Fault  Abnormal condition that can cause an element to fail 
Functional safety Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning 
behaviour of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) 
safety-related systems 
Harm Physical injury or damage to the health of persons 
Hazard  Potential source of harm caused by malfunctioning behaviour of an el-
ement (combination of failure and its consequence) 
Hazardous event Combination of a hazard and a critical operational situation 
Risk  Combination of the probability of a harm’s occurrence and its severity  
Safety function  A function, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the 
EUC, in respect of a specific hazardous event (cf. safety goal) 
                                                 
87 Cf. ISO TC 22/SC 32 Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects: ISO 26262 
(2011). 
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Safety integrity The probability of a system satisfactorily performing the required safety 
functions 
Safety goal A top-level safety requirement resulting from the HARA (cf. safety 
function) 
Severity Estimate of the extent of harm to one or more individuals that can occur 
in a potentially hazardous situation 
Situation A scenario that can occur during an EUC’s lifecycle 
2.3.2 IEC 61508 
The international standard IEC 6150888a, titled Functional safety of E/E/PE safety-related 
systems, has first been published in 1998. The standard enables engineers to investigate 
E/E/PE systems that perform safety functions and to evaluate the safety of such systems. 
It is suitable for all kinds of industry or products, so the standard may also be applied to 
hydraulic or pneumatic systems containing E/E/PE systems. Still, mechanical failure it-
self is not of interest in any functional safety standard because it is assumed that mechan-
ical strength is assured by state-of-the-art design methods. The framework of the 
IEC 61508 adopts an overall safety lifecycle comprised of 16 phases (Figure 2-15): 
 
Figure 2-15: Overall safety lifecycle88b 
                                                 
88 IEC TC 65/SC 65A - System aspects: IEC 61508 (2011). a: - ; b: p. 19. 
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The goal of the concept phase (Figure 2-15) is to acquire familiarity with the EUC by 
determining likely sources of hazards and obtaining information about those hazards. The 
overall scope definition determines the boundaries of the EUC and thereby sets the scope 
for the HARA. The objective of the HARA “is to determine the hazards and hazardous 
events of the EUC and the EUC control system (in all modes of operation), for all rea-
sonably foreseeable circumstances including fault conditions and misuse”89a. Further-
more, the event sequence leading to as well as the risks associated with the hazardous 
events are determined. Five informative risk assessment approaches are given: The 
ALARP-method, a general method, the risk graph method, a layer of protection analysis, 
and a hazardous event severity matrix, whereas the risk graph is the most commonly used, 
where the risk is qualitatively evaluated (Figure 2-16 with the risk parameters described 
in Table 2.4) and assigned to a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) (Table 2.5). 
Table 2.4: Classification of risk parameters89b 
Risk parameter Classification 
Consequence (C) C1 Minor Injury 
C2 Serious permanent injury to one or more persons, death to one 
person 
C3 Death to several people 
C4 Very many people killed 
Frequency of, and ex-
posure time in the haz-
ardous zone (F) 
F1 Rare to more often exposure in the hazardous zone 
F2 Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone 
Possibility of avoiding 
the hazardous event 
(P) 
P1 Possible under certain conditions 
P2 Almost impossible 
Probability of the un-
wanted occurrence 
(W) 
W1 A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will 
come to pass and only a few unwanted occurrences are likely 
W2 A slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will come 
to pass, and few unwanted occurrences are likely 
W3 A relatively high probability that the unwanted occurrences 
will come to pass, and frequent unwanted occurrences are 
likely 
                                                 
89 IEC TC 65/SC 65A - System aspects: IEC 61508 (2011). a: p. 27; b: - . 
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Figure 2-16: Risk graph general scheme90 
Table 2.5: SIL: target failure measures for a safety function, allocated to an E/E/PE safety-related 
system90 
 Probability of failure per hour 
SIL Low demand mode of operation  
(≤1 demand per year) 
High demand mode or continuous mode of 
operation (> 1 demand per year) 
4 ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4 ≥ 10−9 to < 10−8 
3 ≥ 10−4 to < 10−3 ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7 
2 ≥ 10−3 to < 10−2 ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6 
1 ≥ 10−2 to < 10−1 ≥ 10−6 to < 10−5 
The fourth phase “overall safety requirements” (Figure 2-15) develops the specification 
for the overall safety requirement, i.e. the safety requirements list, in which the safety 
functions for each hazardous event are described. The fifth phase allocates safety func-
tions contained in the specification to designated E/E/PE or other technology safety-re-
lated systems and external risk reduction facilities while also allocating a SIL to each 
safety function. Phases six to eight deal with the planning of the operation, maintenance, 
safety validation, installation and commissioning of the E/E/PE safety-related system so 
that functional safety is maintained. The realisation phases (nine to eleven) create E/E/PE, 
other technology safety-related systems, and/or external risk reduction facilities conform-
ing to the specification. The overall installation and commissioning phase is followed by 
the overall safety validation and the overall operation, maintenance, and repair phase. If 
the system is modified, phase 15 is triggered and the process must be restarted at the 
                                                 
90 IEC TC 65/SC 65A - System aspects: IEC 61508 (2011). 
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appropriate overall safety lifecycle phase. The last phase deals with the decommissioning 
or disposal of the system. 
2.3.3 ISO 26262 
The international norm ISO 2626291a, titled Road vehicles – Functional safety, is adapted 
from the IEC 61508 for the application to E/E/PE systems in the automotive industry 
where the ISO norm is widely used. The relationship to the IEC 61508 is noticeable 
throughout the standard, although some significant changes must be mentioned. For ex-
ample, the risk graph is normative and therefore the only approach for risk evaluation in 
the ISO 26262. In addition, the risk parameters and their classifications are supplemented 
and amended. Finally, the Automotive Safety Integrity Level is introduced.  
Still, the norm focuses on E/E/PE systems “that are installed in series production passen-
ger cars [..] [and] does not address unique E/E systems in special purpose vehicles”91b. 
2.3.4 EN ISO 13849 
EN ISO 1384992 is a safety standard, titled Safety of machinery -- Safety-related parts of 
control systems (SRP/CS), and emerged from the DIN EN 954, which was first published 
in 1997. As the title already implies, the application of the standard is merely limited to 
control structures but may be applied to all technologies (not only E/E/PE). Still, the orig-
inal purpose of the standard is intended for machinery. The EN ISO 13849 describes only 
one process for risk estimation, the risk graph, whereas the approach is informative. The 
overall method of risk reduction and the special method of risk graphs are well described 
within the standard. Figure 2-17 shows the risk reduction process that is preceded by the 
risk assessment, which can be divided into the risk analysis (determination of the limits 
of machinery, hazard identification, and risk estimation) and risk evaluation. 
                                                 
91 ISO TC 22/SC 32 Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects: ISO 26262 (2011). 
a: - ; b: pt. 3, p. 1. 
92 ISO/TC 199 - Safety of machinery: EN ISO 13849 (2015). 
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Figure 2-17: Risk reduction process per EN ISO 1384993 
2.3.5 IEC/EN 62061 
The IEC/EN 6206194, titled Safety of machinery: Functional safety of electrical, elec-
tronic and programmable electronic control systems, is intended to help designing func-
tional safety for any E/E/PE system. Risk assessment is not in the focus of the standard, 
which describes only one informative, qualitative method for risk evaluation (very similar 
to the risk graph method) resulting in a SIL according to IEC 61508, whereas the risk 
parameters are identical although with finer gradation. 
2.3.6 IEC 61025 
The IEC 6102595, titled Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), describes a method to determine low-
level events (e.g. failures) that lead to an undesired top-level event, ranking it as a deduc-
tive failure analysis. Boolean logic is used to link the events. The method is especially 
useful when analysing complex systems. Because the undesired top-level event must be 
                                                 
93 Cf. ISO/TC 199 - Safety of machinery: EN ISO 13849 (2015). 
94 IEC TC 44 - Safety of machinery - electrotechnical aspects: IEC 62061 (2005). 
95 IEC TC 56 - Dependability: IEC 61025 (2006). 
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known prior to the analysis, the method is suitable to aid within any of the aforementioned 
functional safety assessment methods but cannot replace them. 
2.3.7 IEC 60812 
The IEC 6081296, titled Analysis techniques for system reliability – Procedure for Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), describes a failure analysis method based on a thor-
ough review of components, subsystems, and processes, ranking it – in contrary to an 
FTA – as an inductive failure analysis. The method aims at identifying basic failures and 
evaluating their causes and effects on the system. The Failure Mode(s), Effects, and Crit-
icality Analysis (FMECA) also evaluates the criticality of the failure and the subsequent 
events. Since the method has been developed in the 1950s’, most of today’s HARA meth-
ods are based on an FME(C)A. 
2.4 Accumulator Technology 
Due to current trends in the automotive industry, the development speed of battery cells 
has rapidly increased over the past years. Figure 2-18 shows the power and energy density 
of commonly used energy storage systems in a Ragone plot.  
 
Figure 2-18: Ragone plot of commonly used energy storages97 
                                                 
96 IEC TC 56 - Dependability: IEC 60812 (2006). 
97 Beidl, C.: Lecture Notes Combustion Engines II (2017). ch. 16, p. 13. 
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For mobile applications, like in a wheeled motion base DS, low mass is crucial. From 
Figure 2-18 can be seen that hydraulic energy storage systems as well as Super-Caps are 
in deficit when it comes to energy density. The remaining four energy storage types are 
similar in power density, whereas lithium-ion cells are superior when it comes to energy 
density. Current trends that are not mass-produced, yet, are lithium polymer, lithium iron 
phosphate, lithium titanite, lithium manganese, and nanostructure-based lithium cells98a. 
Advantageous are a higher energy and power density than with lithium-ion cells. The 
disadvantageous thermal and electrical sensitivity98b can be handled in a controlled envi-
ronment of a DS, in which professionals are maintaining the DS instead of average car-
owners. Finally, the cost for battery cells are expected to drop rapidly over the next dec-
ades, which makes the use of on-board accumulators even more feasible, cf. Figure 2-19. 
 
Figure 2-19: Cost forecast for battery cells per Roland Berger GmbH99 
Another factor that must be considered is the desired duration of test drives and, there-
with, the amount of energy that must be stored on the WMDS. “Typically researchers use 
the guidelines where drives should last between 5 and 25 minutes with 10 minute 
breaks”100. In any case, the total simulation exposure should not exceed 2 h to minimise 
the risk of simulator sickness101. Thus, the energy supplied by the main accumulator is 
desired to be sufficient for a maximum experiment duration of 2 h, until the accumulator 
must be recharged or substituted by a fully charged accumulator. 
                                                 
98 Pfaffenbichler, P. C. et al.: Electric Mobility in Austria (2009). a: pp. 19f.; b: p. 19. 
99 van der Slot, A. et al.: Integrated Fuels and Vehicles Roadmap to 2030+ (2016). p. 37. 
100 Fisher, D. L.: Handbook of DS (2011). p. 14-17. 
101 Johnson, D. M.: Review of Simulator Sickness Research (2005). 
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2.5 Latency and Human Motion Perception 
To reach a high immersion of the subject, all sensory organs must receive the same stim-
ulus as they would in a real vehicle. Nevertheless, the goal of the ongoing research at 
FZD is to provide a novel simulator platform that can overcome limitations in motion 
rendering that are inherent to state-of-the-art DS, wherein this thesis is focused on the 
investigation of the motion performance and on the safety architecture. From this can be 
concluded that for understanding this thesis only motion perception is of relevance. As 
motion is only directly perceived by the vestibular organ, its function will be described 
followed by a summary of published perception thresholds and an evaluation of the role 
of latency in passenger cars. 
2.5.1 Vestibular Organ 
The vestibular organ is situated in the inner ear. It is composed of two larger swellings 
termed utricle and saccule as well as three semi-circular canals, each located in another 
orthogonal plane, whereas utricle and saccule sense translational and the semi-circular 
canals rotational accelerations, Figure 2-20. 
 
Figure 2-20: The vestibulum102 
                                                 
102 Kroemer, K. H. et al.: Engineering Physiology (2010). p. 79. 
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Utricle and saccule are perpendicular and contain a region called macula. The macula is 
composed of a gelatinous layer, in which sensory hair cells are embedded, topped by a 
layer of calcium containing deposits called statoconia or otoliths. The macula of utricle 
is oriented horizontally, the macula of saccule vertically. The inertia of the statoconia 
causes the sensory hair cells to bend when the head is accelerated, thus sensing accelera-
tion103. 
Rotational motion is sensed by the cristae ampullares that are located in each semi-cir-
cular canal, perpendicular to the canals’ walls. The cristae ampullares are composed – 
similarly to the maculae – of a gelatinous mass, the cupula, in which sensory hair cells 
are embedded. When the head is rotating, the endolymph fluid in the semi-circular canals 
is flowing, causing the cristae ampullares and the embedded sensory hair cells to bend, 
thus, sensing rotational velocity103. 
2.5.2 Human Motion Perception Thresholds 
The definition of static perception thresholds is a strenuous task, as already demonstrated 
by Fischer104 and Betz105. This is due to manifold influencing factors104, such as: 
• Duration of exposure 
• Subject’s expectations 
• Subject’s physical condition 
• Individual sensitivity 
• Distraction 
• Information from other sensory organs 
For the sake of consistency and comparability, the same perception thresholds are used 
within this thesis as they were used by Betz105, namely: 
• Maximum tilt angle:   24° ≜ 0.4 𝑔  
• Rotational velocity threshold: 6 °/s 
• Rotational acceleration threshold: 6 °/s2 
• Translational acceleration threshold: 0.2 m/s² 
                                                 
103 Csillag, A.: Atlas of the Sensory Organs (2005). pp. 10f. 
104 Fischer, M.: Diss., MCA für eine realitätsnahe Bewegungssimulation (2009). p. 14. 
105 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). pp. 14ff. 
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2.5.3 Latency 
Two thresholds are defined for latency in the motion system: An upper limit and a lower 
limit. Obviously, the upper limit is defined by the motion latency that can be felt in a real 
car, which is found to be 135 ms for longitudinal and 100 ms for lateral motion; a DS 
must stay below those values (section 2.5.3.2). However, there is also a lower limit be-
cause motion cues must not be provided prior to the corresponding visual cue, being 
60 ms (section 2.5.3.1). While the upper limit is crucial to fulfil, the lower limit could 
also be reached by adding artificial latency in the control structure. 
2.5.3.1 Visual Cues 
Two types of visual representation systems are considered: Conventional display/video 
projector technology and head-mounted displays. For conventional display/video tech-
nology, latency refers to the time span from the user input via HMI to displaying visual 
changes resulting from the input. For HMDs, latency also refers to the time span from the 
user’s head movement to displaying visual changes resulting from the head movement.  
Literature reports that the detection of the driver’s head movement may be reduced to less 
than 10 ms if optical sensors are combined with a gyro. Still, the traffic simulation needs 
about 50 ms for presenting the head movement in the virtual reality106. Another study 
showed that latencies above 267 ms are perceptible to most participants107. Thus, the la-
tency in the motion system is desired to be within the range of 60 ms to 267 ms (lower 
motion latency bears no advantage since the calculation of the visual stimulus takes at 
least 60 ms and the motion cue must not be represented prior to the visual cue). 
2.5.3.2 Acceleration Cues 
The control inputs are given by the driver – in the real vehicle as well as in the DS. Thus, 
latency in the motion system is defined as the time span from the driver’s acceleration 
demand (by brake pedal, acceleration pedal, steering wheel, etc.) to the actual presenta-
tion of the demanded acceleration. A DS’ delay in acceleration representation is regarded 
to be sufficiently low if the values are below those of a real car and will be referred to as 
Acceleration Cue Latency (ACL). In any case (lateral or longitudinal motion), the time 
needed for calculating the control inputs in the MCA and MC must be accounted for. 
Also, if a physics-based vehicle model is used, inherent latencies, e.g. when using an 
elaborate tire model that takes relaxation lengths etc. into account, must not add to ACL. 
Thus, a latency model might be needed in the MC, resembling a feed forward control. 
Whereas the latter issue addresses the control and is therefore not dealt with in this thesis, 
                                                 
106 Berg, G.; Färber, B.: Vehicle in the Loop (2015). pp. 160f. 
107 Wildzunas, R. M. et al.: Visual Display Delay Effects on Pilot Performance (1996). per St. Pierre, M. E. 
et al.: The Effects of Latency on Simulator Sickness in a HMD (2015). p. 1. 
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the latency added by calculating the control inputs must be included in the conducted 
investigation 
2.5.3.2.1 Longitudinal Acceleration Cues 
For longitudinal vehicle motion, deceleration and acceleration must be distinguished. La-
tency in deceleration is characterised by the sum of the brakes’ response and build-up 
time (Figure 2-21), which depend on the brakes’ actuation and force transmission system. 
The response time is the time span from brake pedal actuation to the first incline in vehicle 
deceleration. The build-up time is the time span from the first incline to full vehicle de-
celeration. Passenger cars usually need 200 ms for building up 50 % full vehicle deceler-
ation (𝑡response + 0.5 ∙ 𝑡build−up)
108, which defines the upper limit for longitudinal accel-
eration cue latency. This time span will be referred to as 𝑡50 % and the 50 % target 
acceleration criterion as the Indicator for 50 % ACL (IACL50 %, Figure 2-21). 
 
Figure 2-21: Deceleration during braking, cf. Breuer and Bill108 
For acceleration, the case is more unclear since no standard values can be found in liter-
ature and a difference is expected for vehicles propelled by electric motors or internal 
combustion engines. Sato et al.109 and Kawamura et al.110 researched a highly responsive 
acceleration control for electric vehicles based on a unique shaking vibration control sys-
tem. To prove the effectiveness of their control approach, they measured the acceleration 
response of an electric vehicle (Nissan LEAF) and a gasoline-propelled equivalent vehi-
cle when fully accelerated from standstill, from constant driving at 20 km/h, and from 
                                                 
108 Breuer, B.; Bill, K. H.: Bremsenhandbuch (2012). p. 17. 
109 Sato, Y. et al.: High Response Motor Nissan LEAF (2011). 
110 Kawamura, H. et al.: Highly-Responsive Acceleration Control for Nissan LEAF (2011). 
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coasting at 20 km/h. Hajek provides the same measurements for a full acceleration ma-
noeuvre from constant driving at 20 km/h for a Tesla Model S111a, a BMW ActiveE111b, a 
BMW E92111a, and a BMW E82111b. Applying the same criterion as for braking 
(IACL50 %, time when 50 % of target acceleration is reached minus manoeuvre initiation 
time) yields the values in Table 2.6: 
Table 2.6: Latencies for electric and internal combustion engine vehicles when accelerating, cf. 
Hajek111a,111b, Sato et al.112, and Kawamura et al.113 
Initial driving 
condition 
Electric vehicle Internal combustion engine vehicle 
𝒕𝟓𝟎 % Vehicle 𝒕𝟓𝟎 % Vehicle 
Standstill 100 ms Nissan LEAF 400 ms Gasoline-propelled equivalent 
𝑣 = const.
= 20 km/h 
145 ms Nissan LEAF 590 ms Gasoline-propelled equivalent 
250 ms Tesla Model S 500 ms BMW E92 
280 ms BMW ActiveE 360 ms BMW E82 
Coasting 20 km/h 135 ms Nissan LEAF 525 ms Gasoline-propelled equivalent 
Unfortunately, the measurement run conducted by Sato et al. from standstill shows low 
longitudinal accelerations approximately 200 ms prior to manoeuvre initiation, impeding 
confidence in the results. Even more, latency from standstill is expected to be above la-
tency from constant driving or coasting. Because the values found for acceleration with 
electric vehicles are below that of braking, 135 ms will be used as upper limit for ACL, 
when the IACL50 % is used for evaluation. 
2.5.3.2.2 Lateral Acceleration Cues 
For lateral vehicle motion, the time span from steering wheel input to the first yaw rate 
and/or lateral acceleration is used to evaluate the lateral response behaviour in passenger 
cars. Literature reports values between 82 ms and 138 ms for sports cars and 100 ms to 
190 ms for regular passenger cars calculated from the frequency, at which the phase re-
sponse between yaw rate and steering wheel angle is a phase angle of 45° in a frequency 
response test114. Thus, 100 ms is used as upper limit for lateral ACL because the primary 
purpose of a DS is not to simulate sports cars (normal driver behaviour, hypothesis H1.1, 
section 1.2.3.1). This time span will be referred to as 𝑡 ain and the criterion of an increase 
in the yaw rate and/or lateral acceleration as the Indicator for gaining ACL (IACLgain).
                                                 
111 Hajek, H.: Diss., Längsdynamik von elektrifizierten Straßenfahrzeugen (2017). a: p. 70.; b: p. 73. 
112 Sato, Y. et al.: High Response Motor Nissan LEAF (2011). p. 8. 
113 Kawamura, H. et al.: Highly-Responsive Acceleration Control for Nissan LEAF (2011). p. 5. 
114 Pfeffer, P.; Harrer, M.: Lenkungshandbuch (2011). p. 140. 
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3 Wheeled Mobile Driving Simulator Proto-
type MORPHEUS 
The basic concept behind a wheeled motion base DS has been explained in section 2.2.6. 
At FZD, a scaled prototype of a wheeled mobile driving simulator (WMDS) has been 
designed and manufactured for investigating the feasibility of the concept. The prototype 
is called MORPHEUS, which is the acronym for Mobile OmnidiRectional Platform for 
Highly dynamic and tirEboUnd driving Simulation. This chapter describes MORPHEUS 
and its architecture so that the reader is enabled to follow the outline of the falsification 
experiments for the wheeled motion base and the design of the safety architecture. 
3.1 FZD’s WMDS Concept 
The concept idea has been developed by Betz et al.115. The core element of FZD’s WMDS 
concept is an omnidirectional platform standing on three self-propelled and actively and 
infinitely steerable wheel units. Thus, the linkage between motion range and system mass 
is dissolved and, additionally, an infinite yaw DOF is created, improving urban driving 
simulation capabilities. The tilt system (for TC) in this concept can be reduced to 
three DOF, namely pitch, roll, and heave. A tripod is sufficient for providing these DOF.  
3.2 MORPHEUS’ Design 
However, in the concept design for MORPHEUS decisions were made regarding require-
ments like sufficient system dynamics for urban driving simulation and safety, but also 
costs, ease of manufacturing, and/or availability of purchased parts. Thus, a hexapod was 
chosen over a tripod, because the range of available hexapods is larger than that of tripods 
and the additional DOF can be advantageous. E.g. missing or false cues from vertical 
excitation due to uneven road surface or from misaligned wheels can be masked116. A 
detailed description of MORPHEUS’ development can be found in Wagner et al.117. 
                                                 
115 Betz, A. et al.: Concept Analysis of a WMDS (2012). 
116 Wagner, P. et al.: Potentials and Limitations of Hexapods in WMDS (2015). 
117 Wagner, P. et al.: Conception and Design of Mobile Driving Simulators (2014). 
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3.2.1 Wheel Units 
For the platform design, the decision was made for three wheel units. On the one hand, 
costs are decreased because only three wheel units must be purchased and manufactured 
and on the other hand the calculation of wheel loads is unambiguous. Less wheel units 
would require active stabilisation of the system, whereas more wheel units would de-
crease the footprint of the platform. The resulting wheel unit design is shown in Figure 
3-1, whereas the steering unit’s Electric Motor (EM) and Gearbox (GB) are concentrically 
with the steering axis and the drive unit’s EM and GB are axially aligned with the wheel’s 
axis of rotation. This keeps the construction simple and reduces the moment of inertia 
around the steering EM’s axis of rotation to a minimum. 
 
Figure 3-1: MORPHEUS' wheel unit design 
Press-on band tires with their inherent high vertical stiffness are used instead of pneumatic 
tires with the aim of reducing unwanted pitch and roll movement. The wheel suspension 
is designed without spring and damper and no toe, camber, or caster is used to keep the 
design simple and cost efficient. Because of the omnidirectional approach – which implies 
an infinite steering angle – toe, camber, and caster are unwanted because they would cause 
anisotropy to the tire force transmission. Future designs may be equipped with sophisti-
cated suspension designs to account for vertical excitations from uneven road surfaces.  
3.2.2 Individual Components 
Made-to-measure slip rings from RieTech are used for continuous power and information 
signal transfer to the electric drive motor and gearbox. INA XU 120179 cross roller bear-
ings enable the steering DOF of the wheels. All-steel couplings of the type KTR Radex-
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N 60 NNZ are installed at the gearbox torque output to account for production tolerances 
and negligent assembly. Furthermore, the load paths are unambiguous when couplings 
are introduced. The hexapod is purchased from Mevea and is of the type 6DOF 1200E 
with “no backlash” actuators. The mock-up is purchased from Fanatec and includes a 
frame on which a racing seat with a four-point safety belt is mounted. A BOSE sound 
system and three ASUS VE276N DVI monitors represent acoustical and visual cues. 
Driver inputs are measured by a ClubSport steering wheel with shift paddles and force 
feedback, and ClubSport CSP V2 pedals (clutch pedal with potentiometer, brake pedal 
with ABS actuator and load cell (adjustable in resistance), accelerator pedal with poten-
tiometer (adjustable in resistance)). Table 3.1 gives an overview of MORPHEUS’ drive 
train components from energy storage to force transmission to the driving surface: 
Table 3.1: MORPHEUS‘ drive train components 
Component  Value Unit 
Accumulator 
(reproduction of TU Darmstadt 
Racing Team e.V. (DART) lith-
ium polymer accumulator) 
Number of cells  144 ./. 
Nominal output voltage  532.8 V (DC) 
Nominal output current 140 A 
Maximum output voltage 600 V (DC) 
Maximum output current (20 s) 200 A 
Capacity  10 Ah 
Electric motor controller  
(UniTek BAMOCAR D-3-700-
250) 
Rated supply voltage 700 V (DC) 
Rated output voltage 400 V (AC) 
Continuous current 125 A 
Peak current 250 A 
Electric motor 
(Enstroj EMRAX 228 high volt-
age air-cooled with LTN RE-
15-1-A15 resolvers) 
Peak power  100 kW 
Continuous power 55 kW 
Peak torque  240 Nm 
Continuous torque 125 Nm 
Gearbox  
(Neugart PLFN-140-5 with min-
imum backlash option) 
Transmission ratio  5 ./. 
Max. torque all-time  1,200 Nm 
Max. torque short-time  1,500 Nm 
Tire 
(Gumasol Softy 300/75-15 with 
made-to-measure rims by Pneu-
hage) 
Radius 0.15 m 
Width 0.075 m 
Vertical stiffness 1,036 N/mm 
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3.2.3 Hardware System Architecture 
Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 show the power transfer respectively data transmission archi-
tecture for the MORPHEUS prototype.  
 
Figure 3-2: MORPHEUS' power transfer architecture118 
 
Figure 3-3: MORPHEUS' data transmission architecture118 
                                                 
118 cf. Wagner, P.: Master's thesis, Aufbau und Inbetriebnahme eines WMDS (2013). 
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3.2.4 Summary 
Figure 3-4 shows a photograph of the MORPHEUS prototype with installed provisional 
safety system, and hexapod, but without mock-up, as of April 2015. 
 
Figure 3-4: MORPHEUS prototype119 
The maximum height of the platform triangle (including all attachment parts) is just be-
low 2.4 m, which makes the prototype transportable via truck. The height of the Center 
Of Gravity (COG) is 0.481 m and the total mass of MORPHEUS is 1,302 kg, whereas 
the mass distribution is given in the next section in Table 3.3. This setup assures overturn-
ing stability for horizontal accelerations of about 13.5 m/s², whereas the tire-road friction 
coefficient is limited to values of about 0.8120,121 (see annexe A). The verification ma-
noeuvres (section 6) are driven without hexapod power electronics, mock-up, and subject, 
resulting in a reduced system mass of 1,056 kg. Driving performance figures are given in 
Table 3.3, too. 
3.3 Motion Cueing Algorithm 
3.3.1 Structure 
„The applied MCA is similar to the classical washout. The so-called ‘ideal’ MCA122 
(Figure 3-5) calculates the target DS states that are necessary to perform the target motion 
                                                 
119 Wagner, P. et al.: Potentials and Limitations of Hexapods in WMDS (2015). p. 132. 
120 Betz, A. et al.: Konzeptanalyse und Erprobung eines WMDS (2014). 
121 Zöller, C. et al.: Tire Concept Investigation for WMDS (2016). 
122 Betz, A. et al.: Motion Analysis of a WMDS (2012). 
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cue input. The goal is a frequency-independent acceleration simulation […]. By closing 
the frequency gap of the MCA, the created driving experience is no longer subject to the 
occurring frequencies. In general, this ‘ideal’ MCA provides a more realistic acceleration 
simulation at the cost of increased workspace demand. The characteristic of the new MCA 
suits the system-immanent motion capability of the WMDS“123a. 
 
Figure 3-5: "ideal" MCA123b 
3.3.2 Parameterisation 
The MCA’s feedback gains are tuned for urban driving scenarios (see section 5.1.2). For 
details, see Betz123c. 
• 𝜏𝑣 = 4.49 s 
• 𝜏𝑑 = 19.77 s 
The Low-Pass (LP) filter LPa of the form (3-1) is tuned depending on the chosen scaling 
factor and urban driving scenarios, whereas 𝑛 = 120 refers to 120 threshold violations 
per hour simulation, see Table 3.2. 
𝐺𝐿𝑃(𝑠) =
1
1 + 2𝑑𝛵𝑠 + 𝛵2𝑠2
 (3-1) 
                                                 
123 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). a: pp. 51f.; b: p. 51; c: pp. 52-58. 
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Table 3.2: Parameterisation of low-pass filter in dependence on urban driving scenarios and 
scaling factor124a 
Urban test drive # Scaling 𝒅𝒏=𝟏𝟐𝟎 𝜯𝒏=𝟏𝟐𝟎 𝐢𝐧
𝟏
𝒔
 
1 
1.0 1.49 1.60 
0.7 1.16 1.33 
0.5 0.93 1.14 
2 
1.0 1.49 1.60 
0.7 1.18 1.34 
0.5 0.94 1.15 
3 
1.0 1.38 1.49 
0.7 1.10 1.26 
0.5 0.88 1.09 
4 
1.0 1.34 1.44 
0.7 1.07 1.22 
0.5 0.86 1.05 
3.4 Motion Control 
The MC translates the motion signals generated by the MCA into control inputs for the 
actuators, namely drive torque 𝑀 ,dri e,𝑖 and steering angle 𝛿 ,dyn,𝑖. Because the MC is 
not to be investigated within this work, only a short summary of the constraints and pro-
cess is given. For a detailed description, see Betz124b and Betz et al.125,126. 
Constraints: 
• Equal exploitation of the wheels’ friction capability 
• Linear tire characteristics 
Process: 
(0. Transformation of acceleration and yaw demand of the virtual car (as demanded 
by test person) to acceleration, yaw, and tilt demand of WMDS in the MCA.) 
                                                 
124 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). a: p. 58; b: pp. 58-70. 
125 Betz, A. et al.: Concept Analysis of a WMDS (2012). 
126 Betz, A. et al.: Driving Dynamics Control of a WMDS (2013). 
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1. Transformation of acceleration and yaw demand from MCA into a horizontal 
force acting on and a yaw torque acting about the WMDS’ COG. 
2. Transformation of the yaw torque to horizontal tire forces under the constraint of 
equal exploitation of the tires’ friction capability (under consideration of dynamic 
wheel loads) and calculation of the overall required tire force. 
3. Calculation of kinematic steering angles (neglecting dynamic effects, e.g. slip) 
from the WMDS’ yaw rate and velocity vector. 
4. Estimation of longitudinal tire force demand and slip angles based on the overall 
required tire force and the kinematic steering angles through a numerical optimi-
sation (linear lateral tire model). 
5. Calculation of drive motor torques from longitudinal tire force demand and the 
dynamic tire radius. 
6. Calculation of steering motor angles from kinematic steering angle and slip angle. 
3.5 Control Architecture 
A closed-loop acceleration controller has been developed by Betz et al.127 but could not 
guarantee stability in the MORPHEUS prototype. Since no closed-loop control is needed 
for the scope of this thesis, an open-loop acceleration control is used instead. The motor 
controllers are tuned according to the values provided by the electric motors’ manufac-
turer, controlling the electric motors’ speed. 
3.6 Scaling to Full-Size WMDS 
As mentioned earlier, the MORPHEUS prototype is scaled down in size and power from 
the full-scale WMDS concept with the intention of keeping costs low while still being 
able to investigate feasibility. Besides the scaled size, the major difference is the lack of 
a proper cabin on MORPHEUS. Because a head-mounted display is ought to be used, no 
vehicle cab is used on MORPHEUS and the HMI can be reduced to a minimum. However, 
for the full-scale WMDS, a closed dome and a simplified vehicle mock-up will be used 
to enable the usage of virtual reality methods. In an initial investigation, no pneumatic 
tires could be found that can fulfil the requirements to wheel load, maximum velocity, 
and desired tire radius. Thus, a twin wheel solution is evaluated. The geometry, electric 
motors, and accumulator are re-evaluated and amended to fulfil the requirements for over-
                                                 
127 Betz, A. et al.: Driving Dynamics Control of a WMDS (2013). 
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turning stability, experiment duration, acceleration, and velocity. Table 3.3 shows the pa-
rameters that resulted for this full-scale WMDS concept compared to those of 
MORPHEUS: 
Table 3.3: Properties of scaled MORPHEUS prototype compared to the full-scale WMDS con-
cept 
Property 
MORPHEUS prototype 
with reduced visual repre-
sentation system for valida-
tion reasons 
(motion base research)128,129 
Full DS with enhanced vis-
ual representation system 
for DS studies 
(DS application: studies 
with subjects)130 
Overall mass  1,302 kg 2,604 kg 
     Cabin131  173 kg 393 kg 
     Hexapod 145 kg 350 kg 
     Frame 
576 kg 
347 kg 
     Wheel units (incl. suspension) 600 kg 
     Power supply & electronics 208 kg 674 kg 
     Emergency braking system 200 kg 240 kg 
Height of COG  0.48 m 0.796 m 
𝑙𝑡  2.3 m 4.8 m 
Overall height 1.95 m 3.42 m 
Wheel radius  0.15 m 0.281 m 
Maximum accumulator power 104.5 kW 300 kW 
Accumulator capacity 5.3 kWh 40 kWh 
Traction motor power  300 kW (Peak-Sum) 690 kW (Peak-sum) 
Steering motor power 300 kW (Peak-Sum) 690 kW (Peak-sum) 
90° steer step delay  < 0.1 s < 0.1 s 
Max. acceleration  ~8 m/s² ~8 m/s² 
Max. velocity  ~12 m/s ~20 m/s 
                                                 
128 Cf. Wagner, P.: Master's thesis, Aufbau und Inbetriebnahme eines WMDS (2013). 
129 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 79. 
130 Cf. Hein, E. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Entwicklung des unskalierten WMDS (2017). 
131 Including test person, mock-up, air conditioning (only for full-scale WMDS), visual and acoustical rep-
resentation system 
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4 Methodology 
This chapter describes the experimental setup and evaluation criteria for the falsification 
experiments of the wheeled motion base (sections 4.2 and 4.3, adopted from Wagner et 
al.132). Section 4.4 describes the risk assessment process as it is applied in chapter 7. 
4.1 Power Demand 
The drive power must be sufficient to provide the maximum acceleration and maximum 
velocity required to represent urban driving scenarios with common scaling factors. Betz 
identified the maximum acceleration and velocity required for representing urban driving 
scenarios with different scaling factors in simulation133a. Only the MCA and MC (cf. sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4) were used for determining the velocity and acceleration demand, there-
fore, the results are not influenced by the fact that Betz conducted the simulations for the 
unscaled WMDS. The results of all four urban driving scenarios are merged and can be 
interpolated with a linear regression when acceleration or velocity are plotted in a log-log 
diagram against the scaling factor, Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 (resulting in a power func-
tion of the scaling factor with an exponent of the slope value): 
 
Figure 4-1: Power function regressions for acceleration and scaling factor in urban driving sce-
narios133b 
                                                 
132 Wagner, P. et al.: Power, Energy, and Latency Test Drives with MORPHEUS (2017). 
133 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). a: pp. 105-115, b: p. 109. 
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Figure 4-2: Power function regressions for velocity and scaling factor in urban driving scenar-
ios134 
For unscaled urban driving scenarios, a maximum velocity of 24.7 m/s and a maximum 
acceleration of 7.1 m/s², for a scaling factor of 0.7 a velocity of 12 m/s and an acceleration 
of 4.9 m/s², and for 50 % scaling 6.8 m/s and 3.1 m/s² are sufficient. This shows that the 
velocity demand of unscaled urban driving scenarios cannot be fulfilled by MORPHEUS, 
because its maximum velocity is limited to about 12 m/s (Table 3.3). Furthermore, the 
HV accumulator’s output power limits the overall propulsion power (3 x 100 kW electric 
motor power), as can be seen when calculated: The minimum operating voltage is used 
because measurements show that the accumulator’s output voltage drops to this value 
when the maximum current is drawn from the accumulator. Interestingly, the experiments 
revealed that the maximum current drawn from the accumulator peaked at 242 A and 
coincided with the voltage drop. The accumulator’s maximum power is then calculated 
to: 
𝑃a  umulator = 𝑈min ∙ 𝐼max = 432 V ∙ 242  = 104.5 kW (4-1) 
Therefore, a Matlab Simulink based power/energy model is integrated into the virtual 
prototype and improvements are made to the IPG CarMaker model (section 5.2.4) for 
identifying the power demand (section 6.2). The model takes several effects into account 
that can be grouped into four categories: 
1. Electric power demand of electric motors and motor controllers 
2. Driving speed dependent power demand from driving resistances  
3. Mechanical power demand from steering and self-aligning torque 
                                                 
134 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 109. 
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4. Mechanical power demand at wheel hubs, accounting for slip losses and transla-
tional as well as rotational acceleration resistance  
These effects are parameterised by conducting synthetic manoeuvres (namely coasting 
experiments, holding torque experiments, and straight-line acceleration experiments, sec-
tion 6.1.1) with MORPHEUS and measuring the platform’s energy demand. Simple 
straight-line driving manoeuvres (section 5.1.1.1) with constant acceleration are con-
ducted to verify the power model (section 6.1.2.1).  
The aspect power demand falsifies hypothesis H1.1 if FZD’s WMDS concept cannot rep-
resent the required maximum acceleration and velocity amplitudes with state-of-the-art 
technology. 
4.2 Energy Demand 
Energy is converted by the platform, the hexapod, and auxiliaries. Because the available 
driving area is not sufficient to drive unscaled urban driving scenarios (section 5.1.2) with 
MORPHEUS – which constitute the most realistic application with maximum energy de-
mand – the virtual prototype is used to determine the platform’s energy demand by inte-
grating the power model over time. The resulting energy model is validated by conducting 
scaled synthetic and representative manoeuvres (namely a 90° turn, a figure eight, and an 
urban driving scenario, sections 5.1.1.4, 5.1.1.5, and 5.1.2) with MORPHEUS and com-
paring the measured energy demand to the simulated energy demand (section 6.1.2.2). 
Finally, the maximum energy demand of MORPHEUS is determined by simulating un-
scaled, representative urban driving scenarios with the validated energy model (sec-
tion 6.3.1). The overall energy demand is then calculated by adding the estimated demand 
of the hexapod and the measured energy demand of Low Voltage (LV) auxiliaries (e.g. 
safety system, power electronics, measurement technology) (section 6.3.2). 
The aspect energy demand falsifies hypothesis H1.1 if the results from the verified energy 
model prove that unscaled urban driving simulation cannot be represented with state-of-
the-art accumulator technology for at least 2 h, considering state-of-the-art technology. 
4.3 Acceleration Cue Latency 
To identify the worst-case latency in the motion system, synthetic manoeuvres are used 
with MORPHEUS. Because of the omnidirectionality of WMDS, the latency require-
ments cannot be clearly divided into longitudinal and lateral motion. Even more, latency 
is expected to depend on the wheels’ orientation and to behave identical for lateral and 
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longitudinal motion cues. In contrast, a passenger car has a distinctive orientation, hence 
latency is different for lateral and longitudinal motion, and different measurement indi-
cators are used for determining lateral and longitudinal motion latency. Therefore, the 
manoeuvre with the worst-case latency must be identified for MORPHEUS, analysed 
with the gaining and 50 % criteria for ACL, and evaluated for the minimum acceleration 
latency as it can be found in passenger cars (section 2.5.3.2). Section 4.3.1 describes the 
difference in latency between WMDS and passenger cars in detail and therewith identifies 
the manoeuvre with the worst-case latency for MOPRHEUS. Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.4 de-
scribe the experimental setup, the evaluation methodology and give a conclusion, respec-
tively.  
4.3.1 Latency in a WMDS and in a Passenger Car 
Latency in a WMDS’ acceleration representation arises from delayed force transmission 
in the desired direction. This delay is influenced by the response behaviour of the electric 
motors and by the wheel units’ current state of operation. The response behaviour can be 
influenced by the control parameters that are tuned iteratively. The wheel units’ state of 
operation is strongly dependent on the current DS state and can be discriminated into 
seven cases in dependence on the yaw angle, acceleration demand, and WMDS velocity: 
1. Identical yaw angle in DS’ COS as in vehicle’s COS:  
1.1. Lateral acceleration demand 
1.1.1. WMDS driving velocity well above zero: Like in a real car, slip angle must 
be generated at the wheels to build up lateral tire force.  
1.1.2. WMDS driving velocity close to zero: Whereas the vehicle’s driving ve-
locity is high enough for building up sufficient lateral tire force through 
slip angle, the WMDS’ wheels must re-orientate so that they align with the 
desired direction of motion to provide the lateral acceleration using the 
drive motor. For re-orientating the wheels, the steering unit’s friction 
torque, the tire’s drill torque and the moment of inertia must be overcome. 
1.2. Longitudinal acceleration demand: The drive motors must only overcome the 
drive unit’s friction torque and moment of inertia. The remaining drive torque 
can be used for acceleration. The driving velocity has no influence on latency, 
given that the motor power is sufficient for accelerating. 
2. Different yaw angle in DS’ COS as in vehicle’s COS (can only occur with a low-
frequent acceleration demand → washout is active):  
2.1. Lateral acceleration demand 
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2.1.1. WMDS driving velocity well above zero: Lateral tire force can be gener-
ated by slip angle, although the wheels must be re-orientated first by less 
than 90°. The steering unit’s friction torque, the drill torque, and the mo-
ment of inertia must be overcome. 
2.1.2. WMDS driving velocity close to zero: In the worst case, the wheels are 
perpendicular to the desired direction of motion and must be re-orientated 
first. The steering unit’s friction torque, the drill torque, and the moment 
of inertia must be overcome. 
2.2. Longitudinal acceleration demand: 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 as with lateral acceleration 
demand (case 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).  
Clearly, cases 1.1.1 and 1.2 are least critical. For cases 1.1.2 and 2 the latency that is also 
caused in case 1.2 (drive unit’s friction torque and moment of inertia) is supplemented by 
the latency needed for re-orientating the wheels – in a worst-case by 90° (steering unit’s 
friction torque, drill torque, and moment of inertia must be overcome). Figure 4-3 demon-
strates the difference in tire force transmission for a lateral acceleration step input in a 
real vehicle (or virtual vehicle, left) and a WMDS (right), which is equivalent to 
case 1.1.2. When lateral acceleration is demanded in a moving vehicle, the wheels are 
steered into the desired direction, thus generating slip angle leading to the build-up of 
lateral tire force and, therewith, lateral acceleration. In the WMDS, however, the local 
yaw angle does not necessarily comply with the vehicle’s yaw angle. Still, the overall 
vestibular driving impression, in this case especially the horizontal acceleration, must 
correlate. Due to the washout, the WMDS’ velocity can be reduced to near zero if the 
WMDS’ accelerations match the vehicle’s acceleration (superposed by TC) plus or minus 
the human perception threshold for translational acceleration 𝑎threshold. 
Concluding, the worst-case latency occurs when the wheels are misaligned by 90° to the 
desired direction of acceleration and the driving velocity is near zero. As demonstrated in 
Figure 4-3 the side slip angle of WMDS can reach 90°, unlike a regular passenger car. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to measure the worst-case latency for either longitudinal or lat-
eral acceleration, which is why only lateral acceleration step inputs are used in the exper-
iments. Nevertheless, different acceptable latency limits apply for lateral and longitudinal 
acceleration in a real car. Thus, the lateral acceleration experiments are analysed with the 
criteria for gaining (𝑡 ain, IACLgain) and 50 % (𝑡50 %, IACL50 %) acceleration cue latency 
and evaluated with the minimum lateral and longitudinal acceleration latency of a real 
car. 
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Figure 4-3: Lateral acceleration step input in a vehicle (left) and a WMDS (right) for the initial 
state (top) and the required state for providing the desired acceleration (bottom) 
4.3.2 Experiment Design 
The influence of two variables is of interest: Firstly, the amplitude of the acceleration step 
input, and secondly, the initial driving velocity at manoeuvre initiation. Furthermore, the 
type of the target signal might have an influence, namely an acceleration step input and a 
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steering angle step input. Therefore, an experiments design is chosen so that a minimum 
number of experiments clarifies how latency is influenced in a WMDS: 
1. Variation of lateral acceleration step input amplitude from 1 m/s² to 8 m/s² in 
1 m/s² increments and with an initial longitudinal velocity of 0 and 1 m/s. 
2. Variation of initial longitudinal velocity 
a. with an acceleration step input amplitude of 5 m/s² and with initial longi-
tudinal velocities of 0 to 6 m/s in 1 m/s increments. 
b. With a 90° (i.e. maximum) steering angle step input with initial longitudi-
nal velocities of 1 m/s to 6 m/s in 1 m/s increments. 
Thus, the first experiment investigates the influence of the acceleration step input ampli-
tude in detail and the influence of the initial longitudinal velocity at low speeds. Higher 
speeds are not driven because the most significant influence of the initial velocity is ex-
pected at low speeds due to the drilling torque. The second experiments investigate the 
detailed influence of longitudinal velocity up to medium speeds for one acceleration step 
input and steering angle step input and thereby also investigates the influence of the type 
of control input. Thus, it can be proven if the assumption of negligible influence of the 
initial velocity at speeds above 1 m/s is valid. 
4.3.3 Experiment Assessment 
ACL50 % is calculated by subtracting the manoeuvre initiation time (e.g. acceleration step 
input) from the time when 50 % of the target acceleration is reached (IACL50 %). For cal-
culating ACLgain, an indicator to determine the time when the system is reacting to the 
control input is needed, too. Latency is then calculated as the difference between the time 
of indication and the time of manoeuvre initiation. In passenger cars, the first increase in 
yaw rate or lateral acceleration is used as an indicator for the vehicle’s reaction to the 
control input. Because lateral motion in a driving simulator is not necessarily connected 
to yaw motion, it is advisable to use lateral acceleration as an indicator instead. This as-
sumption is eligible because in a car yaw motion is induced by lateral acceleration making 
the investigation conservative. Since the overall aim is to represent acceleration to a hu-
man test person, it is obvious to use the human perception threshold of 0.2 m/s² (cf. sec-
tion 2.5.2) as an indicator, yielding IACLgain. 
All experiments are analysed with the IACL50 % and the IACLgain. For experiment 2a (var-
iation of the initial longitudinal velocity with a steering angle step input), however, a 
target steering angle is set instead of a target acceleration. Therefore, IACL50 % is defined 
as the time when 50 % of the maximum acceleration resulting from the steering angle 
step input is reached, yielding a conservative value. 
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4.3.4 Summary 
Each experiment is carried out six times, yielding 174 data sets for evaluating ACL50 % 
and ACLgain. 
The aspect motion cue latency falsifies hypothesis H1.1 if the hardware prototype cannot 
reach 50 % of any acceleration step input within 135 ms and 0.2 m/s² after any accelera-
tion or steering angle step input within 100 ms at any velocity, considering state-of-the-
art technology. 
4.4 Risk Assessment 
The most relevant safety standards have been introduced in section 2.3. The ISO 26262 
is intended for automotive series production and is therefore not ideal for prototypes. The 
EN ISO 13849 and the IEC/EN 62061 are focussed on E/E/PE control systems. Thus, the 
IEC 61508, which is often referred to as the “mother standard for E/E/PE system safety”, 
is applied.  
Risk assessment is dealt with in IEC 60300 “Dependability management”, whereas the 
part most important for HARA, the IEC 60300-3-9 “Risk analysis of technological sys-
tems”, has been evolved into the ISO/IEC 31010 “Risk management – Risk assessment 
techniques”135. The ISO/IEC 31010 proposes a total of 31 risk assessment techniques that 
can also be found in Ericson’s “Hazard analysis techniques for system safety”, which is 
more focused on the overarching safety aspects rather than functional safety. Ericson 
states “one of the annoying truisms of system safety is that it is usually easier to mitigate 
a hazard than it is to recognize or find the hazard in the first place”136. Therefore, the goal 
is to identify hazards to the fullest extent possible. Although structured approaches, e.g. 
Figure 2-17, exist, 100 % safety cannot be guaranteed. This makes it even more important 
to be thorough on elaborating each and every step in the risk assessment process. 
The focus of this thesis is on functional safety and, therefore, the chosen methodology is 
closer to IEC 61508 than to the elaborate methods as described by Ericson. The risk graph 
is the only risk estimation method that is described in all aforementioned standards and 
will be used here as well. The structure, as chosen with sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4, is adapted 
from EN ISO 13849 (cf. Figure 2-17). A sufficient mechanical strength of the components 
                                                 
135 ISO/TC 262 - Risk management: IEC 31010 (2009). 
136 Ericson, C. A.: Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety (2005). p. 24. 
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is assumed. Faults like loose connectors and/or worn through cables are not included di-
rectly. Still, signal dropouts are a matter of functional safety and, therewith, take faulty 
cables/connectors indirectly into account. 
4.4.1 Determination of the Limits of Machinery  
The determination of the limits of machinery can also be found in the overall safety lifecy-
cle in IEC 61508 (Figure 2-15), represented by phases one and two: concept and overall 
scope definition.  
Ericson describes a hazard triangle137 that is comprised of three elements: 
1. Hazardous element: A basic hazardous resource, e.g. energy 
2. Initiating mechanism: The trigger or initiator event(s)  
3. Target and threat: The person or thing that is vulnerable to injury and/or damage 
Only if all three elements are present, a hazard can arise. Knowing about these basic ele-
ments enables the design engineer to search the system for them. Generic checklists can 
help because possible hazards that can be caused by single elements are pointed out. This 
also underlines the importance of determining the limits of the system under investigation 
properly, including: 
• System components (structural elements) 
• System design (flow of forces, energy, information) 
• System functions (what is the system intended/designed to do?) 
• Energy sources (electric, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, etc.) 
• Concepts for operation (who will be using the system with which expertise and in 
which mode, e.g. regular operation, maintenance, repair, transport, etc.) 
• External conditions (e.g. climate, electromagnetic compatibility, etc.) 
The results of this process are a complete description of the EUC, likely sources of haz-
ards (hazardous elements, initiating mechanisms, and targets and threats), and infor-
mation about the current safety regulations. 
4.4.2 Hazard Identification 
A hazard is defined by a failure (e.g. no power supply) and the consequence of the failure 
(in this case no acceleration/deceleration or steering possible). The hazard identification 
is included in the third phase, HARA, of the overall safety lifecycle in IEC 61508 (Figure 
2-15). Clause 7.4.2.1 of IEC 61508 states if “decisions are taken [...] which may change 
                                                 
137 Ericson, C. A.: Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety (2005). p. 17. 
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the basis on which the earlier decisions were taken, then a further HARA shall be under-
taken”138, underlining that conducting a HARA is an iterative process. Ericson advises to 
utilise past knowledge, evaluate top-level mishaps and finally yet importantly use generic 
hazard (source) checklists, also provided by Ericson. Still, the process of risk analysis, 
especially hazard identification, is rather intuitive; the predominant method for hazard 
identification is brainstorming, although supported by structured approaches leading 
through the identification process, e.g.: 
• Dividing complex systems into subsystems and precisely working out the infor-
mation and power flow between and within the subsystems. 
• Splitting components into sensors, actuators, and electronic control units. 
• Evaluating possible failures that could arise from the component’s intended func-
tions. 
• Conducting FTA or FME(C)A 
Conducting the hazard identification in a team of experts increases the probability of 
identifying all relevant hazards. The IEC 61822 “Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP 
studies) - Application guide”139 gives a guideline towards structured and systematic ex-
amination of hazards. For identifying hazards, twelve guidewords are introduced. If a 
guideword is applicable to an intended function of the EUC, the combination of the two 
must be reviewed to find out if it constitutes a hazard to the system. The guidewords are: 
Table 4.1: Guidewords for hazard identification139 
Guideword Meaning 
NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent 
MORE Quantitative increase 
LESS Quantitative decrease 
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/increase 
PART OF Qualitative modification/decrease 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent 
OTHER THAN / INSTEAD Complete substitution 
EARLY Relative to the clock time 
LATE Relative to the clock time 
BEFORE Relating to order or sequence 
AFTER Relating to order or sequence 
                                                 
138 IEC TC 65/SC 65A - System aspects: IEC 61508 (2011). p. 27. 
139 IEC TC 56 - Dependability: IEC 61882 (2016). 
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As an example, the function supply demanded power to drive motor is investigated. For 
this function, it must be investigated if it constitutes a hazard in case no/more/less power 
is supplied, power as well as or as part of another signal is supplied, power is drawn rather 
than supplied, another signal instead of power is supplied, or power is supplied late/early 
or before/after a specific event. 
The result of the hazard identification is a – to the best of one’s knowledge – complete 
list of all hazards, whereas the situation, in which each hazard occurs, is not of interest, 
yet. 
4.4.3 Risk Estimation 
The risk estimation is also included in the third phase, HARA, of the overall safety lifecy-
cle in IEC 61508 (Figure 2-15). The goal of the risk estimation is to assign each hazard 
that has been identified in the previous process (section 4.4.2) to a risk level. The combi-
nation of a hazard and a critical operational situation yields a hazardous event, whose risk 
can be evaluated. It is not advisable to list each possible situation, because most situations 
will be uncritical and are not worth looking at. Therefore, the expert conducting the anal-
ysis may choose the most critical situation. If it is unclear which situation is the most 
critical, it is also valid to extend the hazard to a few situations. 
The definition of the risk level depends on the standard (performance level in 
EN ISO 13849, automotive SIL in ISO 26262, or SIL in IEC 61508), whereas the SIL 
will be used in this thesis. In any case, a hazard’s consequences, its probability of occur-
rence (the situation and the mishap), and its controllability must be evaluated. If no valid 
data exists for evaluating these hazard parameters (which usually is the case), a qualitative 
evaluation is performed by estimating the level of each risk parameter. As with the hazard 
identification, this process is rather intuitive and decisions about allocations can be ar-
gued. The most common qualitative method for evaluating the risk level (independent of 
the chosen metric) is the risk graph, Figure 2-16. In addition, a solution for mitigating 
each risk is formulated. 
The result of the risk estimation is a – to the best of one’s knowledge – complete list of 
all hazards that includes – for each and every hazard – a description of the situation, an 
evaluation of the risk/assignment of a risk level, and a proposal of a risk reduction method. 
4.4.4 Risk Evaluation 
The risk evaluation includes the fourth and fifth phases, namely overall safety require-
ments and safety requirement allocation, of the overall safety lifecycle in IEC 61508 
(Figure 2-15). The goals are to establish the overall safety requirements (or safety goals 
according to ISO 26262) and to evaluate if the overall risk that arises from the system has 
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been adequately reduced. The overall safety requirements are comprised of the safety 
functions requirements (i.e. the function that is intended to reduce the risk, derived from 
the hazard analysis) and the safety integrity requirements (i.e. the risk reduction required 
(SIL in case of IEC 61508), derived from the risk analysis). At this stage, the safety func-
tion must not be specified in technology-specific terms. Also, the definition of the safety 
functions must be done regardless of the hazardous event’s situation. Otherwise, the 
safety function could reduce the risk of the specific hazardous event, but not the risk of 
other hazardous events that are associated with the same failure and consequence but in 
different, less critical situations (which possibly result in a lower SIL and are therefore 
not listed in the HARA). If the risk has been adequately reduced, no further measures are 
needed. If not, a risk reduction process is triggered (Figure 2-17). The architectural or 
processual changes that are made within the risk reduction process may require an addi-
tional risk assessment process or a re-assessment of the whole EUC. 
The result of the risk evaluation is a – to the best of one’s knowledge – complete overall 
safety requirements list that must be met to call the EUC safe. The aspect safety architec-
ture falsifies hypothesis H1.2 if no architecture can be found that reduces the identified 
risks to an acceptable level. 
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5 Research Tools 
Section 5.1 of this chapter describes the synthetic and representative test manoeuvres that 
are used in the falsification experiments of the wheeled mobile platform, followed by a 
description of the virtual prototype (section 5.2) that is used for extrapolating the falsifi-
cation experiments. Section 5.3 describes the measurement technology used with 
MORPHEUS and how signals are processed and is adopted from Wagner et al.140. 
5.1 Test Manoeuvres 
Synthetic and representative test manoeuvres are used within this thesis, depending on 
the research aim. All experiments are carried out on the August-Euler-Airfield in Darm-
stadt.  
5.1.1 Synthetic Manoeuvres 
Here, only those synthetic manoeuvres that are required for conducting experiments and 
simulation runs are described. The justifications for the choice of these manoeuvres are 
given in the sections where they are applied. Synthetic manoeuvres are artificially gener-
ated and, therefore, the input signals are noise-free. All synthetic manoeuvres are driven 
without washout and TC. For the 90° turn and the figure eight, scaling is applied in the 
MCA when necessary.  
5.1.1.1 Straight-Line Acceleration 
This manoeuvre is used for the verification of the power demand and the determination 
of the electric drive motor’s and its motor controller’s electrical efficiency that is used in 
the power/energy model. A longitudinal acceleration step input of constant amplitude is 
imposed to the DS at standstill up to its maximum velocity. 
5.1.1.2 Steering Angle Step Input 
A 90° steering angle step input is imposed to the DS, whereas the driving velocity may 
be varied. This manoeuvre is used for the determination of ACL. 
                                                 
140 Wagner, P. et al.: Power, Energy, and Latency Test Drives with MORPHEUS (2017). 
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5.1.1.3 Perpendicular Acceleration Step Input 
An acceleration step input is imposed to the DS, whereas the initial, perpendicular driving 
velocity may be varied. The acceleration step input amplitude may be varied, too. This 
manoeuvre is used for the determination of ACL. 
5.1.1.4 90° Turn 
The 90° turn (a.k.a. T-junction) is approached with 14 m/s. Then the vehicle is decelerated 
with 3 m/s² down to 5 m/s. As soon as the target velocity is reached, cornering is initiated 
with constant velocity. The cornering radius is 10 m. After a change in orientation of 90° 
has been reached, the vehicle accelerates with 3 m/s² to 14 m/s. The resulting accelera-
tion, velocity, and yaw profile is processed in the MC (no washout and TC) and scaled if 
necessary141a. This manoeuvre is used to verify the energy model. 
5.1.1.5 Figure Eight 
The Figure eight manoeuvre is originally intended to evaluate the control and tire behav-
iour. It is driven at a constant longitudinal velocity of 1.5 m/s, whereas the heading of the 
WMDS follows the trajectory, i.e. with yaw. The cornering radius is 7.5 m, resulting in a 
maximum lateral acceleration of ±0.3 m/s². The resulting acceleration, velocity, and yaw 
profile is processed in the MC (no washout and TC) and scaled if necessary141b. This 
manoeuvre is used to verify the energy model. 
5.1.2 Representative Manoeuvres 
Graupner has developed a representative urban driving circuit that is composed of ma-
noeuvres in a probabilistic distribution as they can be found in real urban driving142. Four 
different drivers that were familiar with the driving circuit drove the measurement runs 
during the day, off-hour, resulting in an above-average performance compared to normal 
drivers. The car used was a VW Golf VI R, equipped with a GeneSys ADMA G-3 meas-
urement unit, logging translational accelerations and rotational velocities at a sampling 
rate of 100 Hz. The circuit is about 21 km long and takes about one hour to com-
plete141c,143. The urban measurement runs are used for the evaluation of the energy de-
mand, where MORPHEUS must represent the recorded accelerations. 
Because the measured acceleration and velocity signals are prone to sensor noise and 
vibration induced from the test vehicle, filtering is applied. The reason is that in a real DS 
application the control inputs for the MCA are firstly generated by the driver through the 
                                                 
141 Cf. Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). a: pp. 90f.; b: pp. 91ff.; c: pp. 
93f. 
142 Graupner, M.: Bachelor's thesis, Entwicklung eines repräsentativen Stadtparcours (2011). 
143 Betz, A. et al.: Motion Analysis of a WMDS (2012). 
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HMI (steering wheel angle, pedal positions) and secondly transformed to translational 
accelerations and rotational velocities in a vehicle model. The resulting accelerations and 
velocities are free of measurement noise so that the application of noisy data from the 
urban measurement runs would misrepresent the demand upon the MCA.  
When modelling a vehicle, frequencies below 8 Hz typically characterise the vehicle be-
haviour (driving test support, control system design), whereas frequencies between 3 Hz 
and 20 Hz characterise handling (vehicle dynamics, driving stability), and everything 
above 8 Hz is relevant for comfort analysis (comfort and vibration analysis, durability 
profiles)144. Therefore, a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) low-pass filter is applied, 
whereas the passband frequency is chosen to 8 Hz and the stopband frequency to 10 Hz 
(comfort is not of interest). A Kaiser window is used. Figure 5-1 shows the Power Spectral 
Density (PSD) for the unfiltered (left) and filtered (right) longitudinal acceleration signal 
of urban measurement run 2: 
 
Figure 5-1: PSD of the discrete Fourier transform of the longitudinal acceleration signal of urban 
measurement run 2. Left: Unfiltered acceleration signal, right: Low-pass filtered acceleration sig-
nal.  
                                                 
144 Ammon, D.; Schiehlen, W.: Advanced Road Vehicles: Control Technologies (2009). p. 285. 
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5.2 Virtual Prototype 
A virtual prototype is available, programmed in MATLAB Simulink and IPG CarMaker. 
The MCA and MC are identical to those of MORPHEUS. IPG CarMaker simulates the 
driving dynamics with a frequency of 1 kHz. The virtual prototype is used for scaling the 
measured energy demand of MORPHEUS in a downscaled urban driving scenario up to 
that of an unscaled urban driving scenario. The CarMaker model is required for these 
simulations because of its sophisticated tire model. 
5.2.1 Tire Model145,146 
The press-on band tires are modelled based on Pacejka’s fully non-linear single contact 
point transient tire model combined with the Magic Formula 5.2 and is accessed through 
the Simulink interface of CarMaker. The parameters are derived from measurements of 
the tire’s longitudinal and lateral friction coefficient, and lateral force in dependence on 
the slip angle. The drill torque 𝑇drill,𝑖 and the self-aligning torque 𝑇𝛼,𝑖 were empirically 
determined in dependence on turn slip and slip angle, respectively, and are then provided 
by the magic formula. The model has been validated147. 
5.2.2 Body Model148 
The body is modelled in CarMaker with point masses. Because CarMaker is intended for 
passenger cars, the body model consists of four wheels. For applying the model to the 
three-wheeled WMDS concept, the fourth wheel is minimised in size and mass and has 
no ground contact. The geometric properties of section 3.6 are applied. 
                                                 
145 Cf. Zöller, C. et al.: Tire Concept Investigation for WMDS (2016). 
146 Cf. Zöller, C. et al.: Tires and Vertical Dynamics of WMDS (2017). 
147 Zöller, C.: Master's thesis, Implementierung und Parametrierung eines Reifenmodells für WMDS 
(2014). 
148 Cf. Betz, A. et al.: Driving Dynamics Control of a WMDS (2013). 
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5.2.3 Chassis Model149 
The MORPHEUS prototype has no chassis, i.e. chassis properties like camber, kingpin 
inclination, toe and offset are zero. The steering angle is infinite. In addition, the proper-
ties remain unchanged during wheel lift. All this is accounted for in the CarMaker chassis 
model. Because of numerical problems, the damping constant and the spring stiffness of 
the chassis cannot be set to infinity but are iteratively maximized to values of 2.5 kNs/m 
and 25 kN/m respectively, to minimize their influence on the virtual prototype’s dynamic 
behaviour.  
5.2.4 Power/Energy Model150 
Energy is demanded by electric and electronic components. These components can be 
divided into motion simulation components that must be supplied with energy for moving 
MORPHEUS (electric motors and motor controllers, hexapod’s linear actuators and 
power electronics) and into auxiliary simulation components that do not actively contrib-
ute to motion simulation but are necessary for control (e.g. IPG Roadbox, ADMA G-3, 
simulation computers, etc.). The auxiliary component’s power demand is assumed to be 
nearly constant. Therefore, their demand can be measured (cf. section 6.3.2) and easily 
modelled. The motion simulation components, on the other hand, show a strongly veloc-
ity- and load-dependent behaviour, which makes it necessary to identify and model the 
driving resistances as well as the behaviour of the electric components. Recuperation is 
accounted for in the model, although not separately modelled: If the demanded wheel hub 
torque becomes negative, energy is recuperated with the same efficiency as when energy 
is drawn from the accumulator. Still, in experiments, recuperation’s influence on the over-
all energy demand was marginal. The integration of the steering and drive power demand 
over time yields the total energy demand of MORPHEUS. The output current and voltage 
of the High Voltage (HV) accumulator are measured in the experiments. Therefore, an 
ideal (i.e. 𝜂a  umulator = 1) accumulator model is used. Figure 5-2 gives an overview of 
the energy model and its interaction with other submodels, whereas the description of the 
model is given in the following subsections: 
                                                 
149 Cf. Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 112. 
150 Cf. Albrecht, T. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Fahrwiderstands- und Energiebedarfsbetrachtung des 
MORPHEUS (2016). 
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Figure 5-2: MORPHEUS' energy model 
5.2.4.1 Drive Units’ Driving Resistances  
Climbing resistance (even driving surface) and rolling resistance because of the dis-
placement of water (MORPHEUS must not be used under wet weather conditions) can 
be neglected. Furthermore, and as expected, test drives have shown that air resistance 
(a.k.a. drag) has no significant influence on the overall driving resistance (velocity shows 
no quadratic dependence on time when coasting)151. Thus, air resistance is neglected, also 
because the maximum velocity of MORPHEUS is just slightly above 10 m/s and about 
90 % of all unscaled driving manoeuvres are representable with a maximum velocity of 
8.5 m/s152. This simplification must be re-evaluated when using a full-scale WMDS with 
                                                 
151 Albrecht, T. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Fahrwiderstands- und Energiebedarfsbetrachtung des 
MORPHEUS (2016). p. 32. 
152 Betz, A. et al.: Motion Analysis of a WMDS (2012). 
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a dome. In addition, energy dissipation in the suspension is neglected, because no damp-
ers are used in the chassis and the influence of tire damping is not significant. Slip losses 
are accounted for in the validated tire model. The acceleration resistance including the 
equivalent mass of rotating parts 𝑒𝑚 is included in IPG CarMaker. The CarMaker model 
is parameterised with geometric relations, masses, and mass moments of inertia, which 
are either determined in experiments or derived from the verified CAD model153. The 
rolling resistance coefficients are determined in coasting experiments (cf. sec-
tion 6.1.1.1) and integrated into the tire model in IPG CarMaker. By coasting with 
switched-off drive motors, the drive unit’s friction (actually a drivetrain loss) influences 
the rolling resistance as well as the air resistance, which is not modelled separately. Thus, 
a general driving resistance with linear dependency on velocity is determined and denom-
inated with the index R. 
5.2.4.2 Drive and Steering Units’ Mechanical Motor Model 
The mechanical motor model is provided with wheel speed as well as demanded wheel 
hub and steering torque from the IPG CarMaker model and is not part of the actual energy 
model. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how the steering and drive power are 
calculated and forwarded to the energy model. The mechanically required steering power 
is calculated by multiplying the sum of the torque required to overcome the moment of 
inertia, the drilling torque, and the self-aligning torque with the steering angle rate. The 
axial mass moment of inertia (including wheel, drive unit, parts of the gearbox and slip 
ring, etc.) is determined with a fully parameterised CAD model that has been verified to 
be sufficiently accurate153. The drilling and self-aligning torque are provided by the tire 
model, which has been validated154. Multiplying the provided wheel speed and demanded 
wheel hub torque yields the mechanically required drive power. 
5.2.4.3 Steering Units’ Electric Motor and Motor Controller Model 
For the steering motors, the holding power is added to the mechanically required steering 
power. The holding power results from the control effort of the motor and its controller – 
especially when cornering – and is determined in experiments (cf. section 6.1.1.2).  
5.2.4.4 Drive Units’ Electric Motor and Motor Controller Model 
Initially, the electric drive motor model was based on an efficiency map provided by the 
manufacturer, plotting the relative efficiency over motor speed and torque. The motor 
controller was modelled, in consultation with the supplier, with a constant efficiency of 
95 %. Unfortunately, simulation results showed a large discrepancy to MORPHEUS’ 
                                                 
153 Wagner, P.: Master's thesis, Aufbau und Inbetriebnahme eines WMDS (2013). 
154 Zöller, C.: Master's thesis, Implementierung und Parametrierung eines Reifenmodells für WMDS 
(2014). 
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measured energy demand, which is why the decision was made to determine a joint effi-
ciency model for the electric motor and its motor controller. For highest accuracy, exper-
iments on a test bench would be required that was not available. Thus, constant accelera-
tion experiments with varying acceleration amplitudes were conducted. Dividing the 
mechanically required power, calculated from the motion quantities measured by the 
ADMA G-3 and the previously determined driving resistance and steering holding power, 
by the actual required electrical power yields the overall efficiency of the system for all 
points of operation. 
5.3 Measurement Technology 
Motion quantities are measured by 
• three fibre-optic gyroscopes: angular velocities, 
• three inertial sensors: linear accelerations, 
• and a GPS/DGPS receiver: 3D position and velocity, 
and are merged and filtered into an overall 3D motion information by a GeneSys ADMA 
G-3. Motor resolvers measure the electric motors’ position that is transferred to the motor 
controllers from where these values are tapped together with the signal of a current sensor 
that is positioned between each electric motor and its motor controller. Another current 
and voltage sensor is installed at the main accumulator for identifying the peak power and 
average energy demand. Acceleration as well as rotational and translational velocity are 
measured with 1 kHz, current as well as voltage of the main accumulator with 200 Hz 
(limited by sensor), and motor currents and revolutions with 100 Hz (limited by sensors). 
Sensor noise, vibrations of the electric motors, and body vibration due to vertical excita-
tion from the road surface cause signal disturbance. The PSD of the discrete Fourier trans-
form of a longitudinal acceleration signal is shown in Figure 5-3. 
 
Figure 5-3: PSD of discrete Fourier transform of longitudinal acceleration signal for a 90° steering 
angle input at 𝑣lon  = 2 m/s, trial 1) 
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Therefore, acceleration signals are low-pass filtered in the same manner as for the urban 
measurement runs in section 5.1.2. In accordance with the values found from literature 
(section 5.1.2) a finite impulse response (FIR) low-pass filter with a passband frequency 
of 7 Hz and a stopband frequency of 13 Hz is chosen. A Kaiser window is used. Figure 
5-4 shows the comparison between the unfiltered (orange dots) and low-pass filtered (yel-
low line) measured longitudinal acceleration signal. 
 
Figure 5-4: Comparison of unfiltered and low-pass filtered measured longitudinal acceleration 
(90° steering angle input at 𝑣lon  = 2 m/s, trial 1) 
The reason for the noisy acceleration signals can be found in the vertical excitation due 
to the road surface, which is a major problem at the current state of research. A normalized 
cross-correlation of the vertical and longitudinal acceleration signal from the same test 
drive as in Figure 5-4 is calculated and plotted in Figure 5-5. The lateral and vertical 
acceleration signals are dependent on each other between ±200 ms lag, whereas the lateral 
acceleration signal follows the vertical acceleration signal. This suggests an influence of 
vertical acceleration, and, therewith, vertical excitation, onto horizontal acceleration. Re-
ducing the vertical excitation of MORPHEUS’ self-driving platform is expected to reduce 
acceleration signal disturbance and to improve the tires’ force transmission potential at 
increased velocities. 
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Figure 5-5: Normalized cross-correlation of equally low-pass filtered vertical and lateral acceler-
ation signal (90° steering angle input at 𝑣total = const. = 2 m/s, trial 1, from manoeuvre initiation 
to end of manoeuvre (i.e. 𝑎lat > 0)) 
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6 Falsification Experiments for Wheeled 
Motion Base 
Initially, the power/energy model, its parameterisation, and its verification/validation are 
described (section 6.1). The model is used to extrapolate the results of the energy demand 
experiments to unscaled driving manoeuvres and to investigate the power demand in de-
pendence of the scaling factor. Section 6.2 provides the results for the power demand 
falsification experiments, section 6.3 for the energy demand falsification experiments, 
and section 6.4 for the motion latency falsification experiments. A summary and an out-
look to the application of the found results and used methodology in unscaled WMDS 
will be given at the end of each of these sections. The results described in sections 6.1.2.2, 
6.3, and 6.4 are adopted from Wagner et al.155. 
6.1 Power/Energy Model 
6.1.1 Parameter Identification 
6.1.1.1 Drive Units’ Driving Resistance (Coasting Tests)156 
To determine the driving resistance coefficient, MORPHEUS is accelerated inside a 
hangar to a velocity of 3.6 m/s. Thus, interferences due to wind are eliminated. After 
reaching the desired velocity, the drive motors are switched off and the WMDS coasts 
into standstill. Acceleration and velocity are continuously measured with the ADMA G-3, 
supported by a Correvit (GPS is not available inside the hangar), and filtered. The exper-
iment is carried out 15 times in each direction, thus, influences from climbing resistance 
are eliminated, totalling in 30 runs. Then, all acceleration and velocity signals are shifted 
so that 0.2 m/s are reached simultaneously. Finally, the signals are averaged overall all 
trials. Figure 6-1 shows the averaged acceleration over velocity. This 𝑎 vs. 𝑣 presentation 
is chosen over the traditional 𝑎 vs. 𝑣2 presentation as it is used in coasting tests with 
passenger cars, because a linear relation between deceleration and velocity is identified 
in the experiments. This can be explained with the low velocities driven and the negligible 
(quadratic) influence of air resistance.  
                                                 
155 Wagner, P. et al.: Power, Energy, and Latency Test Drives with MORPHEUS (2017). 
156 Cf. Albrecht, T. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Fahrwiderstands- und Energiebedarfsbetrachtung des 
MORPHEUS (2016).  
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Figure 6-1: Absolute deceleration over velocity in coasting experiments (averaged over all trials) 
A linear regression of the form of equation (6-1) is fitted to the 𝑎 vs. 𝑣 diagram in Figure 
6-1, from which can be concluded that a constant and a linearly velocity-dependent driv-
ing resistance coefficient may be approximated. The regression yields the constant driv-
ing resistance coefficient that can also be read from the intersection point with the ordi-
nate in Figure 6-1, equation (6-2): 
𝑎re ression = 𝑔 ∙ (𝑓 , onst.,re ression + 𝑓 ,𝑣,re ression ∙
𝑣
 dyn
) (6-1) 
  𝑓 , onst.,re ression = 0.0233 (6-2) 
The constant driving resistance coefficient is about 2.5 times the rolling resistance coef-
ficient that can be found on passenger cars with pneumatic tires. For the velocity-depend-
ent driving resistance coefficient, the slope of the linear regression is used, equation (6-3): 
 𝑓 ,𝑣,re ression = 0.0015 
s
r d
 (6-3) 
It must be stressed again that these coefficients do not solely represent the rolling re-
sistance but also include air resistance and friction in the drive units. The driving re-
sistance is implemented in the tire model. Given the omnidirectionality of the concept, 
the wheels can turn in both directions at all velocities, making it necessary to implement 
the driving resistance for both directions of rotation. Using a signum function is numeri-
cally critical, which is why the decision was made for the arc tangent, wherein   is a 
parameter to design the shape of the imitated signum function. Figure 6-2 shows the re-
sulting driving resistance torque plotted over the wheel speed in dependence on the pa-
rameter  .  
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Figure 6-2: Driving resistance torque over wheel speed in dependence on parameter C 
From the diagram can be concluded that values larger than 100 provide the best approxi-
mation to a signum function. Therefore,   is set to 1,000. Thus, the formula for the driving 
resistance at each wheel is: 
𝑇 ,𝑖 =   ,𝑖,dyn ∙  dyn (0.0233 + 0.0015 
s
r d
∙ |𝜔 ,𝑖|)
∙
2
𝜋
 t n−1(1,000 𝜔 ,𝑖) 
(6-4)  
6.1.1.2 Steering Units’ Electric Motor and Motor Controller Model (Holding 
Torque Test)157a 
To determine the holding torque, an external tangential force is applied to a drive motor 
while the tire has no contact to the underground. A torque sensor mounted to the steering 
unit measures the supporting torque provided by the steering motor. The steering angle is 
controlled to stay constant, Figure 6-3.  
 
Figure 6-3: Experiment setup for holding torque test157b 
                                                 
157 Cf. Albrecht, T. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Fahrwiderstands- und Energiebedarfsbetrachtung des 
MORPHEUS (2016). a: - ; b: p. 41. 
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The external force is increased incrementally up to a resulting holding torque of 50 Nm, 
whereas each increment is applied several times for the sake of reproducibility. The trac-
tion battery’s output current and voltage are measured. Figure 6-4 shows the measured 
steering power plotted over the measured holding torque for one steering motor.  
 
Figure 6-4: Measurement data and regression for holding torque158 
A quadratic regression is fitted, whereas the offset of 97.5 W arises due to the control 
effort for keeping the steering angle constant: 
𝑃holdin ,𝑖 = 0.03
1
Nms
∙ 𝑇holdin ,𝑖
2 + 13.5
1
s
∙ 𝑇holdin ,𝑖 + 97.5 W (6-5) 
6.1.1.3 Drive Units’ Electric Motor and Motor Controller Model (Constant 
Acceleration Test) 
Straight-line acceleration tests are driven with MORPHEUS. The acceleration amplitude 
is varied from 0.2 m/s² to 7.2 m/s², whereas the increment is increased by 0.2 m/s² after 
each experiment since lower accelerations are driven more often. Because of the limited 
driving area and the required braking distance, the maximum velocity is reduced for the 
experiments with lower acceleration amplitude. Thus, the experiment setup as described 
in Table 6.1 was used.  
Table 6.1: Experiment setup for constant acceleration tests 
Experiment #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 
𝒂𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐭 in m/s² 0.2 0.6 1.2 2 3 4.2 5.6 7.2 
𝒗𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐭,𝐦𝐚𝐱 in m/s 6 8 10 12 12 12 12 12 
                                                 
158 Albrecht, T. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Fahrwiderstands- und Energiebedarfsbetrachtung des 
MORPHEUS (2016). p. 42. 
6.1 Power/Energy Model 
75 
Acceleration and power signals are filtered and averaged over 30 trials that were con-
ducted for each experiment. The electrical power drawn from the accumulator is the prod-
uct of measured output current and output voltage of the accumulator. The mechanical 
power needed for horizontal acceleration is corrected by the driving resistance, the mass 
moment of inertia of the drive units, and the energy demand of the HV steering system. 
The constant HV energy demand of the steering units results from the required holding 
power (cf. section 6.1.1.2). Thus, the mechanically needed power is calculated to: 
𝑃me h = 𝑣 ∙ (𝑚 ∙ (𝑎 + 𝑔 ∙ (𝑓 , onst. + 𝑓 ,𝑣 ∙
𝑣
 dyn
)) + 𝜃𝑦𝑦,dri e ∙
𝑎
 dyn
2 )
+ 𝑃holdin (0) 
= 𝑣 ∙ (1,056 kg ∙ (𝑎 + 9.81 
m
s2
∙ (0.0233 + 0.0015 
s
r d
∙
𝑣
0.14 m
))
+ 0.985 kgm2 ∙
𝑎
(0.14 m)2
) + 292.5 W 
(6-6) 
The efficiency of the electrical components is then calculated by equation (6-7): 
𝜂el =
𝑃me h
𝑃el
 (6-7) 
Figure 6-5 shows the resulting efficiency map: 
 
Figure 6-5: Efficiency map of drive unit’s HV components 
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A comparably low efficiency of under 40 % is determined at low velocities. A low motor 
torque also has a significant influence on efficiency (under 60 %), although the influence 
is less than with velocity. The highest efficiency is reached at high motor speed and torque 
(proportional to velocity and acceleration). These observations coincide with data pro-
vided by Enstroj for the EMRAX 228 electric motor that is used on MORPHEUS (cf. 
annexe B.1). High accelerations could not be reached at high velocities. This issue will 
be discussed in section 6.2 where the power demand of MORPHEUS is investigated. The 
efficiency map is extrapolated with the nearest neighbour method, saved in a lookup table, 
and provided to the energy model. The extrapolation is not very accurate, but necessary 
because some operating points may lie outside the domain of the efficiency map. Still, 
the influence is expected to be negligible, because – as Betz159 showed – 90 % of all 
situations in an unscaled urban driving scenario driven with the unscaled WMDS require 
no accelerations above 2.3 m/s² and no velocities above 7.5 m/s.  
6.1.2 Verification/Validation 
The power model is verified by comparing the power calculated by the model with the 
power measured in equivalent driving experiments, section 6.1.2.1. Basically, the energy 
model is the power model integrated over time. It is validated by conducting different 
types of manoeuvres and again comparing simulation and measurements, section 6.1.2.2. 
6.1.2.1 Power Model Verification 
Because the purpose of the power model is to investigate the maximum power consump-
tion in a straight-line driving manoeuvre, the same manoeuvre is used for the verification. 
50 data sets were recorded separately from the data sets used to parameterize the model. 
Figure 6-6 shows the resulting measured acceleration (blue stars), target acceleration (red 
line), measured velocity (yellow dots), measured power demand from the accumulator 
(violet circles), and the simulated electric power demand (green dashed line): 
                                                 
159 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 108. 
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Figure 6-6: Verification of power model with 4 m/s² constant target acceleration manoeuvre (av-
eraged over 50 trials) 
The simulation matches the measurement. When jerking, the change in power demand 
occurs earlier in simulation than in the measurements, because the transient behaviour of 
the electric motors and motor controllers is not accounted for in the model. Still, these 
deviations are marginal and, therefore, the power model is sufficiently accurate for the 
purpose of simulating the power demand at higher accelerations and velocities.  
6.1.2.2 Energy Model Validation 
A bottom-up methodology is used for the validation of the energy model, starting with a 
simple 90° turn manoeuvre (averaged over six trials), then evaluating a figure eight ma-
noeuvre (averaged over six trials), and ending with a complex ten minutes urban driving 
scenario (scaling factor 0.3, scenario #3, averaged over ten trials). Table 6.2 shows the 
virtual prototype’s and MORPHEUS’ energy demand during the manoeuvres, whereas 𝜎 
is the standard deviation of and relative to the energy demand of the trials conducted with 
MORPHEUS. 
Table 6.2: Results of the validation of the energy model 
Manoeuvre 𝒕𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐨𝐞𝐮𝐯𝐫𝐞 
in s 
𝑬𝐬𝐢𝐦 
in Wh 
𝑬𝐌𝐎𝐑𝐏𝐇𝐄𝐔𝐒  
in Wh 
𝝈𝐌𝐎𝐑𝐏𝐇𝐄𝐔𝐒 
in % 
∆𝑬𝐫𝐞𝐥 
in % 
90° Turn 31 15.7 17 3.5 7.6 
Figure 8 68 33.5 36 2.2 6.9 
Urban (0.3 scaling) 600 360.8 358.8 4 0.6 
The simulated energy demand of the synthetic manoeuvres undercuts the actual energy 
demand of MORPHEUS. In contrast, the representative urban driving circuit’s energy 
demand is slightly higher in simulation than in reality. The deviation from the actual en-
ergy demand is around 7 % for the synthetic manoeuvres and 0.6 % for the scaled urban 
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driving circuit. Thus, the energy model may be used for estimating the platform’s un-
scaled energy demand. 
6.1.3 Adaption to Full-Scale WMDS 
The power/energy model can be used for the full-scale WMDS, too, although a re-param-
eterisation will be required, because components like tires, bearings, electric motors, mo-
tor controllers, etc. will be changed. Furthermore, the influence of air resistance will be-
come more significant as the maximum velocity will be increased. Therefore, the driving 
resistance should be modelled with a quadratic dependence on wheel speed. Nevertheless, 
the model structure as well as the methodology for parameterisation and verification can 
be kept. Therefore, an updated power/energy model for a full-scale WMDS can be made 
available in two or three working days, as soon as a working prototype is available. Then, 
the investigation of the falsification aspects can be conducted in the same manner as de-
scribed within this thesis. 
6.2 Power Demand 
As previously stressed, the maximum velocity of MORPHEUS and the accumulator’s 
output power are insufficient to conduct experiments for all occurring velocity amplitudes 
with scaling factors of up to 1. Therefore, the power/energy model is used to calculate the 
required mechanical and electrical power for representing the maximum acceleration and 
velocity amplitude of the corresponding scaling factor, equation (6-8): 
𝑃el = (𝑃 + 𝑃𝜃𝑦𝑦 + 𝑃steerin )⏟             
𝑃m ch
∙ 𝜂el
= (((𝑎 + 9.81 
m
s2
∙ (0.0233 + 0.0015 
s
r d
∙ 𝜔 ))
∙ 1,056 kg + 0.985 kgm2 ∙
𝑎
(0.14 m)2
) ∙ 𝜔 ∙ 0.14 m
+ 292.5 W) ∙ 𝜂el(𝜔 , 𝑇me h) 
(6-8) 
 
Figure 6-7 shows the result for this calculation, depicting the maximum output power of 
the accumulator (blue line) as well as the mechanically (yellow dotted line, including all 
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losses as described in sections 6.1.1.1 to 6.1.1.2) and electrically (red dashed line, includ-
ing the electrical efficiency, equation (6-8)) required power for all maximum acceleration 
and velocity amplitudes of the corresponding scaling factor. 
 
Figure 6-7: Power demand depending on the scaling factor (𝑃steerin  being the power required 
for steering, 𝑃𝜃𝑦𝑦  being the power required for overcoming mass moment of inertia, 𝑃  being the 
power required to overcome the driving resistances, 𝑃me h being the sum of the three aforemen-
tioned powers, 𝑃el being 𝑃me h divided by the corresponding electrical efficiency yielding the 
required electrical power demand, and  𝑃a  umulator being the power provided by the currently 
installed accumulator) 
The electrical power demand can be fulfilled up to scaling factors of 0.7. At higher 
scaling factors, the power output of the accumulator is insufficient. A mechanical power 
of about 250 kW is sufficient for unscaled driving simulation, whereas – in this case – the 
electrical power drawn from the accumulator is less than 300 kW. The first requirement 
is already fulfilled by the built-in electric motors. The second requirement can be fulfilled 
by employing three accumulators instead of one. No conclusions can be drawn for the 
full-scale WMDS, because different electric motors and a more detailed design would be 
needed. Still, the found results increase the confidence in the feasibility of the aspect 
power demand. 
Concluding, the aspect power demand cannot falsify hypothesis H1.1 when applying 
state-of-the-art accumulator and actuator technology. 
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6.3 Energy Demand 
6.3.1 Motion Energy Demand (HV) 
Four unscaled, representative urban driving scenarios (section 5.1.2) are simulated with 
the verified energy model of the virtual prototype and a WMDS mass of 1,302 kg (full 
setup, cf. section 3.6) to determine the maximum energy demand. The results are pre-
sented in Table 6.3, whereas the worst-case energy demand of urban driving scenario #1 
will be used for the evaluation. 
Table 6.3: Simulated energy demand for unscaled, representative, urban driving scenarios 
Urban driving scenario # 𝒕𝐬𝐢𝐦 in s 𝑬𝐬𝐢𝐦 in Wh ∅𝑷𝐬𝐢𝐦 in W 
1 3,500 10,908 11,220 
2 3,100 9,185 10,666 
3 2,900 7,700 9,559 
4 3,500 7,999 8,228 
Unfortunately, the hexapod was not operable and therefore no energy demand could be 
determined. Betz identified a Tripod’s average power demand for tilt coordination in an 
unscaled, representative urban driving scenario simulation based on the actuators’ lengths 
and velocities to be 32 W160. The average power required for holding the load was ne-
glected in simulation but estimated to be 100 W160. Adding an estimate for the power 
electronics’ average energy demand yields a total power demand of 200 W for the hexa-
pod’s TC task. 
6.3.2 Auxiliary Energy Demand (LV) 
A 12 V (DC) and a 24 V (DC) auxiliary electrical system with separate LV accumulators 
are used on MORPHEUS. Because the aim is to replace the LV accumulators with a 
DC/DC converter to solely use the HV accumulator, every auxiliary energy consumer’s 
energy demand is measured in every possible operating state. Adding each consumer’s 
maximum demand yields an overall worst-case power demand of 821.9 W, Table 6.4. 
Only the wireless emergency stops, the motor controllers, the power contactors, and the 
visual and audible representation system showed a significant increase in energy demand 
between idle and full operational: 
                                                 
160 Betz, A. et al.: Motion Analysis of a WMDS (2012). 
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Table 6.4: Auxiliary consumers' maximum power demand 
Auxiliary component 𝑷𝐦𝐚𝐱,𝐦𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐝 
IPG Roadbox 30.3 W 
Wireless emergency stop 2.3 W 
Programmable logic controller 3.5 W 
Magnetic clamps (safety system) 121.7 W 
Status LEDs 0.6 W 
Wireless router 4.8 W 
Motor controllers 78 W 
Battery Management Systems (BMS) 4 W 
Power contactors 3.6 W 
ADMA G-3 18.1 W 
Visual & audible representation system (comprised of four simulation com-
puters, Oculus Rift + camera, two monitors for system operator, fan, mock-up 
illumination, speakers, and HMI) 
555 W 
6.3.3 Discussion 
The worst-case average power demand for an unscaled, representative urban driving sce-
nario is 12.2 kW (11,220 W platform, 200 W hexapod, 822 W LV), which results in an 
energy demand of 24.4 kWh for a 2 h simulation run. Thus, the initial requirement for the 
energy demand is not met for the currently installed accumulator (532.8 V ∙ 10 Ah = 
5.33 kWh). Nevertheless, adding four further HV accumulators (mass 34 kg each) is rea-
sonable, especially if a DC/DC converter (e.g. Bel Power Solutions 700DNC40-12-xG 
with 4 kW output power161, mass 22 kg) compensates for the four LV accumulators (mass 
approx. 20 kg each), resulting in an added net weight of 78 kg. Of course, the mass in-
crease leads to an increase of the platform’s power demand, yielding an updated energy 
demand of 25.7 kWh for a 2 h simulation run, which can be fulfilled with the 
26.6 kWh energy of five HV accumulators. Also, the power demand requirement can 
be fulfilled with increased accumulator power.  
Even when considering the energy demand for the 0.3 scaled urban driving scenario (sec-
tion 6.1.2), a simulator runtime of 2 h 28 min is enabled with the current accumulator. If 
more demanding (i.e. more dynamic), manoeuvres are conducted, the average power de-
mand is expected to increase, thus, decreasing the possible simulation duration. Recalling 
the reasoning for the 2 h test drive requirement, being that longer simulation exposures 
                                                 
161 Bel Power Solutions: 700DNC40-12-xG DC/DC Converter Data Sheet (2017). p. 4. 
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increase the risk of simulator sickness (section 2.4), dynamically more demanding ma-
noeuvres would increase the susceptibility to simulator sickness. Therefore, shorter pos-
sible experiment durations compensate for the increased energy demand.  
Concluding, the aspect energy demand cannot falsify hypothesis H1.1 when applying 
state-of-the-art accumulator technology. 
6.4 Acceleration Cue Latency 
6.4.1 Variation of Acceleration Step Input Amplitude 
Recalling the methodology for measuring latency (section 4.3.2), lateral acceleration sig-
nals are used for these experiments, whereas the results are evaluated with different cri-
teria for lateral and longitudinal acceleration cue latency. Figure 6-8 describes the evalu-
ation methodology by showing an exemplary lateral acceleration step input (red point-
dashed line) and MORPEHUS’ lateral acceleration response (blue stars). Additionally, 
the IACL50 % (i.e. 50 % of target acceleration, purple dashed line) and IACLgain (i.e. 
0.2 m/s², black solid line) are shown.  
 
Figure 6-8: Exemplary acceleration time signals for a 4 m/s² lateral acceleration step input at 1 m/s 
longitudinal velocity (trial 1) 
Fifty percent of the target acceleration is reached after approximately 110 ms and 0.2 m/s² 
are reached after approximately 60 ms for this exemplary test drive. The table with the 
detailed results can be found in annexe B.1, whereas Figure 6-9 gives a graphical over-
view: 
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Figure 6-9: ACL50 % and ACLgain caused by an acceleration step input with varied initial velocities 
of 0 and 1 m/s and varied acceleration step input amplitude (values are averaged over six trials) 
The variation of the acceleration step input amplitude yields variable results for ACL50 %, 
Figure 6-9, because the IACL50 % is slightly dependent on the step input amplitude itself. 
For example, in a trial with a step input of 2 m/s² amplitude, the latency measurement 
time ends as soon as 1 m/s² (=IACL50 %) are measured, whereas with a step input of 8 m/s² 
amplitude, an acceleration of 4 m/s² must be measured. Thus, ACL50 % increases with the 
acceleration step input and reaches its maximum of 159 ms at 7 m/s² and 0 m/s. Still, the 
results are rather dependent on the IACL50 % than the input variation itself. The average 
of the relative Mean Standard Deviation (MSD) of each ACL50 % set of six trials (an-
nexe B.1 and B.3) is 4.4 %, proving the robustness of the IACL50 %. 
As expected, for the constant acceleration threshold based ACLgain can be stated that the 
acceleration step input amplitude has no major influence on latency. The relative MSD 
for the ACLgain is 17.4 % for 0 initial driving velocity and 10.9 % for 1 m/s initial driving 
velocity, respectively. The maximum ACLgain is reached at 6 and 7 m/s² and 0 m/s and is 
104 ms. The average of the relative MSD of each ACLgain set of six trials (annexe B.1 and 
B.3) is 14.6 %, showing that the IACLgain is more sensitive than the IACL50 %. 
Most important, an influence of the driving velocity on the ACL can be noted for both 
IACL, as ACL increases with decreasing driving velocity. 
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6.4.2 Variation of Initial Longitudinal Velocity 
The variation of the driving velocity yields variable results because of the relaxation 
length of the tire, as previously shown in Figure 6-9. Conducting experiments with higher 
initial velocities yields that ACL50 % and ACLgain decrease asymptotical with increasing 
driving velocity (and, therewith, increasing tire relaxation length), Figure 6-10. The de-
tailed results can be found in annexe B.3. 
 
Figure 6-10: ACL50 % and ACLgain caused by a constant acceleration or 90° steering angle step 
input with varied initial velocities (values are averaged over six trials) 
The maximum ACL in the constant acceleration step input experiments are found at 
standstill and are 155 ms for ACL50 % and 89 ms for ACLgain, respectively. Additionally, 
a 90° steering angle step input is investigated, wherein the maximum latencies are 65 ms 
and 121 ms for ACLgain and ACL50 %, respectively, and are found at 1 m/s. Noticeable is 
that the ACL50 % for the steering angle step input and the ACLgain for the acceleration step 
input do not decrease above initial velocities of about 2-3 m/s. For the earlier, this behav-
iour can be explained by the way the ACL50 % is calculated: Because no target acceleration 
is set, 50 % of the maximum measured acceleration are used as IACL50 %, thus, resulting 
in higher values for ACL50 % at higher velocities. For the latter, it is not entirely clear why 
this deviation from the expected behaviour arises. Possible reasons are measurement in-
accuracies, too few repetitions, a change in tire temperature (these were the last experi-
ments to be driven), the sensitivity of the IACLgain, or a combination of any of these rea-
sons. Because the resulting ACL is far below the requirements, the cause is not further 
investigated. 
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6.4.3 Discussion 
Two influencing factors (initial velocity, acceleration step input amplitude) and two con-
trol input methods (acceleration step input, steering angle step input) were researched. It 
was shown that the acceleration step input amplitude only affects ACL50 %, which is be-
cause IACL50 % is proportional to the acceleration step input amplitude. ACLgain showed 
no sensitivity on the acceleration step input (Figure 6-9). Therefore, latency itself is not 
dependent on the acceleration step input amplitude. The initial velocity, however, does 
have a major influence: Increasing the driving velocity decreases ACL because of the 
tires’ relaxation length. This effect is very distinctive at low speeds (Figure 6-9 and Figure 
6-10). The differences between the acceleration and steering angle step input are marginal 
(Figure 6-10), so that the control method seems to have no significant influence on the 
acceleration cue latency. 
The IACL50 % proved to yield very reproducible values for ACL50 %, whereas the IACLgain 
yielded less reproducible results. This is partly caused by the resolution of 2 ms of the 
time signal, but also by signal disturbance, whose influence is greater on signals with low 
amplitudes (IACLgain < IACL50 % for target amplitudes above 0.4 m/s²). The require-
ments of staying below 135 ms for ACL50 % and 100 ms for ACLgain, respectively, are 
not met (ACL50 %,max = 159 ms, ACLgain,max = 104 ms). However, for driving velocities 
of 1 m/s and higher, ACL50 %,max is 139 ms and ACLgain,max is 66 ms. Furthermore, the 
requirement for ACL50 % is set by an electric car with a controller that is optimized for 
instantaneous acceleration. Standard electric cars (e.g. Tesla Model S) need about 250 ms 
for providing 50 % of the target acceleration. 
No direct assessment can be derived for the full-scale WMDS. However, if the novel 
control approach of keeping the WMDS in motion is implemented and if the steering 
power is increased appropriately (considering moment of inertia, wheel load, tire width, 
and tire-road-friction coefficient), the latency requirements can be fulfilled by state-of-
the-art technology for full-scale WMDS, too. 
Concluding, the aspect of motion cue latency cannot falsify hypothesis H1.1, considering 
the average relative MSD of 14.6 % for ACLgain measurements, the restrictive require-
ment for ACL50 %, and the control approach to keep the simulator in motion at any time 
so that the driving velocity will never become 0. 
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7 Safety Architecture 
A safety architecture is defined as a “set of elements and their interaction to fulfil the 
safety requirements”162. These safety requirements (also called safety goals) have been 
established for the WMDS prototype MORPHEUS and its unique design. The results of 
the following risk assessment cannot directly be transferred onto any DS or even the full-
scale WMDS. Nevertheless, the risk is assessed for a specific system topology whereas 
the components are generic. Thus, the assessment is independent of specific components 
and the established safety requirements are valid for the specified architecture and there-
with all instances derived from this architecture. For architectural design changes, meth-
ods for adapting an existing risk assessment exist. The specific results for MORPHEUS 
will be adapted towards a more general application of a full-scale WMDS in section 7.4. 
Of course, the quality of the risk analysis and evaluation strongly depends on the expertise 
of the engineer conducting the analysis. The herein presented risk assessment (sec-
tions 7.1 and 7.2) has been carried out by the author who designed, built, and conducted 
numerous experiments with MORPHEUS and been separately and thoroughly reviewed 
by an engineer who is familiar with the system but no expert for WMDS as well as by a 
team of two expert engineers who were involved in the development of MORPHEUS and 
are also experienced in operating the prototype. Still, this cannot guarantee 100 % safety, 
which is why a transparent and exhaustive documentation of the HARA is attached in 
annexe B. Thus, false assumptions or missing failures, consequences, or situations can 
easily be amended while still being able to keep most of the HARA. 
Section 7.1 shows the results of the risk analysis, namely the hazard identification (sec-
tion 7.1.2) and the risk estimation (section 7.1.3). Together with section 7.2, risk evalua-
tion, the risk assessment process according to EN ISO 13849 (Figure 2-17) is completed. 
A proposed safety architecture for fulfilling the formulated safety requirements is given 
in section 7.3 together with an exemplary application of the architecture and an evaluation 
of achieved risk reduction as well as a risk assessment of the newly introduced compo-
nents and functions.  
                                                 
162 ISO TC 22/SC 32 Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects: ISO 26262 (2011). 
p. 14. 
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7.1 Risk Analysis 
7.1.1 Determination of the Limits of Machinery 
The system under investigation is the WMDS prototype MORPHEUS (Figure 3-4), 
fully equipped for driving simulation with a test person. The risk will not be assessed for 
the entire lifecycle of the system but is focussed on the operation and maintenance of 
the system. Further investigations would be needed for the production and disposal phase 
of the lifecycle. The energy supply is entirely electric (hazardous element).  
7.1.1.1 Users 
Humans that are possibly interacting with the system are (target and threat): 
• System engineer(s) (trained in the interaction with HV systems) 
• Mechanic(s)/Maintenance personnel (trained in the interaction with HV systems) 
• System operator(s) (trained in the interaction with HV systems) 
• Test person 
• Uninvolved persons (e.g. bystanders) 
• Emergency personnel 
7.1.1.2 Use Cases 
• Driving Simulation (indirectly controlled by test person inside the WMDS and 
directly controlled by system operator outside the WMDS) 
• Maintenance (e.g. replacing the accumulator) 
• Test drives (e.g. with a new MCA setup) 
• Transportation (self-propelled or externally propelled) 
• Storage 
• Emergency rescue (e.g. test person from the WMDS’ dome) 
7.1.1.3 Components/Subsystems/Structure 
The architecture of the prototype itself is structured into seven E/E/PE subsystems, 
whereas all subsystems are mounted to MORPHEUS’ structure, except for the external 
command device that is used stationary and close to MORPHEUS’ driving area:  
1. Steering units (cf. section 3.2.1) 
2. Drive units (cf. section 3.2.1) 
3. Hexapod (cf. section 3.2.2) 
4. Mock-up (cf. section 3.2.2) 
5. External command device 
6. WMDS dynamics control (cf. sections  3.3 to 3.5 and section 5.3) 
7. Power supply (cf. section 3.2.2) 
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In the following, these seven subsystems’ components, the power and data signal flow 
within each subsystem and between the subsystems as well as interacting users are de-
scribed for the chosen architecture. Furthermore, the specific implementation (compo-
nents, power and data signal flow) in MORPHEUS is shown. A list of all built-in compo-
nents of MORPHEUS can be found in annexe C.1. 
Each steering and drive unit E/E/PE subsystem consists of an electric motor (actuator), 
a motor controller (electronic control unit), and sensors for motor speed (i.e. resolver) and 
temperature. Additionally, the motor controller has a built-in temperature sensor, a built-
in current sensor, and built-in voltage sensors for the input high-voltage supply, the input 
auxiliary-voltage supply, and the output (high-) voltage supply. All sensor signals are pro-
cessed in the motor controllers. Each motor controller itself communicates with the cen-
tral control unit (electronic control unit), from where the controllers get their target values. 
Thus, the steering and drive units do not communicate directly with each other but only 
through the central control unit. Because the motor controllers and their programming 
software are purchased, the safety analysis does not cover the motor controller as an 
E/E/PE system itself, but rather as a black box reacting to inputs. The energy for the motor 
controllers is supplied by the LV and HV accumulators of the power supply E/E/PE sub-
system. When braking, energy is recuperated from the electric motors, forwarded to the 
motor controllers, and sent back to the HV accumulator. The steering and drive unit 
E/E/PE subsystems are only directly interacted with by the maintenance personnel and/or 
system engineer(s). 
Figure 7-1 gives an overview of the components that are included in MORPHEUS’ steer-
ing and drive unit E/E/PE subsystems, whereas the italic labels represent sensors and ar-
rows indicate the direction of flow of power and information signals:  
 
Figure 7-1: MORPHEUS’ steering/drive unit E/E/PE subsystem  
Power supply E/E/PE subsystem
WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystem
Steering/Drive unit E/E/PE subsystem
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Legend: 12/24 V sensor cable 532.8 V individual voltage CAN
Auxiliary battery
Traction battery
Central control unit
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The hexapod E/E/PE subsystem consists of six electric linear actuators, a power elec-
tronics unit, and sensors for the actuators’ position and temperature. The sensor setup of 
the power electronics is not known. The power electronics sends and receives data to/from 
the central control unit. In contrast to the steering and drive units, the power electronics 
unit communicates with all six linear actuators. Because the power electronics unit is pur-
chased, the safety analysis does not cover the power electronics as an E/E/PE system 
itself, but rather as a black box reacting to inputs. The energy for the power electronics is 
supplied by the HV accumulator of the power supply E/E/PE subsystem. The hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystem is only directly interacted with by the maintenance personnel and/or 
system engineer(s). 
Figure 7-2 gives an overview of the components that are included in the MORPHEUS’ 
hexapod E/E/PE subsystem, whereas the italic labels represent sensors and arrows indi-
cate the direction of flow of power and information signals:  
 
Figure 7-2: MORPHEUS’ hexapod E/E/PE subsystem  
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The mock-up E/E/PE subsystem senses gear selection, steering wheel angle, and clutch, 
brake, and accelerator pedal position, which are commanded by the test person (sensors). 
Active steering wheel force feedback and an ABS shaker (actuators) provide tactile feed-
back to the driver. A vision system (e.g. screens, projectors, or a head-mounted display) 
and a sound system provide visual and audible feedback to the driver. A communication 
system allows bidirectional oral communication with the system operator. A surveillance 
system monitors the test person (e.g. seating position, health, safety belt, etc.). An air 
conditioning system provides a pleasant climate for the test person. The system operator 
sets the target values for air temperature and humidity manually. All information gathered 
in the mock-up itself is forwarded to the central control unit (electronic control unit). The 
communication and surveillance system, on the other hand, communicates directly with 
the communication and surveillance system of the external command device E/E/PE sub-
system through a wireless protocol. The power is supplied by an AC/DC converter of the 
power supply E/E/PE subsystem. The mock-up E/E/PE subsystem is directly interacted 
with by the test person, maintenance personnel, system engineer(s), and eventually emer-
gency personnel. 
Figure 7-3 gives an overview of the components that are included in MORPHEUS’ mock-
up E/E/PE subsystem, whereas the italic labels represent sensors/interfaces and arrows 
indicate the direction of flow of power and information signals:  
 
Figure 7-3: MORPHEUS’ mock-up E/E/PE subsystem  
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The external command device E/E/PE subsystem is the HMI between system opera-
tor(s) and WMDS. The HMI senses the operator’s inputs and forwards the input signals 
to the central control unit. With the HMI, the operator can start and stop simulation runs, 
change simulation parameters, and control specific functions of the WMDS (e.g. manual 
drive). Also, he can communicate orally and bidirectional with the test person. Relevant 
information about the WMDS’ state is retrieved from the central control unit through a 
wireless protocol and shown on the HMI. The communication and surveillance system, 
on the other hand, communicates directly and wirelessly with the communication and 
surveillance system in the mock-up E/E/PE subsystem. The power is supplied by a sta-
tionary power supply (i.e. power socket) of the power supply E/E/PE subsystem. The 
system operator(s), maintenance personnel, system engineer(s), and possibly mechanic(s) 
interact directly with the external command device E/E/PE subsystem. 
Figure 7-4 gives an overview of the components that are included in MORPHEUS’ ex-
ternal command device E/E/PE subsystem, whereas the italic labels represent inputs/in-
terfaces and arrows indicate the direction of flow of power and information signals:  
 
Figure 7-4: MORPHEUS’ external command device E/E/PE subsystem  
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The WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystem consists of the central control unit 
(electronic control unit) and a measurement unit for motion quantities (sensors, namely 
translational and rotational acceleration and velocity as well as the absolute position 
within a reference COS). These signals are gathered together with the sensor signals from 
the steering and drive units, the hexapod, and the mock-up in the central control unit to 
calculate the overall WMDS state. From here, the vehicle simulation, the MCA, and the 
MC are executed and target values for the subsystems 1-4 are calculated. The communi-
cation with the external command device E/E/PE subsystem is wireless. Power is supplied 
by the auxiliary battery of the power supply E/E/PE subsystem. The WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE subsystem is only directly interacted with by the system engineer(s) and 
possibly mechanic(s). 
Figure 7-5 gives an overview of the components that are included in MORPHEUS’ dy-
namic control E/E/PE subsystem, whereas the italic labels represent sensors and arrows 
indicate the direction of flow of power and information signals:  
 
Figure 7-5: MORPHEUS’ dynamics control subsystem  
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The power supply E/E/PE subsystem consists of a traction battery (HV), an auxiliary 
battery (LV), a stationary power connector (power socket), and an AC/DC converter (all 
hazardous elements). The converter transforms the direct current of the auxiliary battery 
to alternating current. The auxiliary BMS (electronic control unit) monitors its voltage 
(sensor). The traction BMS (electronic control unit) monitors its temperature, voltage, 
and current (sensors) and can operate its power contactors (actuator). If the temperature 
is in a critical range or if the voltage or current are above a certain threshold, the traction 
battery’s power supply is cut. LV power is provided to the steering unit, drive unit, and 
WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystems; HV power to the steering unit, drive unit, 
and hexapod E/E/PE subsystems. Alternating current is provided to the mock-up (from 
AC/DC converter) and the external command device (from stationary power connector) 
E/E/PE subsystems. The state of charge (SOC) of the traction and auxiliary battery is 
forwarded to the central control unit. Because the auxiliary and traction batteries and their 
BMS are purchased, the safety analysis does not cover the batteries as an E/E/PE system 
themselves, but rather as black boxes reacting to inputs. The power supply E/E/PE sub-
system is only directly interacted with by the system engineer(s) and possibly mechanic(s) 
and/or the system operator(s). 
Figure 7-6 gives an overview of the components that are included in MORPHEUS’ power 
supply E/E/PE subsystem, whereas the italic labels represent signals and arrows indicate 
the direction of flow of power and information signals:  
 
Figure 7-6: MORPHEUS’ power supply E/E/PE subsystem  
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7.1.1.4 Environment 
The controlled environment, in which the system will be used, can be inside (e.g. a hall) 
or outside (e.g. a vehicle dynamics test area) and includes the following conditions:  
• Air temperature: -10 °C to +45 °C 
• Humidity: 0 % to 85 % (condensation must be avoided) 
• Direct solar radiation 
• Paved undergrounds with no obstacles (objects and subjects; WMDS workspace 
must be inspected before the DS may move; boundaries of the workspace must be 
highlighted and monitored or cordoned off so that subjects cannot enter the work-
space) and sufficient tire-underground friction coefficient (i.e. no ice or snow) 
• No rain or fog 
• Low level of pollution (for E/E/PE components) 
• Wind up to level 6 on the Beaufort scale (i.e. strong breeze with wind speeds up 
to 49 km/h, description: “Large branches in motion; whistling heard in telegraph 
wires; umbrellas used with difficulty”) resulting – at -10 °C air temperature – in a 
wind chill temperature163 of -21.7 °C. 
7.1.2 Hazard Identification 
The methodology for the hazard identification is described in section 4.4.2. Each subsys-
tem’s components and their interconnections are investigated and – in combination with 
the guidewords from the HAZOP analysis – evaluated, which failures might occur. Be-
cause the extent of the hazard list is too large to be shown within this thesis, the complete 
list is attached in annexe C.2 (columns “failure” and “consequence”). At this point, 
three examples are selected to demonstrate the application of the methodology. 
7.1.2.1 Hazard 1.2 (Steering Unit E/E/PE Subsystem) 
Failure:  No or insufficient LV energy supply 
Consequence:  The motor controller is unable to process its signals → demanded steer-
ing angle cannot be provided → DS trajectory is uncontrollable 
The LV energy supply is only connected to the motor controller in a steering unit E/E/PE 
subsystem. If the voltage supplied by the LV energy supply is insufficient, the motor con-
troller automatically shuts itself down. Thus, the target values from the WMDS driving 
dynamics control subsystem cannot be processed by the motor controller. The electric 
steering motor cannot be controlled by the motor controller and the demanded DS trajec-
tory cannot be realized because the required steering angles cannot be adjusted. 
                                                 
163 Osczevski, R.; Bluestein, M.: Wind Chill Equivalent Temperature Chart (2005). 
7 Safety Architecture 
96 
7.1.2.2 Hazard 2.8 (Drive Unit E/E/PE Subsystem) 
Failure:  Temperature sensor delivers no/too low/high electric motor temperature 
signals 
Consequence 1: Motor controller reduces maximum electric motor torque or shuts elec-
tric motor down → demanded motor torque cannot be provided → DS 
trajectory is not controllable 
Consequence 2: Motor controller fails to reduce electric motor torque or to shut electric 
motor down → overheating of electric motor → possibly short circuit 
and/or fire hazard 
Here, two consequences are possible. One consequence is that, although the electric mo-
tor is operated within its specifications, the temperature sensors may send a signal to the 
motor controller that the electric motor is too cold, too hot, or sends no signal at all. In all 
these cases the motor controller would either reduce the maximum electric motor torque 
or shut down the electric motor completely. A possible outcome would be that the de-
manded motor torque cannot be provided due to the derating or shutdown of the drive 
motor. 
The other possible consequence is that the electric motor is outside its specified temper-
ature range, although the temperature sensor sends an uncritical signal. Then, the motor 
controller would not reduce the maximum electric motor torque or shut the motor down. 
This could cause the electric motor to overheat, possibly resulting in a short circuit or a 
fire hazard. 
7.1.2.3 Hazard 4.20 (Mock-up E/E/PE Subsystem) 
Failure: Water ingress at steering wheel 
Consequence 1:  Short circuit and possibly fire hazard 
Consequence 2: Steering wheel force feedback actuator is unable to operate → false cues 
are generated 
Consequence 3: Steering wheel angle sensor is unable to operate → false cues are gen-
erated 
The first consequence of water ingress at the steering wheel could be a short circuit and 
possibly a fire hazard. 
The second consequence is a possible malfunction of the steering wheel force feedback 
actuator. Then, the test person would not get tactile feedback about the virtual car’s driv-
ing state, resulting in a degenerated immersion. 
The third potential consequence is a malfunction of the steering wheel angle sensor. In 
this case, the test person’s steering angle input could not be sensed. The virtual car and, 
thus, the DS would not follow the desired trajectory, resulting in false cues. This hazard 
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is not critical in terms of the WMDS’ trajectory, because the trajectory of the virtual car 
is not directly linked to the trajectory of the WMDS that is calculated by the WMDS 
dynamics control subsystem. Thus, collisions are avoided independently of the test per-
son’s input. 
7.1.3 Risk Estimation 
The identified hazards are investigated in each use case, with each user and in each envi-
ronmental condition to find the most critical combination. This combination results in a 
description of the worst-case situation, in which the hazard occurs. The elements failure, 
consequence, and situation describe the full hazardous event, whose risk is now to be 
evaluated. Therefore, the risk parameters C, F, P, and W (see Table 2.4, section 2.3.2) are 
estimated according to IEC 61508 and the hazardous event’s risk is determined with the 
risk graph method (see Figure 2-16, section 2.3.2). The full list of 186 evaluated combi-
nations of failures, consequences, and situations can be found in annexe C.2. For demon-
strating the application of the prescribed methodology, the risk for the same three exam-
ples as described in the previous section is estimated: 
7.1.3.1 Hazardous Event 1.2 (Steering Unit E/E/PE Subsystem) 
Failure:  No or insufficient LV energy supply 
Consequence:  DS trajectory is uncontrollable 
Situation:  Driving simulation with test person, high velocity, close to boundary of 
DS workspace 
The worst situation, in which hazard 1.2 could occur, is the driving simulation use case 
with a test person, whereas the WMDS moves with high (close to maximum) velocity and 
close to the boundary of the DS workspace. If the hazard occurs and the WMDS’ trajec-
tory is uncontrollable, the WMDS might crash into objects and/or subjects outside its 
workspace boundaries. The risk for this hazardous event is estimated as follows: 
Consequence: C3 (Death to several people) 
The test person and/or bystanders and/or the system operator(s) may be 
injured and/or killed. 
Frequency: F2 (Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone) 
The driving simulation use case is the standard application for the EUC 
and is very frequently used. Also, the boundaries of the workspace are 
reached often, and high velocities are driven. 
Poss. of avoid.: P2 (Almost impossible) 
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Although the system operator is skilled, a LV power cut occurs very 
suddenly and can hardly be foreseen prior to the hazardous event. Once 
the hazard has occurred, the system operator has no possibility of miti-
gating the event, because he cannot steer the WMDS anymore. 
Probability: W1 (A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will come 
to pass, and only a few unwanted occurrences likely) 
Standard LV accumulators and a standard BMS are used, which makes 
a LV power cut more unlikely than a HV power cut, where a prototype 
HV accumulator is used in combination with a safety-orientated BMS. 
The combination of the risk parameters results in a SIL of 2 for hazardous event 1.2. 
7.1.3.2 Hazardous Event 2.8 (Drive Unit E/E/PE Subsystem) 
Failure:  Temperature sensor delivers no/too low/high electric motor temperature 
signals 
Consequence 1: DS trajectory is uncontrollable 
Situation 1: Driving simulation with test person, high velocity, close to boundary of 
DS workspace 
For consequence 1, the same situation is used as in hazardous event 1.2: Driving simula-
tion with a test person, whereas the WMDS moves with high (close to maximum) velocity 
and close to the boundary of the DS workspace. The risk for this hazardous event is esti-
mated as follows: 
Consequence: C3 (Death to several people) 
The test person and/or bystanders and/or the system operator(s) may be 
injured and/or killed. 
Frequency: F2 (Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone) 
The driving simulation use case is the standard application for the EUC 
and is very frequently used. Also, the boundaries of the workspace are 
reached often, and high velocities are driven. 
Poss. of avoid.: P1 (Possible under certain conditions) 
The skilled system operator can observe the temperature and, therefore, 
detect a faulty temperature signal. Furthermore, if only one temperature 
sensor and, therewith, electric motors fails, acceleration/deceleration is 
still possible to some extent with the other two electric motors. Steering 
and mitigation are possible as well. 
Probability: W1 (A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will come 
to pass, and only a few unwanted occurrences likely) 
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The supplier developed its electric motor (and temperature sensor) ac-
cording to applicable standards. The motor is also used in light aircrafts. 
The combination of the risk parameters results in a SIL of 1 for hazardous event 2.8.1. 
Consequence 2: Short circuit and/or fire hazard 
Situation 2: Driving simulation with test person, test person must be rescued from 
dome 
For consequence 2, another situation is identified: A high risk exists with the driving sim-
ulation use case with an unskilled test person in case of short circuit and/or fire. The test 
person will get injured and so may be the emergency personnel that is trying to rescue the 
test person. The risk for this hazardous event is estimated as follows: 
Consequence: C3 (Death to several people) 
The test person and/or the emergency personnel may be seriously in-
jured or killed by either short circuit or fire. 
Frequency: F2 (Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone) 
The driving simulation use case is the standard application for the EUC 
and is very frequently used. 
Poss. of avoid.: P1 (Possible under certain conditions) 
The skilled system operator can observe the temperature and therefore 
detect a faulty temperature signal. Mitigation is possible. 
Probability: W1 (A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will come 
to pass, and only a few unwanted occurrences likely) 
The suppliers developed their electric motor (and temperature sensor) 
and motor controller according to applicable standards. The motor is 
also used in light aircrafts.  
The combination of the risk parameters results in a SIL of 1 for hazardous event 2.8.2. 
7.1.3.3 Hazardous Event 4.20 (Mock-up E/E/PE Subsystem) 
Failure: Water ingress at steering wheel 
Consequence 1:  Short circuit and possibly fire hazard 
Situation 1: Driving simulation with test person, test person must be rescued from 
dome 
For consequence 1, the worst situation is any driving simulation use case with a test per-
son. The test person will get injured and so may be the emergency personnel that is trying 
to rescue the test person. The risk for this hazardous event is estimated as follows: 
Consequence: C3 (Death to several people) 
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The test person and/or the emergency personnel may be seriously in-
jured or killed either by short circuit or fire. 
Frequency: F2 (Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone) 
The driving simulation use case is the standard application for the EUC 
and is very frequently used.  
Poss. of avoid.: P1 (Possible under certain conditions) 
The skilled system operator can take countermeasures if rain/snow etc. 
arises so that no water ingress can be caused by weather. Mitigation is 
possible. 
Probability: W2 (A slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will come to 
pass, and few unwanted occurrences are likely) 
The previously determined limits of the machinery exclude wet and 
moist environmental conditions. Still, users interacting with the system 
could bring liquid, e.g. for drinking. 
The combination of the risk parameters results in a SIL of 2 for hazardous event 4.20.1. 
Consequence 2: False cues are generated 
Consequence 3: False cues are generated 
Situation 2/3: Driving simulation with test person, dynamic driving situation 
For consequence 2 and 3, the worst situation is the driving simulation use case with a test 
person, whereas the WMDS moves with high amplitude and frequency accelerations. The 
risk for this hazardous event is estimated as follows: 
Consequence: C1 (Minor injury) 
Because of the representation of false cues in a highly dynamic driving 
situation, motion sickness may occur. 
Frequency: F2 (Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone) 
The driving simulation use case is the standard application for the EUC 
and is very frequently used. Also, highly dynamic driving situations are 
very frequently simulated. 
Poss. of avoid.: P1 (Possible under certain conditions) 
The skilled system operator can take countermeasures if rain/snow etc. 
arises so that no water ingress can be caused by weather. Mitigation is 
possible. 
Probability: W2 (A slight probability that the unwanted occurrences will come to 
pass, and few unwanted occurrences are likely) 
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The previously determined limits of the machinery exclude wet and 
moist environmental conditions. Still, users interacting with the system 
could bring liquid, e.g. for drinking. 
The combination of the risk parameters results in a SIL of a for the hazardous 
events 4.20.2 and 4.20.3. 
7.2 Risk Evaluation 
From the hazard list, safety requirements are established, whereas each safety function 
requirement is assigned to a safety integrity requirement (i.e. SIL). Safety function re-
quirements with a safety integrity requirement of level a are rather requirements for qual-
ity management than functional safety. It is important to understand that some safety 
functions requirements cannot be fulfilled to the full extent in which they are formulated 
because there is no 100 % guarantee that a failure will not occur. Here, the safety integrity 
requirement defines the likelihood with which a failure is allowed to occur. Sections 7.2.1 
to 7.2.5 present the safety function requirements, classified by their highest corresponding 
safety integrity requirement. The underlying hazardous event as well as the risk classifi-
cation is pointed out for every safety function requirement, denoted after each require-
ment with the nomenclature (No. of hazardous event; C level, F level, P level, W level). 
Concluding, a summary of the required safety functions is given in section 7.2.6.  
7.2.1 SIL 4 Safety Function Requirements 
• The DS trajectory must remain controllable (so that collisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided) in case of 
o a faulty data transmission from the central control unit to the drive unit 
subsystem (No. 6.9; C3, F2, P2, W3) 
7.2.2 SIL 3 Safety Function Requirements 
• The DS trajectory must remain controllable (so that collisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided) in case of 
o a faulty data transmission from  
▪ the central control unit to the external command device subsystem 
(No. 6.12; C3, F1, P2, W3) 
▪ the central control unit to the hexapod subsystem (No. 6.10; C3, 
F1, P2, W3) 
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▪ the central control unit to the steering unit subsystem (No. 6.8; C3, 
F1, P2, W3) 
o an HV power cut (No. 7.1; C3, F2, P2, W2) 
o an overvoltage from the steering/drive unit subsystem (during recupera-
tion) (No. 7.6.1; C3, F2, P1, W3) 
• Continuous short circuit must be avoided so that during a rescue other subjects 
cannot get an electric shock (No. 7.6.2; C3, F2, P1, W3) 
• HV overvoltage (because of recuperation) must be avoided (No. 7.6.2; C3, F2, 
P1, W3) 
7.2.3 SIL 2 Safety Function Requirements 
• The DS trajectory must remain controllable (so that collisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided) in case of 
o a faulty auxiliary battery's SOC signal to the WMDS dynamics control 
system (No. 7.15; C3, F2, P2, W1) 
o a faulty traction battery's SOC signal to the WMDS dynamics control sys-
tem (No. 7.14; C3, F2, P2, W1) 
o a faulty data transmission from  
▪ the external command device to the WMDS dynamics control sub-
system (No. 5.5; C3, F1, P2, W2) 
▪ the central control unit to the mock-up subsystem (No. 6.11; C1, 
F2, P2, W3) 
▪ a motor controller to the central control unit (No. 1.14 & 2.14; C3, 
F2, P2, W1) 
o an HV overvoltage (No. 1.3.1 & 2.3.1; C3, F2, P1, W2; No. 7.2.1; C3, F2, 
P2, W1) 
o an LV power cut (No. 6.1; C3, F2, P2, W1) 
o an AC/DC converter overvoltage (No. 7.4.1; C3, F2, P2, W1) 
o a faulty measurement from the measurement unit for motion quantities 
(No. 6.13; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o water ingress at  
▪ the measurement unit for motion quantities (No. 6.4.2; C3, F2, P1, 
W2) 
▪ an electric motor (No. 1.12.3 & 2.12.3; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
▪ the central control unit (No. 6.3.2; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
▪ a motor controller (No. 1.13.3 & 2.13.3; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
▪ the AC/DC converter (No. 7.9.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
▪ an auxiliary battery (No. 7.8.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
▪ the traction battery (No. 7.7.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
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• AC/DC converter overvoltage must be avoided (No. 7.4.1 & 7.4.2; C3, F2, P2, 
W1) 
• Auxiliary battery's temperature must be monitored (No. 7.12; C3, F2, P2, W1) 
• Water ingress at the following components must be avoided 
o AC/DC converter (No. 7.9.1 & 7.9.2; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o auxiliary battery (No. 7.8.1 & 7.8.2; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o electric motor (No. 1.12.1, 1.12.3, 2.12.1 & 2.12.3; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o motor controller (No. 1.13.1, 1.13.3, 2.13.1 & 2.13.3; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o hexapod actuator (No. 3.11.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o hexapod power electronics (No. 3.12.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o stationary power connector (No. 7.10.2; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o measurement unit for motion quantities (No. 6.4.1 & 6.4.2; C3, F2, P1, 
W2) 
o external command device (No. 5.3.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o central control unit (No. 6.3.1 & 6.3.2; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o pedals (No. 4.21.1, 4.22.1, 4.23.1 & 4.24.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o sound system (No. 4.19.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o steering wheel (No. 4.20.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o visual representation system (No. 4.18.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
o traction battery (No. 7.7.1; C3, F2, P1, W2) 
• The test person must be able to communicate with the system operator and 
vice versa in case of  
o a faulty data transmission from the external command device to the 
WMDS dynamics control subsystem (No. 5.6; C2, F2, P2, W2) 
• The wireless data transmission must not fail (No. 5.6; C2, F2, P2, W2) 
7.2.4 SIL 1 Safety Function Requirements 
• The DS trajectory must remain controllable (so that collisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided) in case of 
o a faulty data transmission from the measurement unit for motion quantities 
to the central control unit (No. 6.7; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
o an LV overvoltage (No. 1.4.1, 2.4.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2 & 7.3.1; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
o a stationary power cut (No. 5.1.1 & 5.1.2; C3, F1, P2, W1) 
o water ingress at the 
▪ external command device (No. 5.3.2; C3, F1, P1, W2) 
▪ stationary power connector (No. 7.10.1; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
o a malfunctioning 
▪ measurement unit for motion quantities (No. 6.6.1; C3, F2, P1, 
W1) 
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▪ central control unit (No. 6.5.1; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
▪ AC/DC converter (No. 7.13.1; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
▪ electric motor (No. 1.5.1, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8.1, 1.10.1, 2.5.1, 2.6, 2.7, 
2.8.1 & 2.10.1; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
▪ motor controller (No. 1.9.1, 1.11.1, 2.9.1 & 2.11.1; C3, F2, P1, 
W1) 
▪ traction battery (No. 7.11.1; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
• A stationary power overvoltage must be avoided (No. 5.2.2; C3, F2, P1, W1) 
• Water ingress at the following components must be avoided 
o air conditioning system (No. 4.24.2; C2, F2, P2, W1) 
o communication system (No. 4.22.2; C2, F2, P1, W2) 
• Air conditioning must be available (No. 4.24.2; C2, F2, P2, W1) 
• The test person must be able to communicate with the system operator and vice 
versa in case of 
o water ingress at the communication system (No. 4.22.2; C2, F2, P1, W2) 
• The test person must remain accessible in case of  
o a HV power cut (No. 3.1; C2, F1, P2, W2) 
• The service engineer(s) and/or mechanic(s) or test person must not be seri-
ously injured or killed if the dome becomes loose or instable (No. 3.3.2, 3.5, 
3.7.1 & 3.10; C3, F1, P2, W1; No. 3.3.1; C2, F2, P2, W1) 
7.2.5 SIL a Safety Function Requirements 
• The DS trajectory must remain controllable (so that collisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided) in case of 
o a malfunctioning external command device (No. 1.5.2; C3, F1, P1, W1) 
o a stationary power connector overvoltage (No. 5.2.1 & 7.5.1; C3, F1, P1, 
W1) 
• Water ingress at the following components must be avoided 
o surveillance system (No. 4.23.2; C2, F1, P1, W2) 
• Test person must be able to communicate with the system operator and vice versa 
in case of 
o an AC/DC converter power cut (No. 4.1.2; C2, F1, P2, W1) 
o an AC/DC converter overvoltage (No. 4.2.3; C2, F1, P1, W1) 
o a malfunctioning communication system (No. 4.15.1, C2, F1, P1, W2) 
o Water ingress at the external command device (No. 5.3.2; C2, F1, P1, W2) 
o a faulty data transmission from the mock-up's communication system to 
the external command device's communication system (No. 4.25; C2, F1, 
P1, W2) 
o a stationary power cut (No. 5.1.3; C2, F1, P2, W1) 
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• The following signals must be correctly sensed  
o Accelerator pedal position (No. 4.2.1, 4.14.1 & 4.21.3; C1, F2, P1, W1; 
No. 4.1.1; C1, F2, P2, W1) 
o Brake pedal position (No. 4.2.1, 4.6, 4.14.1 & 4.21.3; C1, F2, P1, W1; 
No. 4.1.1; C1, F2, P2, W1) 
o Clutch pedal position (No. 4.2.1, 4.5, 4.14.1 & 4.21.3; C1, F2, P1, W1; 
No. 4.1.1; C1, F2, P2, W1) 
o Gear selection (No. 4.2.1, 4.3 & 4.14.1; C1, F2, P1, W1; No. 4.1.1; C1, 
F2, P2, W1) 
o Steering wheel angle (No. 4.2.1 & 4.4; C1, F2, P2, W1; No. 4.14.1 & 
4.20.3; C1, F2, P1, W1; No. 4.1.1; C1, F2, P2, W1) 
• The following cues must be correctly provided  
o ABS shaker feedback (No. 4.2.2, 4.9 & 4.13.1; C1, F2, P1, W1; 
No. 4.21.2; C1, F2, P1, W2; No. 4.1.3; C1, F2, P2, W1; No. 4.1.4; C3, F1, 
P1, W1) 
o acoustical feedback (No. 4.2.2, 4.10 & 4.13.1; C1, F2, P1, W1; No. 4.19.2; 
C1, F2, P1, W2; No. 4.1.3; C1, F2, P2, W1; No. 4.1.4; C3, F1, P1, W1) 
o steering wheel force feedback (No. 4.2.2, 4.8 & 4.13.1; C1, F2, P1, W1; 
No. 4.20.2; C1, F2, P1, W2; No. 4.1.3; C1, F2, P2, W1; No. 4.1.4; C3, F1, 
P1, W1) 
o visual feedback (No. 4.2.2, 4.11 & 4.13.1; C1, F2, P1, W1; No. 4.18.2; C1, 
F2, P1, W2; No. 4.1.3; C1, F2, P2, W1; No. 4.1.4; C3, F1, P1, W1) 
• Malfunctioning hexapod’s power electronics must be avoided (No. 3.7.2; C1, F2, 
P2, W1) 
• The system operator must be able to monitor the test person (No. 4.1.5 & 4.1.6; 
C2, F1, P2, W1; No. 4.2.4 & 4.16.1; C2, F1, P1, W1; No. 4.23.2 & 4.26; C2, F1, 
P1, W2) 
• The test person must remain accessible in case of 
o a faulty data transmission from the hexapod’s power electronics to the 
central control unit (No. 3.13; C2, F1, P2, W1) 
o a malfunctioning hexapod actuator (No. 3.4, 3.6.1, 3.8.1 & 3.9.1; C2, F1, 
P1, W1; No. 3.11.4; C2, P1, F1, W2) 
o an HV overvoltage (No. 3.2.1; C2, F1, P1, W2) 
• The test person's inputs must be correctly forwarded to the central control unit 
(No. 4.14.1; C1, F2, P1, W1) 
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7.2.6 Conclusion 
SIL a safety requirements are not considered in the following. Also, case discriminations 
are left out so that hazards are addressed in general and the highest demanded safety in-
tegrity requirement is assigned to the generalised hazards. Concluding, the following 
safety functions must be provided: 
1. The DS trajectory must remain controllable so that collisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided. (SIL 4) 
2. Continuous short circuit must be avoided so that during a rescue other subjects 
cannot get an electric shock. (SIL 3) 
3. HV overvoltage (because of recuperation) must be avoided. (SIL 3) 
4. AC/DC converter overvoltage must be avoided. (SIL 2) 
5. Auxiliary battery's temperature must be monitored. (SIL 2) 
6. Water ingress at all E/E/PE systems must be avoided. (SIL 2) 
7. The test person must be able to communicate with the system operator and vice 
versa. (SIL 2) 
8. The wireless data transmission must not fail. (SIL 2) 
9. Stationary power overvoltage must be avoided. (SIL 1) 
10. Air conditioning must be available at all times. (SIL 1) 
11. The test person must remain accessible. (SIL 1) 
12. The service engineer(s) and/or mechanic(s) or test person must not be seriously 
injured or killed if the dome becomes loose or instable. (SIL 1) 
7.3 Proposed Architectural Design 
Because failures cannot be entirely avoided, the risk is reduced by reducing the failure’s 
probability of occurrence or by mitigating the consequence of a hazard. Possible risk re-
duction measures can be to apply safety-certified technologies, to stipulate conduct guide-
lines or initialisation processes, to employ redundancies, or to implement external risk 
reduction facilities. In any case, a revised HARA will be needed to prove the effectiveness 
of the risk reduction measures and to assess if new risks are generated. Again, the process 
is iterative. Safety functions influence each other and, therefore, may reduce or increase 
the safety integrity requirements of other functions. In this section it will be evaluated 
how the identified safety functions can be provided (section 7.3.1). Concluding, the re-
sulting overall safety architecture is presented (section 7.3.2) and an exemplary safety 
architecture is designed and assessed in terms of risk (section 7.3.3). 
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7.3.1 Safety Functions and Proposed Implementation 
7.3.1.1 DS Trajectory Must Remain Controllable (SIL 4) 
The most important and critical safety function to be provided is the controllability of 
MORPHEUS’ trajectory. The function is required to be available in case of faulty data 
transmission between the subsystems, any power cuts or overvoltage, faulty battery SOC 
signals, incorrect data from the measurement unit for motion quantities, water ingress at 
any E/E/PE system, or a general malfunction of any E/E/PE system, although with differ-
ent safety integrity requirements. Clearly, it is hardly possible to avoid all the prescribed 
failures at the demanded safety integrity levels. Therefore, it is advisable to mitigate the 
consequences of the manifold failures. Using redundancies for all possible failures would 
practically result in building two WMDS onto one frame structure and would therefore 
contradict the lightweight concept. Thus, an external risk reduction facility is favoured, 
which is a common approach for smallest-scale production series.  
The external risk reduction facility is required to control MORPHEUS’ trajectory inde-
pendently of components that could contribute to a hazardous event, namely electric mo-
tors, motor controllers, external command device, central control unit, measurement unit 
for motion quantities, and the entire power supply. Furthermore, the failures leading to 
hazardous events must be continuously monitored so that the external risk reduction fa-
cility is automatically triggered. Possible designs must provide their own energy. The tra-
jectory can be controlled in two ways: Either by using the tire-underground-pairing of the 
WMDS or by using an independent force transmission system (e.g. friction-based or mo-
mentum-based). The design must be able to significantly influence the trajectory while 
being able to counteract the maximum forces that can be applied by the WMDS’ drive 
and steering unit E/E/PE subsystems in case of a malfunction or be able to prevent those 
subsystems from influencing the trajectory. In either case, the system must be deployed – 
in dependence of the driving velocity and the heading – so that the trajectory cannot lead 
to exceeding the boundaries of the workspace. Using appropriate (time-variant and posi-
tion-dependent) scaling factors in the MCA increases the availability of the WMDS. Con-
trolling the trajectory relates to steering and/or accelerating and/or decelerating. Because 
decelerating is sufficient to transfer the WMDS into a safe state, easier to implement, 
lighter in weight, and safer in terms of reliability (compared to full control over the tra-
jectory), an emergency braking system is favoured. Possible approaches to fulfil the re-
quirements are formulated in a patent held by TU Dresden and AMST Systemtechnik 
(section 2.2.8.4) and have been designed and tested by TU Darmstadt, whereas the knee 
lever mechanism has been patented (section 7.3.3.1.1). Triggering the emergency braking 
system influences availability and safety, which is why the system should only be trig-
gered if necessary. Therefore, several system states must be monitored, as described in 
section 7.2. A detailed analysis on how the integrity can be evaluated will be given in 
section 7.3.3.1.1. 
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7.3.1.2 Continuous Short Circuit Must be Avoided (SIL 3) 
A continuous short circuit can only arise from the power supply E/E/PE subsystem itself 
because only here energy is stored. Although energy can be generated by the electric mo-
tors during recuperation, this process is not continuous (limited kinetic energy is con-
verted to electric energy and a rescue will only be initiated when MORPHEUS is in stand-
still) and is separately dealt with in section 7.3.1.3.  
The safety function must monitor if there is a short circuit. This can be done by an Insu-
lation Monitoring Device (IMD), e.g. the patented A-Isometer of the company Bender 
that measures the current between the reference ground and the insulated as well as active 
conductor. If the insulation resistance is below a predefined threshold, a short circuit is 
probable, and the power supply must be cut. For cutting the power supply, power contac-
tors are needed. 
7.3.1.3 HV Overvoltage Must be Avoided (SIL 3) 
HV overvoltage can arise from a malfunction in the power supply E/E/PE subsystem or 
from recuperation with the electric motors. Here, the safety function for the latter case is 
addressed because the power supply is monitored by its own safety certified BMS. Recu-
peration can be problematic because some types of accumulators can only absorb a frac-
tion of the power that can be drawn from it.  
The safety function must continuously monitor the current drawn from the electric motors 
during recuperation and limit this current to a value that is absorbable for the accumulator 
(20 A (DC) in MORPHEUS’ setup). The safety function can easily be implemented in the 
motor controllers since the current to and from the electric motors is continuously meas-
ured and the controllers provide a function to limit the recuperation current164. If this risk 
reduction measure does not fulfil the safety integrity requirement sufficiently, a diode 
(e.g. surge protector) connected between the motor controllers and the traction battery 
can limit the power that must be absorbed by the accumulator. 
7.3.1.4 AC/DC Converter Overvoltage Must be Avoided (SIL 2) 
In case of a malfunctioning AC/DC converter, an overvoltage at the mock-up E/E/PE 
subsystem might endanger the test person’s health and that of subjects trying to rescue 
the test person as well if the overvoltage is continuous.  
The continuous overvoltage safety function has already been addressed (section 7.3.1.2), 
thus, only very short overvoltage is possible until the IMD operates the power contactors. 
Then, the test person can be rescued without putting the rescue personnel at unreasonable 
                                                 
164 E.g. UNITEK Industrie Elektronik GmbH: Manual Bamocar-D3 (2017). 
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risk. If this risk reduction measure does not fulfil the safety integrity requirement suffi-
ciently, a fuse may limit the output power of the AC/DC converter to a safe value. Fur-
thermore, a safety-certified AC/DC converter may be used.  
7.3.1.5 Auxiliary Battery's Temperature Must be Monitored (SIL 2) 
If the temperature of the auxiliary battery is not monitored, overheating may not be de-
tected, leading to short circuit and/or fire hazard.  
(Continuous) short circuit has already been addressed (section 7.3.1.2). Auxiliary batter-
ies with integrated temperature sensors are available on the market and must be intro-
duced to the system. Thus, the safety function can be provided either by an automatic 
shutdown of the auxiliary battery in case of overheating (in this case power contactors 
must be integrated that can be operated by the auxiliary BMS) or manually by the system 
operator who would be obliged to monitor the auxiliary battery’s temperature. 
7.3.1.6 Water Ingress Must be Avoided (SIL 2) 
Water ingress is a safety issue for all components except for the surveillance system (co-
incidence of water ingress at surveillance system and a health issue of test person is very 
unlikely).  
Instead of using waterproof components, which would contradict the lightweight concept, 
the occurrence of water should be avoided. On the one hand, the skilled operator can 
monitor the weather (when using MORPHEUS outdoors) and take precautionary coun-
termeasures (e.g. driving MORPHEUS back into its hall). If the countermeasures have 
been taken too late, a sufficiently large, waterproof cover must be provided that can with-
stand the allowed wind speeds and can be appropriately secured so that MORPHEUS can 
endure wet weather. On the other hand, all subjects interacting with MORPHEUS must 
be instructed not to bring any liquids to the system (e.g. for drinking). Condensation, e.g. 
from the air conditioning, must be collected. 
7.3.1.7 The Test Person Must be Able to Communicate with the System 
Operator and Vice Versa (SIL 2) 
The bidirectional communication between the test person and the system operator is im-
portant in case of health issues of the test person or if the situation is unclear to the test 
person. In the latter case, the test person could unbuckle and move within the dome while 
driving simulation is in progress.  
The use of a safety-certified communication system could increase the availability. If the 
test person has a health issue, the system operator can still monitor the test person through 
the surveillance system. The test person must be instructed not to unbuckle under any 
circumstances until he or she is told to do so by the system operator. If these safety func-
tions do not fulfil the safety integrity requirement sufficiently, the buckles could be re-
mote controlled by the system operator so that the test person is not able to unbuckle him- 
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or herself. Of course, in case of a power cut, these automatic buckles would need a me-
chanical emergency release or be directly unlocked. 
7.3.1.8 The Wireless Data Transmission Must Not Fail (SIL 2) 
Wireless data is transmitted between the external command device E/E/PE subsystem and 
the IPG Roadbox as well as the mock-up E/E/PE subsystem’s communication and sur-
veillance system.  
If the emergency braking safety function (section 7.3.1.1) is implemented, the safety func-
tion can be reduced to “a wireless data dropout must be diagnosed”. The diagnosis can be 
done by using more than one transmission channel and comparing the signals. If the num-
ber of transmission channels is sufficiently large, it is even possible to use the signals, if 
one channel fails.  
7.3.1.9 Stationary Power Overvoltage Must be Avoided (SIL 1) 
In case of a stationary power overvoltage, the health of the system operator(s) might be 
endangered as well as that of subjects trying to rescue the system operator(s) if the over-
voltage is continuous.  
The continuous overvoltage safety function has already been addressed (section 7.3.1.2), 
thus only very short overvoltage is possible until the IMD operates the power contactors. 
Then, the system operator can be rescued without putting the rescue personnel at unrea-
sonable risk. If this risk reduction measure does not fulfil the safety integrity requirement 
sufficiently, a fuse may limit the output power of the stationary power connector to a safe 
value.  
7.3.1.10 Air Conditioning Must be Available (SIL 1) 
This safety function requirement was formulated in combination with water ingress at the 
air conditioning. If water ingress can be avoided, the safety integrity requirement drops 
to level a and, therefore, must not be accounted for. 
7.3.1.11 The Test Person Must Remain Accessible (SIL 1) 
In case the hexapod cannot be operated (e.g. HV power cut, malfunctioning hexapod, 
etc.), the test person must remain accessible for rescue in any position of the hexapod.  
This safety function can be fulfilled by providing a ladder or some other kind of mobile 
entry aid. In MORPHEUS’ current setup, the height of the entrance to the dome is about 
1 m above floor level. Even if the dome is fully tilted (18°) and at maximum heave 
(75 mm), this would result in an entrance level of about 1.5 m. 
7.3.1.12 Nobody Must be Injured or Killed if the Dome Becomes Loose or 
Instable (SIL 1) 
In case of a malfunction within the hexapod E/E/PE subsystem, it might happen that – 
due to mechanical stress because of a violation of the inverse kinematics model’s integrity 
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– one or more actuators fail, and the dome becomes instable so that the position and mo-
tion cannot be controlled. In a worst-case scenario, the remaining actuators cannot bear 
the static and dynamic load of the dome so that the dome becomes entirely loose and 
might fall off the self-driving platform. These hazards can endanger system engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) during maintenance or test drives as well as the test person during 
regular driving simulation.  
The safety function must be able to prevent the dome from falling off the self-driving 
platform in any case. Strengthened actuators and actuator mounts could achieve this. An-
other option is to utilise restraining straps that only come into effect if the maximum 
stroke of the actuators is exceeded. Thus, the position can be controlled to some extent 
but high accelerations and the risk of crushing (a) system engineer(s) and/or mechanic(s) 
are still present. Using actuators with a self-locking effect cannot prevent unwanted mo-
tion because already one malfunctioning actuator makes one DOF uncontrollable. In any 
case, the system engineer(s) and mechanic(s) must be instructed to stand back of the hex-
apod and self-driving platform as soon as power is supplied to the hexapod, steering unit, 
or drive unit E/E/PE subsystem. In addition, putting a bellows over the hexapod reduces 
the risk of being crushed significantly.  
7.3.2 Overall Safety Architecture 
An external emergency braking system is employed that disconnects the tires from the 
underground, supplies its own energy, and is triggered either by a safety logic or manually 
by the system operator. The safety logic itself must be programmed in a fail-safe manner, 
e.g. in a programmable logic controller, and in such a way that emergency braking is 
triggered as soon as the programmable logic controller does not send an “OK”-signal. 
Analysing the revised HARA, with all safety functions implemented except the external 
emergency braking system, revealed that the following states must be monitored with the 
outlined safety integrity requirements: 
• Malfunctioning of (SIL 1) 
o AC/DC converter  
o measurement unit for motion quantities  
o auxiliary battery  
o electric motor 
o external command device 
o central control unit 
o motor controller 
o traction battery 
o stationary power connector 
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• HV overvoltage from the traction battery to steering and/or drive unit E/E/PE sub-
systems’ motor controllers (SIL 2) 
• HV overvoltage from the steering or drive unit E/E/PE subsystems’ motor con-
trollers to the traction battery (recuperation) (SIL 1) 
• HV power cut between the traction battery and the steering and (SIL 2)/or (SIL 1) 
drive unit E/E/PE subsystems’ motor controllers 
• LV overvoltage from the auxiliary battery to steering and/or drive unit E/E/PE 
subsystems’ motor controllers and/or WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystem 
(SIL 1) 
• LV power cut between the auxiliary battery and the steering and (SIL 2)/or (SIL 1) 
drive unit E/E/PE subsystems’ motor controllers 
• LV power cut between the auxiliary battery and the WMDS dynamics control 
E/E/PE subsystem (SIL 2) 
• AC/DC converter overvoltage (SIL 2) 
• Stationary power connector overvoltage (SIL 1) 
• Stationary power connector power cut (SIL 2) 
• Faulty data transmission between the central control unit and the 
o Auxiliary battery (SOC) (SIL 2) 
o Traction battery (SOC) (SIL 2) 
o External command device (SIL 2) 
o Drive unit’s motor controllers (SIL 2) 
o Steering unit’s motor controllers (SIL 1) 
o measurement unit for motion quantities (SIL 1) 
• Incorrect data from the measurement unit for motion quantities (SIL 2) 
Especially for wireless data transmission, at least two channels must be employed, mak-
ing a diagnosis possible. The MCA must be adapted so that the driving velocity is suffi-
ciently low that emergency braking is always possible without leaving the workspace.  
An IMD monitors the insulation integrity and operates power contactors in the power 
supply E/E/PE subsystem if a short circuit is detected. An additional power contactor is 
integrated into the auxiliary battery and can be operated by the auxiliary battery’s BMS. 
The auxiliary battery itself is replaced by a version with integrated temperature sensors. 
Fuses between motor controllers and traction battery, between the AC/DC converter and 
the mock-up E/E/PE subsystem, and between the stationary power connector and the ex-
ternal command device prevent overloads. The recuperation current from the electric 
motors is limited within the motor controllers to a value that is absorbable for the accu-
mulator. 
A sufficiently large, waterproof cover must be provided to the system operator(s) to avoid 
water ingress in case of sudden weather changes. In addition, a sufficiently large ladder 
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or other kind of entry aid must be provided to be able to rescue the test person from the 
dome if the hexapod is not operable. 
The hexapod is put into a bellows to prevent anybody from being crushed. Restraining 
straps prevent the dome from falling off the self-driving platform if more than one actu-
ator breaks. 
The conduct guidelines prohibit all subjects interacting with MORPHEUS from bringing 
liquids into the system. Furthermore, the test person must be instructed not to unbuckle 
under any circumstances unless he or she is told to do so by the system operator. System 
engineers and mechanics must be instructed to stand back of the system when HV is 
switched on unless direct contact with the system is absolutely essential. The system op-
erator(s) is/are required to monitor the weather if MORPHEUS is used outdoors so that 
countermeasures can be taken at an early stage if wet weather occurs and to monitor 
MORPHEUS’ workspace for unauthorised subjects. He or she is also instructed to drive 
with low velocity in manual mode when MORPHEUS is close to its workspace bounda-
ries and to thoroughly check MORPHEUS’ workspace for obstacles prior to the initiali-
sation of a driving simulation. 
Revising the HARA revealed that the following safety functions must be implemented, 
too, for reducing all hazards to a SIL of a: Self-programmed software, especially for the 
MCA and MC, must be externally reviewed and thoroughly tested before putting into 
operation. If this measure will not fulfil the safety integrity requirement, an outer software 
layer could be implemented that monitors only the very safety-relevant information (e.g. 
absolute position in workspace and target vs. actual motion) and can directly activate the 
external emergency braking system. The HV accumulator and its BMS – although 
safety-oriented – must provide a high availability so that a shutdown of the HV power 
supply is unlikely. 
The full list of revised hazards can be found in annexe C.3, where all hazardous events 
have been evaluated with a SIL of a. 
7.3.3 Exemplary Application of the Safety Architecture 
In this section, a specific, exemplary application of the safety architecture will be evalu-
ated in regard of its functional safety. The application includes the safety functions exter-
nal emergency braking E/E/PE system and the IMD E/E/PE element. 
7.3.3.1 Determination of the Limits of Machinery 
The users, uses cases, and environment are identical with those of MORPHEUS (cf. sec-
tions 7.1.1.1, 7.1.1.2, and 7.1.1.4).  
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7.3.3.1.1 External Emergency Braking E/E/PE Subsystem 
Although mechanically mounted to the WMDS, the emergency braking safety function is 
implemented externally and, therefore, supplies its own energy for the activation of the 
emergency braking. The system is connected to an IPG Roadbox as well as a manual 
emergency stop through CAN and is fed by a LV power supply that is not needed for 
activating an emergency braking. 
The external emergency braking E/E/PE subsystem is designed to lift MORPHEUS 
off the ground so that the tires lose contact to the underground165,166. The friction partners, 
namely road surface and the emergency braking system’s brake pads, are designed in such 
a way that the friction coefficient is equal or below that of MORPHEUS’ tires to the road 
surface, thus preventing overturning. The energy for deploying the safety system is stored 
in steel coil springs (hazardous element) that are preloaded when the safety system is 
engaged. Electric holding magnets (actuator) that are powered by the on-board auxiliary 
batteries (LV) counteract the preloaded springs. Contact switches are used in each safety 
system, detecting whether the system is engaged or deployed. When the safety system is 
triggered, which may be done either manually or automatically by a programmable logic 
controller (initiating mechanism), the magnet’s energy supply is cut, and the preloaded 
springs push the brake pads against the road surface, lifting MORPHEUS off the ground. 
A knee lever is installed for transforming the required vertical force acting on the brake 
pads to a desired shape and has been patented167. Dampers are installed for controlling 
the system’s dynamics and iteratively tuned to the desired behaviour. The undamped ver-
tical force of the emergency braking system was sufficiently large to make MORPHEUS 
jump and, thus, generated unwanted large vertical accelerations and mechanical stress. 
Figure 7-7 shows the CAD model of the emergency braking system, whereas the left 
system is engaged, and the right system is deployed. Figure 3-4 shows a photograph of 
the emergency braking system on MORPHEUS. 
                                                 
165 Betz, A. et al.: Development and Validation of a Safety Architecture of a WMDS (2014). 
166 Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). pp. 81-89. 
167 Betz, A.; Winner, H.: Patent Knee Lever Safety System (2014). 
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Figure 7-7: Emergency braking system. Left: Engaged, right: Deployed 
An essential function of the external emergency braking system is monitoring the integ-
rity of MORPHEUS. Therefore, the following information are gathered in the program-
mable logic controller: 
• IMDs detect short circuits and overvoltage between 
o Traction battery and steering and/or drive unit’s motor controllers and/or 
hexapod’s power electronics 
o Auxiliary battery and steering and/or drive unit’s motor controllers and/or 
WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystem 
o AC/DC converter and mock-up E/E/PE subsystem (this is the only func-
tion of the AC/DC converter and, therefore, also constitutes its malfunc-
tion) 
o Stationary power connector and external command device E/E/PE subsys-
tem (this is the only function of the stationary power connector and, there-
fore, also constitutes its malfunction) 
• Motor controllers send error codes in case of 
o Malfunctioning electric motor (measurement of speed and temperature) 
o Malfunctioning motor controller (self-diagnosis) 
o Overvoltage from steering or drive unit’s electric motors (recuperation) 
o HV power cut between traction battery and steering and/or drive unit’s 
motor controllers 
o LV power cut between auxiliary battery and steering and/or drive unit’s 
motor controllers 
• IPG Roadbox sends error codes in case of 
o Malfunctioning ADMA G-3 (self-diagnosis) 
o Malfunctioning steering or drive unit (comparing target motion and actual 
motion) 
o Erroneous ADMA G-3 signals (measurement and data transmission; plau-
sibility of the signals is checked by comparing to an inertial measurement 
unit (IMU) that is redundantly integrated into the WMDS dynamics con-
trol E/E/PE subsystem) 
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o Malfunctioning traction BMS  
o Malfunctioning auxiliary BMS 
o Erroneous battery SOC signals (measurement and data transmission; plau-
sibility of signal must be checked when initialising driving simulation, 
then the SOC signal’s plausibility can be checked with the WMDS energy 
model) 
o Malfunctioning IPG Roadbox (self-diagnosis) 
o LV power cut between the auxiliary battery and the WMDS’ dynamics 
control E/E/PE subsystem 
o Faulty data transmission between the IPG Roadbox and external command 
device (at least two wireless channels are employed and can be compared, 
checksums and/or watchdogs assure that valid signals are sent) 
o Faulty data transmission between the IPG Roadbox and the motor control-
lers (checksums and/or watchdogs assure that valid signals are sent) 
• External command device sends error codes or no “OK”-signal in case of 
o Malfunctioning external command device (self-diagnosis) 
o Power cut between stationary power connector and external command de-
vice E/E/PE subsystem 
• Manual emergency stop that is operated by system operator(s) 
• Contact switches at each knee lever detect if one knee lever is unintentionally 
activated 
All information (also “OK”-signals) must be sent within predefined time intervals. If one 
piece of information does not reach the programmable logic controller in time, emergency 
braking is activated. 
Figure 7-8 gives an overview of the functional safety-relevant components that are in-
cluded in the external emergency braking E/E/PE system, whereas the italic labels repre-
sent information and arrows indicate the direction of flow of power and information sig-
nals: 
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Figure 7-8: MORPHEUS’ external emergency braking E/E/PE system 
7.3.3.1.2 Revised Power Supply E/E/PE Subsystem 
The IMDs (sensors) are implemented into the power supply E/E/PE subsystem and 
measure the current between the reference ground and the insulated as well as active con-
ductors of all energy sources (hazardous element). The auxiliary battery’s and the AC/DC 
converter’s IMDs send their information to the auxiliary BMS (electronic control unit), 
the traction battery’s IMD to the traction BMS (electronic control unit) and the stationary 
power connector’s IMD to a switch located between the stationary power connector and 
its IMD. If a short circuit or undervoltage is measured, the corresponding power contac-
tors (actuator) of the batteries or the switch (actuator) in the stationary power supply are 
operated and power is cut. Overvoltage is avoided by the implementation of fuses and 
limiting the recuperation current in the motor controllers. The IMDs are supplied with 
12 V (DC). 
Figure 7-9 gives an overview of the components that are included in the revised power 
supply E/E/PE system, whereas the italic labels represent information and arrows indicate 
the direction of flow of power and information signals: 
External emergency braking E/E/PE subsystem
WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystem
Legend: 12/24 V Mechanical power CAN sensor cable
External command device E/E/PE subsys.
Power supply E/E/PE subsystem
6 x Steel coil spring
6 x Electric holding magnet with
Knee lever and brake pad
Contact switch
PLC
IPG Roadbox
Error codes
manual emergency stop 
emergency braking activation
Auxiliary battery
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Figure 7-9: MORPHEUS’ revised power supply E/E/PE subsystem 
7.3.3.2 Hazard Identification & Risk Estimation 
The hazard list with 21 additional, evaluated combinations of failures, consequences, and 
situations for the exemplary application of the safety architecture is attached in an-
nexe C.4. 
7.3.3.3 Risk Evaluation & Safety Requirements 
The following safety requirements are established from the hazard list: 
• System engineer(s) and/or mechanic(s) must not be injured or even killed when 
working at the WMDS and emergency braking is activated (SIL 1) 
• Short circuit must be reliably detected by IMDs (SIL a) 
• LV power supply must not be cut (SIL a) 
• LV power supply must not exceed nominal voltage (SIL a) 
• Fuses must reliably blow at threshold current (SIL a) 
• Electric holding magnet must not provide no or too low/high force (SIL a) 
• Steel coil springs must always be preloaded prior to driving simulation initialisa-
tion (SIL a) 
Therefore, it is proposed to build a housing around the emergency braking system so that 
nobody can be crushed or be injured otherwise by the system. The conduct guidelines are 
appended by the instruction that the system operator must check the emergency braking 
Power supply E/E/PE subsystem
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Short circuits
Mock-up E/E/PE subsystem
WMDS dynamics control E/E/PE subsystem
Legend: 12/24 V 230 V 532.8 V CAN
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Error codes, SOC
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Hexapod E/E/PE subsystem
External command device E/E/PE 
subsystemStationary power 
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system visually prior to initialising driving simulation. Especially checking if all steel coil 
springs are preloaded is mandatory. 
7.4 Adaption to Full-Scale WMDS 
Besides the design changes in terms of size, weight, power, and energy supply, as de-
scribed in section 3.6, changes in the safety architecture are necessary as well when build-
ing a full-scale WMDS. The external emergency braking system can be kept, although 
adapted in size and power to be able to handle the increased wheel load. The electric 
architecture with IMDs and fuses can be kept, too. The increased size makes it difficult 
to use a waterproof cover in case of sudden weather changes. Either the full-scale WMDS 
is constructed in such a way that the system is at least safe in wet conditions when it is 
shut down or some kind of aid must be provided to cover the WMDS in all possible 
emergency states and under all environmental conditions. Because of the increased size 
and the expectable stroke increase of the hexapod, it will become more difficult to rescue 
the test person from the dome in case of emergency and power cut. Also, the WMDS’ 
workspace will probably increase, making it even more time consuming to reach the test 
person on foot. A possible solution could be derived from passenger boarding stairs as 
used in aviation (a.k.a. boarding ramps or stair car). This approach could also be used for 
regular entrance to the dome, if mobile stairs is equipped with a top platform that is ad-
justable in height. A solution that is easier to implement are inflatable emergency slides 
as also used in aviation that come into action in case of emergency. If the full-scale 
WMDS is intended to be used with more than one test person simultaneously, a thorough 
revision of the HARA must be conducted because many safety integrity requirements 
resulted of the assumption that only one person can be injured or killed in the dome. 
7.5 Discussion 
A suitable safety architecture for WMDS in general has been found and theoretically 
demonstrated to reduce risk to an acceptable level. It was surprising to find out that no 
environment perception is required when subjects are restrained from entering the 
WMDS’ driving area. Although the implementation of an external emergency braking 
system comes to mind somewhat intuitively, this safety measure is demanded by a vast 
number of safety requirements. Furthermore, the importance or the communication be-
tween test person and system operator could intuitively be underestimated.  
Concluding, the hypothesis H1.2 cannot be falsified, considering the determined limits of 
the WMDS, international functional safety standards, and state-of-the-art-technology.
  
121 
8 Conclusion 
The results presented within this thesis provide the next building block towards proving 
general feasibility of WMDS. The falsification aspects power demand, energy demand, 
and latency are practically researched in experiments and the falsification aspect safety 
architecture in theory, trying to falsify the working hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 (sec-
tions 1.2.3.1 and 1.2.3.2). 
8.1 Wheeled Motion Base 
H1.1: “The wheeled motion base of [FZD’s] WMDS [concept] with its dynamics lim-
ited by friction forces can simulate the horizontal dynamics of urban traffic for normal 
driver behaviour considering common scaling factors” 168. 
The falsification aspect power demand is researched with a verified power model. The 
model is designed partially based on physical effects (power demand by mass moment of 
inertia, self-alignment torque, and drill torque) and partially based on empirical findings 
where the underlying physical effects were so complex that a detailed model would not 
justify the effort required for modelling and parameterisation (driving resistance, steering 
holding power, and electrical efficiency). The parameterisation is done with coasting ex-
periments (driving resistance model), steering holding torque experiments (steering hold-
ing power), and straight-line acceleration experiments (electrical efficiency). The param-
eterised model is then verified by conducting straight-line driving manoeuvres with 
constant acceleration with MOPRHEUS while measuring the current and voltage at the 
accumulator and comparing the experimental with the simulative results. The verified 
model is then used to determine the power demand for different scaling factors. 
MORPHEUS’ current setup can provide driving simulation up to scaling factors of 0.7. 
For unscaled driving simulation, the electric motor power is sufficient, but the accumula-
tor’s power must be increased by the factor three. Thus, the aspect power demand is not 
able to falsify hypothesis H1.1.  
The falsification aspect energy demand is researched with a validated energy model that 
is derived from the power model. The parameterised model is validated by driving a 
90°-turn, a figure eight, and a scaled representative urban driving circuit with 
                                                 
168 Cf. Betz, A.: Diss., Feasibility Analysis and Design of WMDS (2015). p. 4. 
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MORPHEUS. The validated model is then used to simulate the energy demand in un-
scaled urban driving scenarios for the fully set-up MORPHEUS prototype. The highest 
resulting average energy demand is extrapolated to the demanded 2 h experiment dura-
tion. Auxiliary energy consumers are measured and added to the energy demand by the 
motion system. Although the accumulator used in MORPHEUS is not able to fulfil the 
requirement, state-of-the-art accumulators are. Then, the accumulator’s energy must be 
increased by the factor five, including the additional energy demand by the mass increase. 
Thus, the aspect energy demand is not able to falsify hypothesis H1.1. 
The falsification aspect latency is researched by imposing step inputs to MORPHEUS. 
The experimental design is chosen so that the influence of the initial driving velocity, the 
acceleration step input amplitude, and the type of control (acceleration and steering angle 
step input) are considered. Whereas the acceleration step input amplitude showed no in-
fluence on latency if the indicator for latency is independent of the amplitude, the initial 
driving velocity has a significant influence. Motion latency shows the highest value at 
low driving velocities and asymptotically decreases at higher velocities. The steering an-
gle step input showed marginally higher latency than the acceleration step input. Consid-
ering inaccuracies in the measurement, this influence can be neglected. Concluding, the 
highest ACL50 % was found at 7 m/s² acceleration step input amplitude and 0 driving ve-
locity with a value of 159 ms, which is above the requirement of 135 ms. The highest 
ACLgain was found at 6 and 7 m/s² acceleration step input and 0 driving velocity with a 
value of 104 ms, which is slightly above the requirement of 100 ms. Considering the con-
trol approach of keeping the WMDS in motion, the restrictive requirement for ACL50 %, 
and the small deviation from the requirement, the aspect latency is not able to falsify 
hypothesis H1.1. 
8.2 Safety Architecture 
H1.2: FZD’s WMDS concept does not bear an unacceptable risk to a human under any 
environmental conditions and in any use case. 
The falsification aspect of a safety architecture is investigated by conducting a HARA, 
formulating safety requirements, and proposing a safety architecture design that fulfils 
these requirements. The HARA yields 186 hazardous events that are addressed by 
twelve main safety requirements, whereas the most important requirement is that the DS 
trajectory must remain controllable so that collisions with objects and subjects can be 
avoided with a SIL of 4. Five safety requirements address electrical safety (continuous 
short circuit must be avoided (SIL 3), HV overvoltage because of recuperation must be 
avoided (SIL 3), AC/DC converter overvoltage must be avoided (SIL 2), auxiliary bat-
tery's temperature must be monitored (SIL 2), and stationary power overvoltage must be 
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avoided (SIL 1)). Furthermore, water ingress at all E/E/PE systems must be avoided 
(SIL 2), the test person must be able to communicate with the system operator and vice 
versa (SIL 2), the wireless data transmission must not fail (SIL 2), the test person must 
remain accessible (SIL 1), and nobody must be seriously injured or killed if the dome 
becomes loose or instable (SIL 1). 
Being able to control the WMDS’ trajectory with the on-board power supply and actuators 
under any given circumstances requires a tremendous effort in designing functions, signal 
transmission, and software to fulfil the safety integrity requirement. Thus, the decision is 
made for an external risk reduction facility, namely an emergency braking system, be-
cause this concept represents the easiest and thereby the safest way to control the trajec-
tory (in terms of reliability in comparison to a risk reduction facility intended to keep full 
trajectory control over the WMDS). Monitoring all failures that require the emergency 
braking system to be triggered is crucial. The electrical safety requirements are addressed 
by implementing IMDs that control power contactors, limiting the recuperation current 
in the motor controllers, implementing diodes and fuses, and by utilizing an auxiliary 
battery with integrated temperature sensors. A multichannel wireless data transmission is 
introduced. A weatherproof cover for the WMDS and a ladder for emergency evacuation 
from the dome must be provided. The hexapod must be secured by restraining straps and 
bellows must be installed. All other safety requirements can be addressed by conduct 
guidelines.  
The architecture is verified by re-assessing the hazardous events and by assessing the risk 
for the newly introduced function and components. No hazardous events are identified 
that require a risk reduction, thus, the architecture is able to fulfil the safety requirements 
for a WMDS. Concluding, the falsification aspect of a safety architecture for WMDS is 
not able to falsify hypothesis H1.2. 
8.3 Outlook 
Although hypothesis H1.1 and H1.2 were not falsified, it could not be ultimately proven 
that they are practically valid. For hypothesis H1.1 this ultimate proof would imply in-
stalling sufficient accumulators for fulfilling the power and energy demand, increasing 
the platform’s maximum velocity, and implementing the control approach of keeping the 
WMDS in motion. For hypothesis H1.2 this ultimate proof would require implementing 
the designed safety architecture into MORPHEUS. Although the emergency braking sys-
tem has already been installed on MORPHEUS and proven reliable, though sensitive, no 
statistical evidence is provided. Not to mention the remaining safety functions. 
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Measurements revealed that due to vertical excitation from the uneven road surface and, 
also, because of the lack of a suspension on MORPHEUS the wheel load fluctuation be-
comes so large at high velocities that the average friction coefficient is impaired. Besides 
a solution by a very even pavement for operation, a vertical dynamics control of a WMDS, 
as currently researched by Zöller169, is assumed to resolve this problem. Furthermore, the 
signal quality in general would profit from reduced vertical excitation, as – most im-
portantly – would the immersion of the test person, too. 
Of course, all falsification aspects have been researched with the scaled prototype 
MORPHEUS. For the power and energy demand, no direct conclusions can be drawn for 
the full-scale WMDS, because design changes would affect the validity of the power/en-
ergy model. Still, the found results increase the confidence in the feasibility of these as-
pects. Latency is not expected to change significantly, especially with the novel control 
approach. Also, for a full-scale WMDS the HARA must be revised, and the safety archi-
tecture adapted to the updated safety requirements. Although specific for MORPHEUS, 
the extensively conducted HARA provides a basis for assessing the risk of any WMDS. 
Although these findings suggest that the falsification aspects will also not be able to fal-
sify the working hypotheses in a full-scale WMDS, the practical evidence is to be pro-
vided. Thus, designing and building a full-scale WMDS with a system to control the ver-
tical excitation induced by uneven driving surfaces and the updated safety architecture 
applied to it is the next consequent step in FZD’s WMDS project. This full-scale WMDS 
would be able to evaluate the immersion of the test person that can be accomplished with 
the concept in comparison to state-of-the-art DS and, therewith, assumingly prove overall 
practical feasibility and the claimed advantages of WMDS. 
                                                 
169 Zöller, C. et al.: Tires and Vertical Dynamics of WMDS (2017). 
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A Overturning Stability170 
In case of full acceleration, it must be ensured that the WMDS will not turn over. Over-
turning will start as soon as one of the wheel loads gets smaller than zero. Within a defined 
triangle, Figure 8-1 left, safety against overturning is assured by setting up the free body 
diagram, Figure 8-1 right, and calculating the momentum equilibrium around point 2, 
wherein COG is the abbreviation for Centre Of Gravity: 
 𝑇
(2)
= 0 = 𝑚DS ∙ 𝑔 (𝜇tire ∙ ℎCOG − ℎCOG,t) + ℎt ∙   , ,rear (8-1) 
For the overturning stability of MORPHEUS, this triangle is defined as the equilateral 
triangle that is spread out by the tire’s contact points to the road surface. Applying the 
geometric relations, which can be derived from Figure 8-1 left, overturning stability is 
ensured by complying with inequality (8-3): 
  , ,rear =
2 𝑚DS ∙ 𝑔 (
1
2√3
𝑙t − 𝜇tire ∙ ℎCOG)
√3𝑙t
> 0 (8-2) 
 𝑙t > 2√3𝜇tire ∙ ℎCOG (8-3) 
 
Figure 8-1: Left: Geometry of omnidirectional motion base; Right: Balance of forces of the om-
nidirectional motion base when accelerating 
This makes it obvious that overturning protection is only dependent upon friction coeffi-
cient, height of the triangle, and height of COG. The height of MORPHEUS‘ COG ℎCOG 
is 481 mm; the length of the triangle edges 𝑙t is 2,300 mm. Applied to equation (8-3), this 
results in a maximum possible acceleration before overturning: 
𝑙t = 2√3 
𝑎DS,hor,max
𝑔
 ∙ ℎCOG (8-4) 
                                                 
170 Wagner, P. et al.: Conception and Design of Mobile Driving Simulators (2014). pp. 5, 8. 
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  𝑎DS,hor,max =
𝑔 𝑙t
2√3 ℎCOG
= 13.54 
m
s2
 (8-5) 
Since the friction coefficient of the used press-on band tires on regular road surfaces is 
limited to approximately 0.8171,172, safety against overturning is assured for friction trac-
tion. 
                                                 
171 Betz, A. et al.: Konzeptanalyse und Erprobung eines WMDS (2014). 
172 Zöller, C. et al.: Tire Concept Investigation for WMDS (2016). 
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B Experiment Results 
B.1 EMRAX 228 Electric Motor Efficiency 
Map According to Enstroj 
 
Figure 8-2: Linearly interpolated efficiency map of the EMRAX 228 according to data provided 
by Enstroj173 
  
                                                 
173 Albrecht, T. et al.: Advanced Design Project, Fahrwiderstands- und Energiebedarfsbetrachtung des 
MORPHEUS (2016). p. 47. 
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B.2 Variation of Acceleration Amplitude 
The table shows the ACL in ms, caused by varied lateral acceleration step inputs, calcu-
lated with the IACL50 % and IACLgain, and driven with initial longitudinal driving veloci-
ties of 0 and 1 m/s. The values for ACL are averaged over six trials. For the ACLgain the 
relative MSD is calculated 
 
𝒗
𝟎
 i
n
 
m
/s
 
𝒂𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥 in m/s² 
MSDrel 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ACL50 % in ms 
0 m/s 123 134 145 150 155 155 159 157 - 
1 m/s 81 93 101 113 122 127 134 139 - 
ACLgain in ms 
0 m/s 102 95 98 84 89 104 104 77 17.4 % 
1 m/s 59 59 55 58 56 53 66 56 10.9 % 
B.3 Variation of Initial Velocity 
The table shows the ACL in ms, caused by a 5 m/s² lateral acceleration step input or 90° 
steering angle step input, calculated with the IACL50 % and IACLgain, and driven with 
varied initial longitudinal driving velocity. The values for ACL are averaged over six tri-
als. 
Step input ACL 
𝒗𝟎 in m/s 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
𝒂𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐭 = 𝟓 
𝐦
𝐬𝟐
 
ACL50 % in ms 155 122 100 97 78 83 78 
ACLgain in ms 89 56 46 32 34 35 46 
𝜹𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐭 = 𝟗𝟎° 
ACL50 % in ms - 121 110 118 114 119 120 
ACLgain in ms - 65 48 53 52 48 44 
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C Safety Analysis 
C.1 List of Built-in Components 
Legend:  
 Purchased part 
 Milled part 
 Turned part 
 Part used in earlier version 
 
Part 
Number 
Qty. Part name Supplier, Material, Dimension 
1 3 Cross-roller bearing Kistenpfennig 
2 3 Crossbeam bearing 
JHW, X37CrMoV5-1, plate 180,4 x 25,4 mm, 1 
m 
3 3 Strut wheel hub JHW, X37CrMoV5-1, plate 200,4 x 20,4 mm 
4 3 Wheel hub BMW 
5 3 Adapter wheel hub Geier, EN AW 6082 T6 round rod 200 mm 
6-8 3 Compensation coupling KTR 
9 3 Adapter gearbox Geier, EN AW 6082 T6 round rod 100 mm 
10 3 Rim Pneuhage 
11 3 Tyre Gumasol 
12 3 Sleeve gearbox 
Bieber+Marburg, S355 round tube 244,5 x 50 
mm 
13 6 Gearbox Neugart 
14 3 Strut gearbox JHW, X37CrMoV5-1, plate 200,4 x 6,2 mm 
15 3 Strut drive JHW, X37CrMoV5-1, plate 200,4 x 15,4 mm 
16 6 Adapter electric motor Geier, EN AW 6082 T6 round rod 100 mm 
17 3 Crossbeam drive JHW, X37CrMoV5-1, plate 200,4 x 15,4 mm 
18 3 Electric motor Enstroj 
19 3 Strut electric motor JHW, X37CrMoV5-1, plate 200,4 x 6,2 mm 
20 3 Adapter gearbox 2 
Geier, EN AW 2007 round rod 200 mm x 34 
mm 
21 3 Flange slip ring 
Geier, EN AW 2007 round rod 150 mm x 18 
mm 
22 3 Flange spline shaft Mädler 
23 3 Slip ring Rie-Tech 
24 3 Bracket electric motor Alu Boll, EN AW 7075, eroded to outer contour 
25 9 Strut steering frame 
Geier, EN AW 2007 flat bar, 30 mm x 12 mm, 
220 mm 
26 3 Bracket gearbox 
Geier, EN AW 2007 round rod 270 mm x 10 
mm 
27 3 Sleeve steering frame 
Metallstore, Alu, tube 250 mm x 20 mm, 200 
mm 
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Part 
Number 
Qty. Part name Supplier, Material, Dimension 
28 3 lower frame plate Geier, Alu, plate >273 x 20 mm, 500 mm 
29 3 upper frame plate Geier, Alu, plate >273 x 20 mm, 500 mm 
30 3 Crossbeam frame 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, rectangular tube 
150x100x3 
31 3 Strut frame 
Geier, EN AW 6060 T66 (AlMgSi0,5), rectan-
gular tube 100x50x2 
32 3 Supporting strut steering frame Alu round rod 15 mm x 150 mm 
33 3 
Left inner flange steering frame 
strut 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
5 mm 
34 3 
Right inner flange steering frame 
strut 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
5 mm 
35 6 lower flange steering frame Geier, EN AW 6060, flat bar 150 mm x 10 mm  
36 6 outer flange steering frame 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 120 mm x 80 mm x 
10 mm 
37 6 Strut hexapod 
Geier, EN AW 6060 T66 (AlMgSi0,5), rectan-
gular tube 100x100x2 
38 6 Right flange hexapod strut 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
8 mm 
39 6 Left flange hexapod strut 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
5 mm 
40 3 Outer flange Hexapod strut Geier, Alu, plate 150 x 10 mm, 500 mm 
41 3 Left outer flange hexapod 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
8 mm 
42 3 Right inner flange hexapod 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
8 mm 
43 3 Left inner flange hexapod 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
8 mm 
44 3 Right outer flange hexapod 
Geier, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm x 
8 mm 
45 1 Hexapod MeVEA 
46 12 Inner insert frame bar 
Geier, EN AW 2007, flat bar 144 mm x 100 mm 
x 20 mm 
47 6 Middle insert frame bar 
Geier, EN AW 2007, flat bar 94,5 mm x 100 
mm x 20 mm 
48 24 Outer insert frame bar 
Geier, EN AW 6082 T6 round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm, 144 mm  
49 18 Insert frame strut 
Geier, EN AW 6082 T6 round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm, 46 mm 
50 36 Inert hexapod strut 
Geier, EN AW 6082 T6 round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm, 96 mm 
51 6 Power electronics UniTek 
52 3 Bracket power electronics Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
53 1 Mounting aid drive unit Stock item 
54 3 Rotation lock slip ring Geier, EN AW 2007 flat bar, 30 mm x 12 mm 
55 3 Spacer slip ring Geier, EN AW 2007, disc 180 mm x 17 mm 
56 3 Rubber buffer Wagner Verbindungstechnik 
57 3 Cover frame corner 
Geier, EN AW 2007, plate 340 mm x 190 mm x 
6 mm 
58 3 Safeguard frame corner Alu Boll, EN AW 5754, eroded to outer contour 
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Part 
Number 
Qty. Part name Supplier, Material, Dimension 
59 3 Support safeguard frame corner 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, flat bar 30 mm x 12 
mm 
60 3 Flange safeguard frame corner 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 50 mm x 50 mm 
x 5 mm 
61 6 SaSy Lever L1 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, flat bar 40 mm x 15 
mm x 310 mm 
62 6 SaSy Lever L2 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, rectangular tube 60 mm 
x 40 mm x 4 mm 
63 6 SaSy Lever L3 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, rectangular tube 60 mm 
x 40 mm x 4 mm 
64 12 SaSy reinforcement Lever L2 
Alu Boll, EN AW 7075, plate 70 mm x 52 mm 
x 6 mm 
65 12 SaSy connection lever L2-L3 
Alu Boll, EN AW 7075, plate 240 mm x 120 
mm x 6 mm 
66 18 SaSy bearing block lever L2 Mädler 
67 6 SaSy bearing block lever L3 Mädler 
68 6 SaSy linear slide bearing DryLin W igus 
69 6 SaSy spring Knörzer Federntechnik 
70 6 SaSy electromagnet Magnetbau Schramme 
71 6 SaSy anchor plate magnet Magnetbau Schramme 
72 12 SaSy slide bearing WSM 2022-15  igus 
73 6 SaSy slide bearing WSM 1820-20 igus 
74 6 SaSy bracket spring knee joint Alu Boll, EN AW 2007, round rod 90 mm 
75 6 SaSy bracket spring frame Alu Boll, EN AW 2007, round rod 90 mm 
76 12 SaSy slide bearing WSM 2023-08 igus 
77 6 SaSy slide bearing WSM 2023-23 igus 
78 3 Bracket cable gland Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
79 3 Baseplate cable grand hexapod strut 
Stock item, Aluminium, flat bar 100 mm x 35 
mm x 5 mm 
80 1 Bracket accumulator 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, rectangular tube 80 mm 
x 30 mm x 2 mm 
81 2 Insert bracket accumulator 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, flat bar 70 mm x 20 
mm x 25 mm 
82 2 Bracket accumulator stand 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, flat bar 70 mm x 20 
mm x 100 mm 
83 1 Front bracket accumulator 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, flat bar, 25 mm x 6 mm 
x 280 mm 
84 1 Back bracket accumulator 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, T profile, 60 mm x 60 
mm x 6 mm 
85 2 Bracket HV-box 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, flat bar, 25 mm x 6 mm 
x 175 mm 
86 6 SaSy bar 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, rectangular tube 100 
mm x 60 mm x 3 mm 
87 6 SaSy bar strut 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, rectangular tube 40 mm 
x 40 mm x 2 mm 
88 12 SaSy bar elbow 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 130 mm x 80 
mm x 6 mm 
89 6 SaSy upper left flange bar strut 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 40 mm x 30 mm 
x 3 mm 
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Part 
Number 
Qty. Part name Supplier, Material, Dimension 
90 6 SaSy upper right flange bar strut 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 40 mm x 30 mm 
x 3 mm 
91 6 SaSy lower left flange bar strut 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 35 mm x 30 mm 
x 3 mm 
92 6 SaSy lower right flange bar strut 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 35 mm x 30 mm 
x 3 mm 
93 6 SaSy left elbow spring 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 150 mm x 100 
mm x 10 mm 
94 30 SaSy sleeve M10 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm 
95 6 SaSy upper insert bar 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 54 mm x 94 mm 
x 20 mm 
96 24 SaSy outer insert crossbeam 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 47 mm x 144 mm 
x 20 mm 
97 12 SaSy inner insert crossbeam 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 50 mm x 144 mm 
x 20 mm 
98 24 SaSy ribs elbow bar Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
99 12 SaSy ribs elbow spring Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
100 6 SaSy upper bolt Geier, 1.4301, round rod 20 mm 
101 6 SaSy lower bolt Geier, 1.4301, round rod 22 mm 
102 3 SaSy left cross brace Geier, 1.4301, round tube 25 mm x 2 mm 
103 6 SaSy upper baseplate cross brace 
Geier, 1.4301, sheet metal 190 mm x 100 mm x 
4 mm 
104 6 SaSy lower baseplate cross brace 
Geier, 1.4301, sheet metal 78 mm x 56 mm x 4 
mm 
105 6 SaSy sleeve M8 short 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm 
106 24 SaSy sleeve M8 long 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm 
107 12 SaSy sleeve M8 cross brace 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm 
108 6 SaSy adapter plate brake shoe Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
109 6 SaSy adapter piece brake shoe long Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
110 6 SaSy adapter piece brake shoe short Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
111 6 SaSy brake shoe Bänfer 
112 6 SaSy lower insert bar 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 54 mm x 94 mm 
x 20 mm 
113 6 SaSy spacer upper bearing block Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, eroded to outer contour 
114 6 SaSy bracket magnet 
Alu Boll, EN AW 2007, round rod 100 mm, 
length 162 mm 
115 1 HV accumulator Self-manufactured 
116 1 HV-box Stock item 
117 6 Vertical clamping element 
Stock item, Stahl, rectangular tube 100 mm x 60 
mm x 3 mm 
118 3 Crossbeam jack-up system 
Stock item, Stahl, rectangular tube 120 mm x 60 
mm x 3 mm 
119 3 
lower horizontal clamping element 
jack-up system 
Stock item, Stahl, rectangular tube 100 mm x 60 
mm x 3 mm 
120 3 
upper horizontal clamping element 
jack-up system 
Stock item, Stahl, plate 110 mm x 100 mm x 20 
mm 
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Part 
Number 
Qty. Part name Supplier, Material, Dimension 
121 3 
Base insert clamping element jack-
up system 
Stock item, Stahl, plate 110 mm x 100 mm x 20 
mm 
122 3 Castor jack-up system Rollentechnik 
123 3 
Screw connection castor jack-up 
system 
Stock item, Stahl, plate 125 mm x 100 mm x 20 
mm 
124 3 SaSy right elbow spring 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 150 mm x 100 
mm x 10 mm 
125 3 
SaSy lower left flange bar strut 
bearing 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 35 mm x 30 mm 
x 3 mm 
126 3 
SaSy lower right flange bar strut 
bearing 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, elbow 35 mm x 30 mm 
x 3 mm 
127 12 SaSy lower insert bar rail 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 54 mm x 94 mm 
x 20 mm 
128 6 SaSy spacer bracket magnet 
Alu Boll, EN AW 2007, round rod 100 mm, 
length 14,5 mm 
129 12 SaSy upper sleeve M8 bar strut 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6060, round tube 20 mm x 5 
mm 
130 1 
SaSy spring compressor clamping 
plate magnet 
Alu Boll, EN AW 7075, eroded to outer contour 
131 1 
SaSy spring compressor clamping 
plate knee lever 
Alu Boll, EN AW 7075, eroded to outer contour 
132 3 Baseplate cable grand frame 
Stock item, Aluminium, flat bar 100 mm x 35 
mm x 5 mm 
133 6 SaSy adapter bump stop 
Geier, EN AW 6060 T66, flat bar 60 mm x 25 
mm  
134 3 SaSy right cross brace Geier, 1.4301, round tube 25 mm x 2 mm 
135 6 SaSy counter-plate bump stop Alu Boll 
136 3 SaSy left bracket switch 
Stock item, Aluminium, elbow 30 mm x 30 mm 
x 2 mm 
137 3 SaSy right bracket switch 
Stock item, Aluminium, elbow 30 mm x 30 mm 
x 2 mm 
138 6 SaSy switch Elektro Zimmermann 
139 6 SaSy outer flange damper 
Stock item, Stahl, flat bar 96 mm x 60 mm x 12 
mm 
140 6 SaSy damper Stabilus 
141 12 SaSy insert bar damper 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 54 mm x 94 mm 
x 20 mm 
142 3 Bracket magnetic sensor 
Stock item, Aluminium, flat bar 40 mm x 10 
mm x 300 mm 
143 2 Bracket LV-fuse box base bar 
Stock item, Aluminium, flat bar 18 mm x 5 mm 
x 170 mm 
144 4 Bracket LV-fuse box strut 
Stock item, Aluminium, square bar 10 mm x 10 
mm x 50 mm 
145 1 Baseplate HV accumulator Alu Boll, Aluminium, eroded to outer contour 
146 6 SaSy bump stop Gummi 
147 12 SaSy vertical insert bar 
Alu Boll, EN AW 6082, plate 94 mm x 60 mm 
x 20 mm 
148 6 SaSy bracket anchor plate Alu Boll, EN AW 6082 
148 12 SaSy mandrel sleeve Alu Boll, EN AW 6082 
149 1 ADMA GeneSys 
150 1 Roadbox IPG 
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Part 
Number 
Qty. Part name Supplier, Material, Dimension 
151 1 LV-fuse box   
152 4 LV accumulator VARTA 
152 1 GPS receiver   
152 1 DGPS antenna   
153 1 Wireless emergency stop receiver   
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No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENT CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD 
SIL Safety function Hazard 
Situation C Justification F Justific. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
S
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g
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n
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1.1 
No or insuf-
ficient HV 
power sup-
ply 
Demanded steer-
ing angle cannot 
be provided -> 
DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, emergency braking 
possible, mitigation is 
possible 
2 
HV accumulator 
and safety-ori-
ented BMS can 
lead to HV 
power cut 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a HV power cut 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
1.2 
No or insuf-
ficient LV 
power sup-
ply 
The motor con-
troller is unable 
to process its sig-
nals -> demanded 
steering angle 
cannot be pro-
vided -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
LV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, emergency braking 
possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV power cut 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
1.3.1 
HV input 
power too 
high 
Motor controller 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded steering 
angle cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
2 
HV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age, except 
when recupera-
tion is in pro-
cess. 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a HV overvoltage 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
1.3.2 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage in 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards and 
equipped the 
controller with 
overvoltage pro-
tection 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
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No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENT CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD 
SIL Safety function Hazard 
Situation C Justification F Justific. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
S
te
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g
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n
it
 
1.3.3 
HV input 
power too 
high 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage in 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Maintenance 3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards and 
equipped the 
controller with 
overvoltage pro-
tection 
a 
HV overvoltage because 
of recuperation must be 
avoided 
1.4.1 
LV input 
power too 
high 
Motor controller 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded steering 
angle cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV overvoltage 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
1.4.2 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage in 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
1.5.1 
Electric mo-
tor provides 
no/less/more 
torque than 
demanded 
Incorrect torque 
leads to no/de-
creased/increased 
steering angle 
rate and therefore 
incorrect steering 
angle -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over 
steering is given, emer-
gency braking is possible, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Electric motor 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
output voltage 
of motor con-
troller translates 
directly to mo-
tor torque 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
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HAZARDOUS EVENT CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD 
SIL Safety function Hazard 
Situation C Justification F Justific. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
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1.5.2 
Electric mo-
tor provides 
no/less/more 
torque than 
demanded 
Incorrect torque 
leads to no/de-
creased/increased 
steering angle 
rate and therefore 
incorrect steering 
angle -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Maintenance, ser-
vice engineer(s) 
standing close by 
electric motor 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer, 
control inputs to the DS 
can be checked before ex-
ecuting them, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Electric motor 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
output voltage 
of motor con-
troller translates 
directly to mo-
tor torque 
a 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
1.6 
Resolver de-
livers no 
electric mo-
tor speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller 
is unable to con-
trol motor speed -
> demanded 
steering angle 
cannot be pro-
vided -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over 
steering is given, emer-
gency braking is possible, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its re-
solver according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
1.7 
Resolver de-
livers too 
low/high 
electric mo-
tor speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller 
demand too 
high/low torque 
from electric mo-
tor -> too 
high/low steering 
angle -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over 
steering is given, emer-
gency braking is possible, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its re-
solver according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
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1.8.1 
Temperature 
sensor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
electric mo-
tor tempera-
ture signals 
Motor controller 
reduces maxi-
mum electric mo-
tor torque or 
shuts electric mo-
tor down -> de-
manded steering 
angle cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, if only one temper-
ature sensor fails limited 
control over steering is 
given, emergency braking 
possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Electric motor 
(and tempera-
ture sensor) that 
is also used in 
light aircrafts 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
1.8.2 
Motor controller 
fails to reduce 
electric motor 
torque or to shut 
electric motor 
down -> over-
heating of electric 
motor -> possibly 
short circuit 
and/or fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Electric motor 
(and tempera-
ture sensor) that 
is also used in 
light aircrafts, 
motor controller 
developed ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
1.9.1 
Motor con-
troller pro-
vides no/too 
low/too high 
power to 
electric mo-
tor 
No/too low/too 
high torque from 
electric motor -> 
demanded steer-
ing angle cannot 
be provided -> 
DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
detection possible by 
comparing the signals of 
all three steering motors, 
if only one motor control-
ler fails limited control 
over steering is given, 
emergency braking possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
motor controller so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
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1.9.2 
Motor con-
troller pro-
vides no/too 
low/too high 
power to 
electric mo-
tor 
Overvoltage in 
electric motor -> 
short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
maximum output voltage 
can be set in motor con-
troller, mitigation is pos-
sible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
1.10.1 
Electric mo-
tor becomes 
too hot 
Motor controller 
reduces maxi-
mum engine 
torque or shuts 
electric motor 
down -> de-
manded steering 
angle cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, if only electric mo-
tor fails limited control 
over steering is given, 
emergency braking possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, pro-
totype electric 
motor (and tem-
perature sensor) 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
motor controller 
monitors tem-
peratures 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
1.10.2 
Overheating of 
electric motor -> 
possibly short cir-
cuit and/or fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, pro-
totype electric 
motor (and tem-
perature sensor) 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
motor controller 
monitors tem-
peratures 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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1.11.1 
Motor con-
troller be-
comes too 
hot 
Motor controller 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded steering 
angle cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, if only electric mo-
tor fails limited control 
over steering is given, 
emergency braking possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its motor 
controller ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
motor controller so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
1.11.2 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overheating of 
motor controller -
> possibly short 
circuit and/or fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its motor 
controller ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
1.12.1 
Water in-
gress at elec-
tric motor 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at electric mo-
tor must be avoided 
1.12.2 
Maintenance, ser-
vice engineer 
working at the 
electric motor 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at electric mo-
tor must be avoided 
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1.12.3 
Water in-
gress at elec-
tric motor 
Electric motor is 
unable to operate 
-> DS trajectory 
is uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the electric motor so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
1.13.1 
Water in-
gress at mo-
tor controller 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at motor con-
troller must be avoided 
1.13.2 
Maintenance, ser-
vice engineer 
working at the mo-
tor controller 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at motor con-
troller must be avoided 
1.13.3 
Motor controller 
is unable to oper-
ate -> DS trajec-
tory is uncontrol-
lable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the motor controller so 
that collisions with ob-
jects and subjects can be 
avoided 
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1.14 
Motor con-
troller pro-
vides no/in-
correct/too 
late infor-
mation to 
IPG Road-
box 
IPG Roadbox is 
unable to calcu-
late correct 
WMDS state -> 
DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over mo-
tor controller, no mitiga-
tion possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
motor controller to the 
IPG Roadbox so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
D
ri
v
e 
u
n
it
 
2.1 
No or insuf-
ficient HV 
energy sup-
ply 
Demanded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, steering is possible, 
mitigation is possible 
2 
HV accumulator 
and safety-ori-
ented BMS can 
lead to HV 
power cut 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a HV power cut 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
2.2 
No or insuf-
ficient LV 
energy sup-
ply 
The motor con-
troller is unable 
to process its sig-
nals -> demanded 
motor torque can-
not be provided -
> DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, steering is possible, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV power cut 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
2.3.1 
HV input 
voltage too 
high 
Motor controller 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
2 
HV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age, except 
when recupera-
tion is in pro-
cess. 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a HV overvoltage 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
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2.3.2 
HV input 
voltage too 
high 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage in 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards and 
equipped the 
controller with 
overvoltage pro-
tection 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
2.3.3 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage in 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Maintenance 3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards and 
equipped the 
controller with 
overvoltage pro-
tection 
a 
HV overvoltage because 
of recuperation must be 
avoided 
2.4.1 
LV input 
voltage too 
high 
Motor controller 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV overvoltage 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
2.4.2 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage in 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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2.5.1 
Electric mo-
tor provides 
no/less/more 
torque than 
demanded 
Incorrect torque 
leads to no/de-
creased/increased 
wheel speeds and 
therefore incor-
rect velocity/ac-
celeration and 
possibly yaw mo-
tion -> DS trajec-
tory is uncontrol-
lable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration 
is given, steering is possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Electric motor 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
output voltage 
of motor con-
troller translates 
directly to mo-
tor torque 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
2.5.2 
Maintenance, ser-
vice engineer 
standing close by 
electric motor 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer, 
control inputs to the DS 
can be checked before ex-
ecuting them, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Electric motor 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
output voltage 
of motor con-
troller translates 
directly to mo-
tor torque 
a 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
2.6 
Resolver de-
livers no 
electric mo-
tor speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller 
is unable to con-
trol motor speed -
> demanded mo-
tor torque cannot 
be provided -> 
DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration 
is given, steering is possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its re-
solver according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
2.7 
Resolver de-
livers too 
low/high 
electric mo-
tor speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller 
demand too 
high/low torque 
from electric mo-
tor -> too 
high/low motor 
torque -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration 
is given, steering is possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its re-
solver according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
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2.8.1 
Temperature 
sensor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
electric mo-
tor tempera-
ture signals 
Motor controller 
reduces maxi-
mum electric mo-
tor torque or 
shuts electric mo-
tor down -> de-
manded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, if only one temper-
ature sensor fails limited 
control over accelera-
tion/deceleration is given, 
steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Electric motor 
(and tempera-
ture sensor) that 
is also used in 
light aircrafts 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
2.8.2 
Motor controller 
fails to reduce 
electric motor 
torque or to shut 
electric motor 
down -> over-
heating of electric 
motor -> possibly 
short circuit 
and/or fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Electric motor 
(and tempera-
ture sensor) that 
is also used in 
light aircrafts, 
motor controller 
developed ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
2.9.1 
Motor con-
troller pro-
vides no/too 
low/too high 
voltage to 
electric mo-
tor 
No/too low/too 
high torque from 
electric motor -> 
demanded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
detection possible by 
comparing the signals of 
all three steering motors, 
if only one motor control-
ler fails limited control 
over acceleration/deceler-
ation is given, steering is 
possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
motor controller so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
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2.9.2 
Motor con-
troller pro-
vides no/too 
low/too high 
voltage to 
electric mo-
tor 
Overvoltage in 
electric motor -> 
short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
maximum output voltage 
can be set in motor con-
troller, mitigation is pos-
sible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
2.10.1 
Electric mo-
tor becomes 
too hot 
Motor controller 
reduces maxi-
mum engine 
torque or shuts 
electric motor 
down -> de-
manded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, if only electric mo-
tor fails limited control 
over acceleration/deceler-
ation is given, steering is 
possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, pro-
totype electric 
motor (and tem-
perature sensor) 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
motor controller 
monitors tem-
peratures 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
electric motor so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
2.10.2 
Overheating of 
electric motor -> 
possibly short cir-
cuit and/or fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, pro-
totype electric 
motor (and tem-
perature sensor) 
that is also used 
in light aircrafts, 
motor controller 
monitors tem-
peratures 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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2.11.1 
Motor con-
troller be-
comes too 
hot 
Motor controller 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded motor 
torque cannot be 
provided -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, if only electric mo-
tor fails limited control 
over acceleration/deceler-
ation is given, steering is 
possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its motor 
controller ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
motor controller so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
2.11.2 
Motor controller 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overheating of 
motor controller -
> possibly short 
circuit and/or fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its motor 
controller ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
2.12.1 
Water in-
gress at elec-
tric motor 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at electric mo-
tor must be avoided 
2.12.2 
Maintenance, ser-
vice engineer 
working at the 
electric motor 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at electric mo-
tor must be avoided 
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2.12.3 
Water in-
gress at elec-
tric motor 
Electric motor is 
unable to operate 
-> DS trajectory 
is uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the electric motor so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
2.13.1 
Water in-
gress at mo-
tor controller 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at motor con-
troller must be avoided 
2.13.2 
Maintenance, ser-
vice engineer 
working at the mo-
tor controller 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at motor con-
troller must be avoided 
2.13.3 
Motor controller 
is unable to oper-
ate -> DS trajec-
tory is uncontrol-
lable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the motor controller so 
that collisions with ob-
jects and subjects can be 
avoided 
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2.14 
Motor con-
troller pro-
vides no/in-
correct/too 
late infor-
mation to 
IPG Road-
box 
IPG Roadbox is 
unable to calcu-
late correct 
WMDS state -> 
DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over mo-
tor controller, no mitiga-
tion possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its mo-
tor controller 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
motor controller to the 
IPG Roadbox so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
H
ex
a
p
o
d
 
3.1 
No or insuf-
ficient HV 
power sup-
ply 
Power electronics 
shut down -> de-
manded hexapod 
motion cannot be 
provided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
emergency shutdown and 
HV energy cut are sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation pos-
sible 
2 
HV accumulator 
and safety-ori-
ented BMS can 
lead to HV 
power cut 
1 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of HV 
power cut 
3.2.1 
HV input 
power too 
high 
Power electronics 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded hexapod 
motion cannot be 
provided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
2 
HV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age, except 
when recupera-
tion is in pro-
cess. 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of HV 
overvoltage AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
3.2.2 
Power electronics 
fail to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overvoltage at 
power electronics 
-> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
HV overvoltage is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its 
power electron-
ics according to 
applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
C Safety Analysis 
150 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENT CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD 
SIL Safety function Hazard 
Situation C Justification F Justific. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
H
ex
a
p
o
d
 
3.3.1 
Linear actua-
tor provides 
no/less/more 
force than 
demanded 
Motion of the lin-
ear actuators does 
not match the in-
verse kinematics 
model -> tension 
within hexapod 
may lead to frac-
ture of actuator -
> other actuators 
cannot support 
static and dy-
namic dome load 
-> instable or 
loose dome 
Driving simulation 
with test person 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over in-
verse kinematics model or 
voltage provided to actua-
tors, no mitigation possi-
ble 
1 
The suppliers 
developed their 
actuators ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
The test person must not 
be seriously injured or 
killed if the dome be-
comes loose or instable 
3.3.2 
Maintenance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
2 
Skilled service engi-
neer/mechanic, no direct 
control over inverse kine-
matics model or voltage 
provided to actuators, no 
mitigation possible 
1 
The suppliers 
developed their 
actuators ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
The service engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be seriously injured 
or killed if the dome be-
comes loose or instable 
3.4 
Linear actua-
tor's position 
sensor deliv-
ers no signal 
Power electronics 
cannot control the 
linear actuator's 
position -> de-
manded hexapod 
motion cannot be 
provided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
safe hexapod position can 
be reached with open-
loop control, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its actu-
ators and sen-
sors according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of a 
malfunctioning hexapod 
actuator 
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3.5 
Linear actua-
tor's position 
sensor deliv-
ers too 
low/high sig-
nal 
Power electronics 
demands too 
high/low actuator 
force -> motion 
of the linear actu-
ators does not 
match the inverse 
kinematics model 
-> tension within 
hexapod may 
lead to fracture of 
actuator -> other 
actuators cannot 
support static and 
dynamic dome 
load -> instable 
or loose dome 
Maintenance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
2 
Skilled service engi-
neer/mechanic, no direct 
control over inverse kine-
matics model or voltage 
provided to actuators, no 
mitigation possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its actu-
ators and sen-
sors according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The service engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be seriously injured 
or killed if the dome be-
comes loose or instable 
3.6.1 
Linear actua-
tor's temper-
ature sensor 
delivers 
no/too 
low/high sig-
nal 
Power electronics 
reduce maximum 
actuator force or 
shuts actuator 
down -> de-
manded hexapod 
motion cannot be 
provided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored and compared, mit-
igation possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its actu-
ators and sen-
sors according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of a 
malfunctioning hexapod 
actuator 
3.6.2 
Power electronics 
fails to reduce 
maximum actua-
tor force or to 
shut actuator 
down -> over-
heating of actua-
tor -> possibly 
short circuit and 
fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored and compared, mit-
igation possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its actu-
ators and sen-
sors according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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3.7.1 
Power elec-
tronics pro-
vide no/too 
low/too high 
power to lin-
ear actuator 
No/too low/too 
high force from 
one linear actua-
tor -> motion of 
the linear actua-
tors does not 
match the inverse 
kinematics model 
-> tension within 
hexapod may 
lead to fracture of 
actuator -> other 
actuators cannot 
support static and 
dynamic dome 
load -> instable 
or loose dome 
Maintenance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
2 
Skilled service engi-
neer/mechanic, no direct 
control over inverse kine-
matics model or voltage 
provided to actuators, no 
mitigation possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its 
power electron-
ics according to 
applicable 
standards 
1 
The service engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be seriously injured 
or killed if the dome be-
comes loose or instable 
3.7.2 
Too high force 
from all linear ac-
tuators -> accel-
eration of the 
hexapod above 
demanded accel-
eration 
Driving simulation 
with test person 
1 
Test person 
may be in-
jured 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over ac-
tuators, no mitigation 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its 
power electron-
ics according to 
applicable 
standards 
a 
Malfunctioning power 
electronics must be 
avoided 
3.7.3 
Overvoltage at 
linear actuator -> 
short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over ac-
tuators, no mitigation 
possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its 
power electron-
ics according to 
applicable 
standards 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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3.8.1 
Linear actua-
tor becomes 
too hot 
Power electronics 
reduces maxi-
mum actuator 
force or shuts ac-
tuator down -> 
demanded hexa-
pod motion can-
not be provided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its actua-
tors and sensors 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of a 
malfunctioning hexapod 
actuator 
3.8.2 
Power electronics 
fails to reduce 
maximum actua-
tor force or to 
shut actuator 
down -> over-
heating of actua-
tor -> possibly 
short circuit and 
fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its actua-
tors and sensors 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
3.9.1 
Power elec-
tronics be-
come too hot 
Power electronics 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> de-
manded hexapod 
motion cannot be 
provided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its power 
electronics ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of a 
malfunctioning hexapod 
actuator 
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3.9.2 
Power elec-
tronics be-
come too hot 
Power electronics 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> overheating of 
power electronics 
-> possibly short 
circuit and/or fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its power 
electronics ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
3.10 
The motion 
of one or 
more linear 
actuators, de-
manded by 
the power 
electronics, 
does not 
match the in-
verse kine-
matics model 
Tension within 
hexapod may 
lead to fracture of 
actuator -> other 
actuators cannot 
support static and 
dynamic dome 
load -> instable 
or loose dome 
Maintenance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
2 
Skilled service engi-
neer/mechanic, no direct 
control over actuators, no 
mitigation possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its 
power electron-
ics according to 
applicable 
standards 
1 
The service engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be seriously injured 
or killed if the dome be-
comes loose or instable 
3.11.1 
Water in-
gress at lin-
ear actuator 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at hexapod ac-
tuator must be avoided 
C.2 Preliminary Hazard List 
155 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENT CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD 
SIL Safety function Hazard 
Situation C Justification F Justific. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
H
ex
a
p
o
d
 
3.11.2 
Water in-
gress at lin-
ear actuator 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Maintenance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
1 
Skilled service engineer 
and mechanic, water in-
gress can be observed, 
mitigation is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Water ingress at hexapod 
actuator must be avoided 
3.11.3 Emergency rescue 3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Water ingress at hexapod 
actuator must be avoided 
3.11.4 
Linear actuator is 
unable to operate 
-> demanded 
hexapod motion 
cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of a 
malfunctioning hexapod 
actuator 
3.12.1 
Water in-
gress at 
power elec-
tronics 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at hexapod 
power electronics must 
be avoided 
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3.12.2 
Water in-
gress at 
power elec-
tronics 
Power electronics 
is unable to oper-
ate -> demanded 
hexapod motion 
cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Water ingress at hexapod 
power electronics must 
be avoided 
3.13 
Power elec-
tronics pro-
vide no/in-
correct/too 
late infor-
mation to 
IPG Road-
box 
IPG Roadbox is 
unable to calcu-
late correct 
WMDS state -> 
hexapod motion 
is uncontrollable 
Emergency rescue, 
dome fully tilted 
and poorly acces-
sible 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Rare 
emergency 
use case 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over 
power electronics, no mit-
igation possible 
1 
The supplier de-
veloped its 
power electron-
ics according to 
applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person must remain 
accessible in case of a 
faulty data transmission 
from the power electron-
ics to the IPG Roadbox 
M
o
ck
-u
p
 
4.1.1 
No or insuf-
ficient power 
supply 
Test person is un-
able to give con-
trol inputs 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
energy cut is sudden and 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
a 
Test person must be able 
to give control inputs 
4.1.2 
Test person is un-
able to communi-
cate with system 
operator and vice 
versa 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
energy cut is sudden and 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
a 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa 
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4.1.3 
No or insuf-
ficient power 
supply 
Test person can-
not receive sys-
tem feedback 
through visual, 
auditory, and tac-
tile channels 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
energy cut is sudden and 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
a 
Test person must receive 
visual, auditory, and tac-
tile feedback 
4.1.4 
Test person can-
not receive sys-
tem feedback 
through visual, 
auditory, and tac-
tile channels -> 
test person gets 
motion sick and 
throws up onto 
E/E/PE element -
> short circuit 
and possible fire 
hazard -> test 
person must be 
rescued 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person can be moni-
tored and driving simula-
tion can be aborted prior 
to critical event, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
a 
Test person must receive 
visual, auditory, and tac-
tile feedback 
4.1.5 
System operator 
is unable to mon-
itor test person 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
might unbuckle 
and/or move 
within move 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
energy cut is sudden and 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
a 
System operator must be 
able to monitor test per-
son 
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4.1.6 
No or insuf-
ficient power 
supply 
System operator 
is unable to mon-
itor test person 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
energy cut is sudden and 
can hardly be detected 
prior to hazardous event, 
no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
a 
System operator must be 
able to monitor test per-
son 
4.1.7 
Air conditioning 
is unable to oper-
ate 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
extremely cold/hot 
environmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when dome gets too 
cold/hot test person can 
leave DS, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut, ex-
treme tempera-
tures excluded 
from environ-
mental condi-
tions 
a 
Air conditioning must be 
available at all times 
4.2.1 
Input power 
too high 
Control elements 
go into safety 
shutdown -> test 
person cannot 
give control in-
puts 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
Test person must be able 
to give control inputs 
4.2.2 
Representation 
elements go into 
safety shutdown -
> test person can-
not receive sys-
tem feedback 
through visual, 
auditory, and tac-
tile channels 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
Test person must receive 
visual, auditory, and tac-
tile feedback 
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4.2.3 
Input power 
too high 
Communication 
system goes into 
safety shutdown -
> test person is 
unable to com-
municate with 
system operator 
and vice versa 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa 
4.2.4 
Surveillance sys-
tem goes into 
safety shutdown -
> system operator 
is unable to mon-
itor test person 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
System operator must be 
able to monitor test per-
son 
4.2.5 
Air conditioning 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> air 
conditioning is 
unable to operate 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
extremely cold/hot 
environmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when dome gets too 
cold/hot test person can 
leave DS, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal volt-
age, extreme 
temperatures ex-
cluded from en-
vironmental 
conditions 
a 
Air conditioning must be 
available at all times 
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4.2.6 
Input power 
too high 
Any of the sub-
system's elements 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal volt-
age, suppliers of 
subsystem's ele-
ments devel-
oped their com-
ponents 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
4.3 
Gear selec-
tion is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong gear 
selection is for-
warded to 
WMDS dynamics 
control subsys-
tem -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person and signals 
can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its gear se-
lection system 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
a 
Gear selection must be 
correctly sensed at all 
times 
4.4 
Steering 
wheel angle 
is not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong steer-
ing wheel angle 
is forwarded to 
WMDS dynamics 
control subsys-
tem -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person and signals 
can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its steering 
wheel according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Steering wheel angle 
must be correctly sensed 
at all times 
4.5 
Clutch pedal 
position is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong clutch 
pedal position is 
forwarded to 
WMDS dynamics 
control subsys-
tem -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person and signals 
can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its pedal 
assembly ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
a 
Clutch pedal position 
must be correctly sensed 
at all times 
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4.6 
Brake pedal 
position is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong brake 
pedal position is 
forwarded to 
WMDS dynamics 
control subsys-
tem -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person and signals 
can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its pedal 
assembly ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
a 
Brake pedal position 
must be correctly sensed 
at all times 
4.7 
Accelerator 
pedal posi-
tion is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong accel-
erator pedal posi-
tion is forwarded 
to WMDS dy-
namics control 
subsystem -> 
false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person and signals 
can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its pedal 
assembly ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
a 
Accelerator pedal posi-
tion must be correctly 
sensed at all times 
4.8 
Steering 
wheel force 
feedback ac-
tuator gives 
no/too 
low/too high 
feedback 
force 
False cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when false cues are repre-
sented test person can 
communicate with system 
operator and abort driving 
simulation, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its steering 
wheel according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Correct steering wheel 
force feedback must be 
provided at all times 
4.9 
Brake pedal's 
ABS shaker 
gives no/too 
low/too high 
feedback 
force 
False cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when false cues are repre-
sented test person can 
communicate with system 
operator and abort driving 
simulation, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its pedal 
assembly ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
a 
Correct ABS shaker 
feedback must be pro-
vided at all times 
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4.10 
Sound sys-
tem gives 
no/wrong/too 
early/too late 
auditory 
feedback 
False cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when false cues are repre-
sented test person can 
communicate with system 
operator and abort driving 
simulation, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its sound 
system accord-
ing to applicable 
standards 
a 
Correct acoustical cues 
must be provided at all 
times 
4.11 
Visual repre-
sentation 
system gives 
no/wrong/too 
early/too late 
visual feed-
back 
False cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when false cues are repre-
sented test person can 
communicate with system 
operator and abort driving 
simulation, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its visual 
representation 
system accord-
ing to applicable 
standards 
a 
Correct visual cues must 
be provided at all times 
4.12 
Air condi-
tioning is set 
at too 
high/low air 
temperature 
Temperature 
within dome is 
too low/high -> 
health hazard to 
test person 
Driving simulation 
with test person 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, 
when dome gets too 
cold/hot test person can 
communicate with system 
operator and abort driving 
simulation and leave DS, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Skilled system 
operator sets 
temperature, 
supplier devel-
oped its air con-
ditioning ac-
cording to 
applicable 
standards 
a 
Air conditioning must be 
available at all times 
4.13.1 
Any of the 
representa-
tion elements 
becomes too 
hot 
Representation 
element goes into 
safety shutdown -
> test person can-
not receive sys-
tem feedback 
through visual, 
auditory, or tac-
tile channels 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
suppliers devel-
oped their repre-
sentation ele-
ments according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Correct visual, acoustical 
and tactile cues must be 
provided at all times 
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4.13.2 
Any of the 
representa-
tion elements 
becomes too 
hot 
Representation 
element fails to 
go into safety 
shutdown -> pos-
sibly short circuit 
and fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its power 
electronics ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
4.14.1 
Any of the 
control ele-
ments be-
comes too 
hot 
Control element 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> test 
person cannot 
give control in-
puts 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures and test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
suppliers devel-
oped their con-
trol input ele-
ments according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person's inputs must 
be correctly sensed at all 
times 
4.14.2 
Control element 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> possibly short 
circuit and fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
suppliers devel-
oped their con-
trol input ele-
ments according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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4.15.1 
Communica-
tion system 
becomes too 
hot 
Communication 
system goes into 
safety shutdown -
> test person is 
unable to com-
municate with 
system operator 
and vice versa 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its com-
munication sys-
tem according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa 
4.15.2 
Communication 
system fails to go 
into safety shut-
down -> possibly 
short circuit and 
fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its com-
munication sys-
tem according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
4.16.1 
Surveillance 
system be-
comes too 
hot 
Surveillance sys-
tem goes into 
safety shutdown -
> system operator 
is unable to mon-
itor test person 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person can communi-
cate with system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its surveil-
lance system ac-
cording to 
applicable 
standards 
a 
System operator must be 
able to monitor test per-
son 
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4.16.2 
Surveillance 
system be-
comes too 
hot 
Surveillance sys-
tem fails to go 
into safety shut-
down -> possibly 
short circuit and 
fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its surveil-
lance system ac-
cording to 
applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
4.17.1 
Air condi-
tioning sys-
tem becomes 
too hot 
Air conditioning 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> air 
conditioning is 
unable to operate 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
extremely cold/hot 
environmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its air con-
ditioning ac-
cording to 
applicable 
standards 
a 
Air conditioning must be 
available at all times 
4.17.2 
Air conditioning 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> possibly short 
circuit and fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its air con-
ditioning ac-
cording to 
applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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4.18.1 
Water in-
gress at vis-
ual represen-
tation system 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the visual 
representation system 
must be avoided 
4.18.2 
Visual represen-
tation system is 
unable to operate 
-> false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Correct visual cues must 
be provided at all times 
AND water ingress at the 
visual representation sys-
tem must be avoided 
4.19.1 
Water in-
gress at 
sound sys-
tem 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the sound 
system must be avoided 
4.19.2 
Sound system is 
unable to operate 
-> false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Correct acoustical cues 
must be provided at all 
times AND water ingress 
at the sound system must 
be avoided 
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4.20.1 
Water in-
gress at 
steering 
wheel 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the steering 
wheel must be avoided 
4.20.2 
Steering wheel 
force feedback 
actuator is unable 
to operate -> 
false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Correct steering wheel 
force feedback must be 
provided at all times 
AND water ingress at the 
steering wheel must be 
avoided 
4.20.3 
Steering wheel 
angle sensor is 
unable to operate 
-> false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Steering wheel angle 
must be correctly sensed 
at all times AND water 
ingress at the steering 
wheel must be avoided 
4.21.1 
Water in-
gress at ped-
als 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the pedals 
must be avoided 
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4.21.2 
Water in-
gress at ped-
als 
Brake pedal ABS 
shaker is unable 
to operate -> 
false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Correct ABS shaker 
feedback must be pro-
vided at all times AND 
water ingress at the ped-
als must be avoided 
4.21.3 
Brake and/or 
clutch and/or ac-
celerator pedal 
sensor is unable 
to operate -> 
false cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, test per-
son's control input and 
behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Brake/Accelerator/Clutch 
pedal position must be 
correctly sensed at all 
times AND water ingress 
at the pedals must be 
avoided 
4.22.1 
Water in-
gress at com-
munication 
system 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the pedals 
must be avoided 
4.22.2 
Communication 
system is unable 
to operate -> test 
person cannot 
communicate 
with system oper-
ator and vice 
versa 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa in case of water in-
gress at the communica-
tion system AND water 
ingress at the communi-
cation system must be 
avoided 
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4.23.1 
Water in-
gress at sur-
veillance 
system 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the pedals 
must be avoided 
4.23.2 
Surveillance sys-
tem is unable to 
operate -> system 
operator cannot 
monitor test per-
son 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
System operator must be 
able to monitor test per-
son AND water ingress 
at the surveillance system 
must be avoided 
4.24.1 
Water in-
gress at air 
conditioning 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the pedals 
must be avoided 
4.24.2 
Air conditioning 
is unable to oper-
ate -> health haz-
ard to test person 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
extremely cold/hot 
environmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, temper-
atures can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
Air conditioning must be 
available at all times 
AND water ingress at the 
air conditioning system 
must be avoided 
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4.25 
Communica-
tion system 
does 
not/other 
than/too late 
forward the 
test person's 
input to ex-
ternal com-
mand de-
vice's 
communica-
tion system 
System operator 
cannot/too late 
react to the test 
person's input 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Wireless data 
transmission, 
supplier devel-
oped its com-
munication sys-
tem according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa in case of a faulty 
data transmission from 
the mock-up's to the ex-
ternal command device's 
communication system 
4.26 
Surveillance 
system does 
not/other 
than/too late 
forward its 
information 
to the exter-
nal com-
mand de-
vice's 
communica-
tion system 
System operator 
cannot/too late 
react to the test 
person's behav-
iour/condition 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test person's 
condition 
might worsen 
because res-
cue is im-
peded 
1 
Regular 
use case, 
rare event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person can communi-
cate with system operator, 
mitigation is possible 
2 
Wireless data 
transmission, 
supplier devel-
oped its surveil-
lance system ac-
cording to 
applicable 
standards 
a 
System operator must be 
able to monitor test per-
son in case of a faulty 
data transmission from 
the surveillance system 
to the external command 
device 
4.27 
Driver input 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
IPG Road-
box 
False cues are 
generated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
test person and signals 
can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its compo-
nents according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
Test person's inputs must 
be correctly forwarded to 
the IPG Roadbox 
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5.1.1 
No or insuf-
ficient power 
supply 
System operator 
is unable to give 
control inputs -> 
DS trajectory is 
uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
LV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
Power cut from 
stationary power 
socket very un-
likely 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a stationary 
power cut so that colli-
sions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
5.1.2 
Manual drive, 
maximum manu-
ally adjustable 
driving velocity 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
LV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
Power cut from 
stationary power 
socket very un-
likely 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a stationary 
power cut so that colli-
sions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
5.1.3 
External com-
mand device is 
unable to operate 
-> communica-
tion with and sur-
veillance of test 
person impossi-
ble 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
LV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
Power cut from 
stationary power 
socket very un-
likely 
a 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa in case of a station-
ary power cut 
5.2.1 
Input power 
too high 
External com-
mand device goes 
into safety shut-
down -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage in stationary 
power supply only possi-
ble with lightning which 
can be avoided by test 
person (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Overvoltage sta-
tionary power 
socket very un-
likely 
a 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a stationary 
power overvoltage so 
that collisions with ob-
jects and subjects can be 
avoided AND stationary 
power overvoltage must 
be avoided 
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5.2.2 
Input power 
too high 
External com-
mand device fails 
to go into safety 
shutdown -> 
short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simula-
tion, system opera-
tor must be res-
cued 
3 
System oper-
ator(s) and/or 
emergency 
personnel 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage in stationary 
power supply only possi-
ble with lightning which 
can be avoided by test 
person (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Overvoltage sta-
tionary power 
socket very un-
likely 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND sta-
tionary power overvolt-
age must be avoided 
5.2.3 Maintenance 3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage in stationary 
power supply only possi-
ble with lightning which 
can be avoided by test 
person (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Overvoltage sta-
tionary power 
socket very un-
likely 
a 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND sta-
tionary power overvolt-
age must be avoided 
5.3.1 
Water in-
gress at ex-
ternal com-
mand device 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simula-
tion, system opera-
tor must be res-
cued 
3 
System oper-
ator(s) and/or 
emergency 
personnel 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the external 
command device must be 
avoided 
5.3.2 
External com-
mand device is 
unable to operate 
-> DS trajectory 
is uncontrollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the external command 
device AND water in-
gress at the external com-
mand device must be 
avoided 
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5.3.3 
Water in-
gress at ex-
ternal com-
mand device 
External com-
mand device is 
unable to operate 
-> communica-
tion with and sur-
veillance of test 
person impossi-
ble 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
a 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa AND water ingress 
at the external command 
device must be avoided 
5.4.1 
External 
command 
device be-
comes too 
hot 
External com-
mand device goes 
into safety shut-
down -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its external 
command de-
vice according 
to applicable 
standards 
a 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
external command device 
5.4.2 
External com-
mand device fails 
to go into safety 
shutdown -> pos-
sibly short circuit 
and/or fire hazard 
Driving simula-
tion, system opera-
tor must be res-
cued 
3 
System oper-
ator(s) and/or 
emergency 
personnel 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its external 
command de-
vice according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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5.5 
Command 
inputs are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
the WMDS 
dynamics 
control sub-
system 
System operator 
has no/wrong/de-
layed influence 
on DS trajectory 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation possible 
2 
Wireless data 
transmission, 
supplier devel-
oped its external 
command de-
vice according 
to applicable 
standards 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the ex-
ternal command device 
to the WMDS dynamics 
control subsystem AND 
wireless data transmis-
sion must not fail 
5.6 
Communica-
tion system 
does 
not/other 
than/too late 
forward the 
system oper-
ator's input 
to the mock-
up E/E/PE 
subsystem's 
communica-
tion system 
Test person can-
not/too late react 
to the system op-
erator's input 
Driving simulation 
or emergency res-
cue with unclear 
situation for test 
person, test person 
must not unbuckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
2 
Unskilled test person, no 
communication possible, 
mitigation is hardly possi-
ble 
2 
Wireless data 
transmission, 
supplier devel-
oped its com-
munication sys-
tem according 
to applicable 
standards 
2 
Test person must be able 
to communicate with sys-
tem operator and vice 
versa in case of a faulty 
data transmission from 
the external command 
device to the WMDS dy-
namics control subsys-
tem AND wireless data 
transmission must not 
fail 
W
M
D
S
 d
y
n
a
m
ic
s 
c
tr
l 
6.1 
No or insuf-
ficient LV 
power sup-
ply 
DS trajectory 
cannot be calcu-
lated -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
LV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard BMS 
make LV power 
cut more un-
likely than HV 
power cut 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV power cut 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
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6.2.1 
LV input 
power too 
high 
IPG Roadbox 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV power over-
voltage so that collisions 
with objects and subjects 
can be avoided 
6.2.2 
ADMA G-3 goes 
into safety shut-
down -> close-
loop control not 
possible, possibly 
dangerous trajec-
tory 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), emergency braking 
is possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV power over-
voltage so that collisions 
with objects and subjects 
can be avoided 
6.2.3 
IPG Roadbox 
and/or ADMA G-
3 fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
6.4.1 
Water in-
gress at IPG 
Roadbox 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the IPG 
Roadbox must be 
avoided 
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6.4.2 
Water in-
gress at IPG 
Roadbox 
IPG Roadbox is 
unable to operate 
-> DS trajectory 
not controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the IPG Roadbox so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided AND water in-
gress at the IPG Roadbox 
must be avoided 
6.5.1 
Water in-
gress at 
ADMA G-3 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at the ADMA 
G-3 must be avoided 
6.5.2 
ADMA-G3 is un-
able to operate -> 
position/motion 
of DS unclear -> 
DS trajectory not 
controllable in 
closed-loop con-
trol, possibly 
dangerous trajec-
tory 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, open-
loop control still possible, 
mitigation is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of water ingress at 
the ADMA G-3 so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided AND water in-
gress at the ADMA G-3 
must be avoided 
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6.6.1 
IPG Road-
box becomes 
too hot 
IPG Roadbox 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> DS 
trajectory is un-
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its Road-
box according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
IPG Roadbox so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
6.6.2 
IPG Roadbox 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> possibly short 
circuit and/or fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its Road-
box according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
6.7.1 
ADMA G-3 
becomes too 
hot 
ADMA G-3 goes 
into safety shut-
down -> DS tra-
jectory is uncon-
trollable in 
closed-loop con-
trol, possibly 
dangerous trajec-
tory 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, open-loop control 
still possible, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its ADMA 
G-3 according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
ADMA G-3 so that colli-
sions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
6.7.2 
ADMA G-3 fails 
to go into safety 
shutdown -> pos-
sibly short circuit 
and/or fire hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, open-loop control 
still possible, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its ADMA 
G-3 according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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6.8 
ADMA G-3 
signals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
IPG Road-
box 
Position/motion 
of DS unclear -> 
DS trajectory not 
controllable in 
closed-loop con-
trol, possibly 
dangerous trajec-
tory 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
open-loop control still 
possible, emergency brak-
ing possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its ADMA 
G-3 according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from 
ADMA G-3 to IPG 
Roadbox so that colli-
sions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
6.9 
IPG Road-
box signals 
are not/in-
correctly/too 
late for-
warded to 
steering unit 
subsystem 
Incorrect steering 
angle is provided 
-> DS trajectory 
is not controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
emergency braking possi-
ble, no mitigation possi-
ble 
3 
Supplier devel-
oped its IPG 
Roadbox ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards, 
self-pro-
grammed dy-
namics control 
3 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
IPG Roadbox to the 
steering unit subsystem 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
6.10 
IPG Road-
box signals 
are not/in-
correctly/too 
late for-
warded to 
drive unit 
subsystem 
Maximum wheel 
hub torque is pro-
vided -> DS tra-
jectory is not 
controllable, 
steering impossi-
ble 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation possible 
3 
Supplier devel-
oped its IPG 
Roadbox ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards, 
self-pro-
grammed dy-
namics control 
4 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
IPG Roadbox to the drive 
unit subsystem so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
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IPG Road-
box signals 
are not/in-
correctly/too 
late for-
warded to 
hexapod sub-
system 
Incorrect linear 
actuator force is 
provided -> false 
cues are gener-
ated and/or mo-
tion of the linear 
actuators does not 
match the inverse 
kinematics model 
-> tension within 
hexapod may 
lead to fracture of 
actuator -> other 
actuators cannot 
support static and 
dynamic dome 
load -> instable 
or loose dome 
Maintenance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare use 
case 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation possible 
3 
Supplier devel-
oped its IPG 
Roadbox ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards, 
self-pro-
grammed dy-
namics control 
3 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
IPG Roadbox to the hex-
apod subsystem so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
6.12 
IPG Road-
box signals 
are not/in-
correctly/too 
late for-
warded to 
mock-up 
subsystem 
Test person can-
not receive sys-
tem feedback 
through visual, 
auditory, and tac-
tile channels 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
dynamic driving 
situation 
1 
Motion sick-
ness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation possible 
3 
Supplier devel-
oped its IPG 
Roadbox ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards, 
self-pro-
grammed dy-
namics control 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
IPG Roadbox to the 
mock-up subsystem so 
that collisions with ob-
jects and subjects can be 
avoided 
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6.13 
IPG Road-
box signals 
are not/in-
correctly/too 
late for-
warded to 
external 
command 
device sub-
system 
System operator 
is unclear about 
the DS' driving 
state 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation possible 
3 
Wireless data 
transmission, 
supplier devel-
oped its IPG 
Roadbox ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards, 
self-pro-
grammed dy-
namics control 
3 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty data 
transmission from the 
IPG Roadbox to the ex-
ternal command device 
subsystem so that colli-
sions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
6.14 
ADMA G-3 
position 
and/or mo-
tion are 
not/incor-
rectly meas-
ured 
Position/motion 
of DS unclear -> 
DS trajectory not 
controllable in 
closed-loop con-
trol, possibly 
dangerous trajec-
tory 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
open-loop control still 
possible, emergency brak-
ing possible, mitigation is 
possible 
2 
sensor noise, 
sensor drift, 
GPS is blind 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of faulty position 
and/or motion ADMA G-
3 measurements so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
P
o
w
er
 s
u
p
p
ly
 
7.1 
Traction bat-
tery's man-
agement sys-
tem cuts 
power sup-
ply 
Steering unit, 
drive unit, and 
hexapod E/E/PE 
subsystems can-
not operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over 
BMS, no mitigation pos-
sible 
2 
HV accumulator 
and safety-ori-
ented BMS can 
lead to HV 
power cut 
3 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a HV power cut 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
7.2.1 
Overvoltage 
from traction 
battery 
Steering unit, 
drive unit, and 
hexapod E/E/PE 
subsystems can-
not operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over 
BMS, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
HV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a HV overvoltage 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
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7.2.2 
Overvoltage 
from traction 
battery 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at steering 
unit, drive unit, 
and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsys-
tems 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over 
BMS, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
HV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND HV 
overvoltage because of 
recuperation must be 
avoided 
7.3.1 
Overvoltage 
from auxil-
iary battery 
Steering unit, 
drive unit, mock-
up, and WMDS 
dynamics control 
E/E/PE subsys-
tems cannot oper-
ate -> DS trajec-
tory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a LV overvoltage 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided 
7.3.2 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at steering 
unit, drive unit, 
mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE 
subsystems 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by test person 
(when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
7.4.1 
Overvoltage 
from AC/DC 
converter 
Mock-up E/E/PE 
subsystem cannot 
operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over 
AC/DC converter, no mit-
igation possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age, supplier de-
veloped its 
AC/DC con-
verter according 
to applicable 
standards 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a AC/DC con-
verter overvoltage so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided AND AC/DC 
converter overvoltage 
must be avoided 
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7.4.2 
Overvoltage 
from AC/DC 
converter 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at mock-up 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
system operator(s) 
must be rescued 
3 
System oper-
ator(s) and/or 
emergency 
personnel 
may be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no direct control over 
AC/DC converter, no mit-
igation possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
maximum volt-
age, supplier de-
veloped its 
AC/DC con-
verter according 
to applicable 
standards 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND 
AC/DC converter over-
voltage must be avoided 
7.5.1 
Overvoltage 
from station-
ary power 
connection 
External com-
mand device 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem cannot oper-
ate -> DS trajec-
tory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage in stationary 
power supply only possi-
ble with lightning which 
can be avoided by test 
person (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Overvoltage 
from power 
socket very un-
likely 
a 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a stationary 
power connector over-
voltage so that collisions 
with objects and subjects 
can be avoided 
7.5.2 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at external 
command device 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage in stationary 
power supply only possi-
ble with lightning which 
can be avoided by test 
person (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Overvoltage 
from power 
socket very un-
likely 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
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7.6.1 
Overvoltage 
from steering 
unit/drive 
unit E/E/PE 
subsystem 
when recu-
perating 
Traction battery 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> 
steering unit, 
drive unit, and 
hexapod E/E/PE 
subsystems can-
not operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
3 
Recuperation 
power is above 
maximum input 
power to trac-
tion battery, no 
conventional 
brakes 
3 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of an overvoltage 
from the steering/drive 
unit subsystem (during 
recuperation) so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
AND overvoltage be-
cause of recuperation 
must be avoided 
7.6.2 
Traction battery 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is 
possible 
3 
Recuperation 
power is above 
maximum input 
power to trac-
tion battery, no 
conventional 
brakes 
3 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND over-
voltage because of recu-
peration must be avoided 
7.7.1 
Water in-
gress at trac-
tion battery 
Steering unit, 
drive unit, and 
hexapod E/E/PE 
subsystems can-
not operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
HV accumulator 
and safety-ori-
ented BMS can 
lead to HV 
power cut 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case water ingress at trac-
tion battery so that colli-
sions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
AND water ingress at 
traction battery must be 
avoided 
7.7.2 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at steering 
unit, drive unit, 
and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsys-
tems 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at traction bat-
tery must be avoided 
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7.8.1 
Water in-
gress at aux-
iliary battery 
Steering unit, 
drive unit, mock-
up, and WMDS 
dynamics control 
E/E/PE subsys-
tems cannot oper-
ate -> DS trajec-
tory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case water ingress at aux-
iliary battery so that col-
lisions with objects and 
subjects can be avoided 
AND water ingress at 
auxiliary battery must be 
avoided 
7.8.2 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at steering 
unit, drive unit, 
mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE 
subsystems 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at auxiliary 
battery must be avoided 
7.9.1 
Water in-
gress at 
AC/DC con-
verter 
Mock-up E/E/PE 
subsystem cannot 
operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case water ingress at 
AC/DC converter so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided AND water in-
gress at AC/DC con-
verter must be avoided 
7.9.2 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at mock-up 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at AC/DC 
converter must be 
avoided 
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7.10.1 
Water in-
gress at sta-
tionary 
power con-
nection 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE 
subsystem cannot 
operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace, 
MCA fails 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case water ingress at sta-
tionary power connector 
so that collisions with 
objects and subjects can 
be avoided AND water 
ingress at stationary 
power connector must be 
avoided 
7.10.2 
Short circuit and 
possibly fire haz-
ard at WMDS dy-
namics control 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter, liquid could 
be brought into 
the system by 
users (e.g. for 
drinking) 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND wa-
ter ingress at stationary 
power connector must be 
avoided 
7.11.1 
Traction bat-
tery becomes 
too hot 
Traction battery 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> 
steering unit, 
drive unit, and 
hexapod E/E/PE 
subsystems can-
not operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its traction 
battery and 
BMS according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
traction battery so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
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7.11.2 
Traction bat-
tery becomes 
too hot 
Traction battery 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> Short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard at steering 
unit, drive unit, 
and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsys-
tems 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its traction 
battery and 
BMS according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
7.12 
Auxiliary 
battery be-
comes too 
hot 
Auxiliary battery 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard at steering 
unit, drive unit, 
mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE 
subsystems 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures cannot be 
monitored (no sensors), 
no mitigation possible 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its auxil-
iary battery and 
BMS according 
to applicable 
standards 
2 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock AND aux-
iliary battery's tempera-
ture must be monitored 
7.13.1 
AC/DC con-
verter be-
comes too 
hot 
AC/DC converter 
goes into safety 
shutdown -> 
mock-up E/E/PE 
subsystem cannot 
operate -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its AC/DC 
converter ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a malfunctioning 
AC/DC converter so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
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7.13.2 
AC/DC con-
verter be-
comes too 
hot 
AC/DC converter 
fails to go into 
safety shutdown -
> short circuit 
and possibly fire 
hazard at mock-
up E/E/PE sub-
system 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
temperatures can be mon-
itored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat 
excluded from 
environmental 
conditions, the 
supplier devel-
oped its AC/DC 
converter ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
Continuous short circuit 
must be avoided so that 
during a rescue other 
subjects could get an 
electric shock 
7.14 
Traction bat-
tery's SOC is 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late transmit-
ted to 
WMDS dy-
namics con-
trol system 
System operator 
is unaware of 
traction battery's 
SOC -> WMDS 
may run out of 
HV power -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its BMS 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty traction 
battery's SOC signal to 
the WMDS dynamics 
control system so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
7.15 
Auxiliary 
battery's 
SOC is 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late transmit-
ted to 
WMDS dy-
namics con-
trol system 
System operator 
is unaware of 
auxiliary battery's 
SOC -> WMDS 
may run out of 
LV power -> DS 
trajectory is not 
controllable 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity, 
close to boundary 
of DS workspace 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or system 
operator may 
be injured 
and/or killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its BMS 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
2 
The DS trajectory must 
remain controllable in 
case of a faulty auxiliary 
battery's SOC signal to 
the WMDS dynamics 
control system so that 
collisions with objects 
and subjects can be 
avoided 
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1.1 
No or in-
sufficient 
HV power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, emergency braking possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
HV accumulator and 
safety-oriented battery 
management system with 
high availability 
a 
1.2 
No or in-
sufficient 
LV power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, LV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, emergency braking possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
1.3.1 
HV input 
power too 
high 
Motor controller goes 
into safety shutdown -
> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
HV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage, except 
when recuperation is in 
process. 
a 
1.3.2 
Motor controller fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overvoltage 
in power electronics -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
and equipped the control-
ler with overvoltage pro-
tection 
a 
1.3.3 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
and equipped the control-
ler with overvoltage pro-
tection 
a 
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1.4.1 
LV input 
power too 
high 
Motor controller goes 
into safety shutdown -
> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
system operator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
1.4.2 
Motor controller fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overvoltage 
in power electronics -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
system operator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
1.5.1 
Electric 
motor pro-
vides 
no/less/m
ore torque 
than de-
manded 
Incorrect torque leads 
to no/decreased/in-
creased steering angle 
rate and therefore in-
correct steering angle 
-> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
steering is given, emergency 
braking is possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Electric motor that is also 
used in light aircrafts, out-
put voltage of motor con-
troller translates directly 
to motor torque 
a 
1.5.2 
Mainte-
nance, ser-
vice engi-
neer(s) 
standing 
close by 
electric mo-
tor 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer, control 
inputs to the DS can be checked 
before executing them, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Electric motor that is also 
used in light aircrafts, out-
put voltage of motor con-
troller translates directly 
to motor torque 
a 
1.6 
Resolver 
delivers 
no electric 
motor 
speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller is 
unable to control mo-
tor speed -> de-
manded steering angle 
cannot be provided -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
steering is given, emergency 
braking is possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
resolver according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
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1.7 
Resolver 
delivers 
too 
low/high 
electric 
motor 
speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller de-
mand too high/low 
torque from electric 
motor -> too high/low 
steering angle -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
steering is given, emergency 
braking is possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
resolver according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
1.8.1 
Tempera-
ture sen-
sor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
electric 
motor 
tempera-
ture sig-
nals 
Motor controller re-
duces maximum elec-
tric motor torque or 
shuts electric motor 
down -> demanded 
steering angle cannot 
be provided -> safety 
logic detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, if only 
one temperature sensor fails lim-
ited control over steering is 
given, emergency braking possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Electric motor (and tem-
perature sensor) that is 
also used in light aircrafts 
a 
1.8.2 
Motor controller fails 
to reduce electric mo-
tor torque or to shut 
electric motor down -
> overheating of elec-
tric motor -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Electric motor (and tem-
perature sensor) that is 
also used in light aircrafts, 
motor controller devel-
oped according to applica-
ble standards 
a 
1.9.1 
Motor 
controller 
provides 
no/too 
low/too 
high 
power to 
electric 
motor 
No/too low/too high 
torque from electric 
motor -> demanded 
steering angle cannot 
be provided -> safety 
logic detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, detec-
tion possible by comparing the 
signals of all three steering mo-
tors, if only one motor controller 
fails limited control over steering 
is given, emergency braking pos-
sible, mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
a 
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1.9.2 
Motor 
controller 
provides 
no/too 
low/too 
high 
power to 
electric 
motor 
Overvoltage in elec-
tric motor -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, maxi-
mum output voltage can be set in 
motor controller, diodes and 
fuses avoid overvoltage, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
a 
1.10.1 
Electric 
motor be-
comes too 
hot 
Motor controller re-
duces maximum en-
gine torque or shuts 
electric motor down -
> demanded steering 
angle cannot be pro-
vided -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, if only 
electric motor fails limited con-
trol over steering is given, emer-
gency braking possible, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, prototype electric 
motor (and temperature 
sensor) that is also used in 
light aircrafts, motor con-
troller monitors tempera-
tures 
a 
1.10.2 
Overheating of elec-
tric motor -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, prototype electric 
motor (and temperature 
sensor) that is also used in 
light aircrafts, motor con-
troller monitors tempera-
tures 
a 
1.11.1 
Motor 
controller 
becomes 
too hot 
Motor controller goes 
into safety shutdown -
> demanded steering 
angle cannot be pro-
vided -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, if only 
electric motor fails limited con-
trol over steering is given, emer-
gency braking possible, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its motor controller 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
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1.11.2 
Motor 
controller 
becomes 
too hot 
Motor controller fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overheating 
of motor controller -> 
IMD cuts power sup-
ply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its motor controller 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
1.12.1 
Water in-
gress at 
electric 
motor 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
1.12.2 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
1.12.3 
Electric motor is una-
ble to operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
1.13.1 
Water in-
gress at 
motor 
controller 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
1.13.2 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
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1.13.3 
Water in-
gress at 
motor 
controller 
Motor controller is 
unable to operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
1.14 
Motor 
controller 
provides 
no/incor-
rect/too 
late infor-
mation to 
IPG Road-
box 
IPG Roadbox is una-
ble to calculate cor-
rect WMDS state -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over motor controller, no 
mitigation possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
a 
D
ri
v
e 
u
n
it
 
2.1 
No or in-
sufficient 
HV en-
ergy sup-
ply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
HV accumulator and 
safety-oriented battery 
management system with 
high availability 
a 
2.2 
No or in-
sufficient 
LV energy 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
2.3.1 
HV input 
voltage 
too high 
Motor controller goes 
into safety shutdown -
> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
HV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage, except 
when recuperation is in 
process. 
a 
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2.3.2 
HV input 
voltage 
too high 
Motor controller fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overvoltage 
in power electronics -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
and equipped the control-
ler with overvoltage pro-
tection 
a 
2.3.3 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
and equipped the control-
ler with overvoltage pro-
tection 
a 
2.4.1 
LV input 
voltage 
too high 
Motor controller goes 
into safety shutdown -
> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
system operator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
2.4.2 
Motor controller fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overvoltage 
in power electronics -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
system operator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
2.5.1 
Electric 
motor pro-
vides 
no/less/m
ore torque 
than de-
manded 
Incorrect torque leads 
to no/decreased/in-
creased wheel hub 
torque and therefore 
incorrect accelera-
tion/deceleration -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration is 
given, steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Electric motor that is also 
used in light aircrafts, out-
put voltage of motor con-
troller translates directly 
to motor torque 
a 
C Safety Analysis 
196 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENTS CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
S
IL
 
Hazard 
Situation C Justif. F Justif. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
D
ri
v
e 
u
n
it
 
2.5.2 
Electric 
motor pro-
vides 
no/less/m
ore torque 
than de-
manded 
Incorrect torque leads 
to no/decreased/in-
creased wheel hub 
torque and therefore 
incorrect accelera-
tion/deceleration -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Mainte-
nance, ser-
vice engi-
neer(s) 
standing 
close by 
electric mo-
tor 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer, control 
inputs to the DS can be checked 
before executing them, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Electric motor that is also 
used in light aircrafts, out-
put voltage of motor con-
troller translates directly 
to motor torque 
a 
2.6 
Resolver 
delivers 
no electric 
motor 
speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller is 
unable to control mo-
tor torque -> de-
manded accelera-
tion/deceleration 
cannot be provided -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration is 
given, steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
resolver according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
2.7 
Resolver 
delivers 
too 
low/high 
electric 
motor 
speed sig-
nal 
Motor controller de-
mand too high/low 
torque from electric 
motor -> too high/low 
motor torque -> safety 
logic detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration is 
given, steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
resolver according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
2.8.1 
Tempera-
ture sen-
sor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
electric 
motor 
tempera-
ture sig-
nals 
Motor controller re-
duces maximum elec-
tric motor torque or 
shuts electric motor 
down -> demanded 
motor torque cannot 
be provided -> safety 
logic detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, if only one electric 
motor fails, limited control over 
acceleration/deceleration is 
given, steering is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Electric motor (and tem-
perature sensor) that is 
also used in light aircrafts 
a 
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2.8.2 
Tempera-
ture sen-
sor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
electric 
motor 
tempera-
ture sig-
nals 
Motor controller fails 
to reduce electric mo-
tor torque or to shut 
electric motor down -
> overheating of elec-
tric motor -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Electric motor (and tem-
perature sensor) that is 
also used in light aircrafts, 
motor controller devel-
oped according to applica-
ble standards 
a 
2.9.1 
Motor 
controller 
provides 
no/too 
low/too 
high volt-
age to 
electric 
motor 
No/too low/too high 
torque from electric 
motor -> demanded 
motor torque cannot 
be provided -> safety 
logic detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, detec-
tion possible by comparing the 
signals of all three steering mo-
tors, if only one electric motor 
fails, limited control over accel-
eration/deceleration is given, 
steering is possible, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
a 
2.9.2 
Overvoltage in elec-
tric motor -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, maxi-
mum output voltage can be set in 
motor controller, diodes and 
fuses avoid overvoltage, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
a 
2.10.1 
Electric 
motor be-
comes too 
hot 
Motor controller re-
duces maximum en-
gine torque or shuts 
electric motor down -
> demanded motor 
torque cannot be pro-
vided -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, if only 
one electric motor fails, limited 
control over acceleration/deceler-
ation is given, steering is possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, prototype electric 
motor (and temperature 
sensor) that is also used in 
light aircrafts, motor con-
troller monitors tempera-
tures 
a 
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2.10.2 
Electric 
motor be-
comes too 
hot 
Overheating of elec-
tric motor -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, prototype electric 
motor (and temperature 
sensor) that is also used in 
light aircrafts, motor con-
troller monitors tempera-
tures 
a 
2.11.1 
Motor 
controller 
becomes 
too hot 
Motor controller goes 
into safety shutdown -
> demanded motor 
torque cannot be pro-
vided -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, if only 
one electric motor fails, limited 
control over acceleration/deceler-
ation is given, steering is possi-
ble, mitigation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its motor controller 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
2.11.2 
Motor controller fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overheating 
of motor controller -> 
IMD cuts power sup-
ply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its motor controller 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
2.12.1 
Water in-
gress at 
electric 
motor 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
2.12.2 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
C.3 Revised Hazard List 
199 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENTS CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
S
IL
 
Hazard 
Situation C Justif. F Justif. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
D
ri
v
e 
u
n
it
 
2.12.3 
Water in-
gress at 
electric 
motor 
Electric motor is una-
ble to operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
2.13.1 
Water in-
gress at 
motor 
controller 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
2.13.2 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
2.13.3 
Motor controller is 
unable to operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
2.14 
Motor 
controller 
provides 
no/incor-
rect/too 
late infor-
mation to 
IPG Road-
box 
IPG Roadbox is una-
ble to calculate cor-
rect WMDS state -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over motor controller, no 
mitigation possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
motor controller according 
to applicable standards 
a 
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3.1 
No or in-
sufficient 
HV power 
supply 
Power electronics 
shut down -> de-
manded hexapod mo-
tion cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, emer-
gency shutdown and HV energy 
cut are sudden and can hardly be 
detected prior to hazardous 
event, rescue enabled by pro-
vided ladder, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
HV accumulator and 
safety-oriented battery 
management system with 
high availability 
a 
3.2.1 
HV input 
power too 
high 
Power electronics 
goes into safety shut-
down -> demanded 
hexapod motion can-
not be provided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is possible 
1 
HV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage, over-
voltage by recuperation is 
avoided in motor control-
ler and by a diode 
a 
3.2.2 
Power electronics fail 
to go into safety shut-
down -> overvoltage 
at power electronics -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, HV 
overvoltage is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior to haz-
ardous event, recuperation can be 
avoided, mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
power electronics accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
3.3.1 
Linear ac-
tuator pro-
vides 
no/less/m
ore force 
than de-
manded 
Motion of the linear 
actuators does not 
match the inverse kin-
ematics model -> ten-
sion within hexapod 
may lead to fracture 
of actuator -> other 
actuators cannot sup-
port static and dy-
namic dome load -> 
restraining straps pre-
vent dome from fall-
ing off the self-driv-
ing platform 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may be in-
jured 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over inverse kinematics 
model or voltage provided to ac-
tuators, no mitigation possible 
1 
The suppliers developed 
their actuators according 
to applicable standards 
a 
3.3.2 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer/me-
chanic, no direct control over in-
verse kinematics model or volt-
age provided to actuators, service 
engineers and mechanics are in-
structed to stand back of WMDS 
when HV is switched on, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
The suppliers developed 
their actuators according 
to applicable standards 
a 
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3.4 
Linear ac-
tuator's 
position 
sensor de-
livers no 
signal 
Power electronics 
cannot control the lin-
ear actuator's position 
-> demanded hexapod 
motion cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, safe 
hexapod position can be reached 
with open-loop control, rescue 
enabled by provided ladder, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
actuators and sensors ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
3.5 
Linear ac-
tuator's 
position 
sensor de-
livers too 
low/high 
signal 
Power electronics de-
mands too high/low 
actuator force -> mo-
tion of the linear actu-
ators does not match 
the inverse kinematics 
model -> tension 
within hexapod may 
lead to fracture of ac-
tuator -> other actua-
tors cannot support 
static and dynamic 
dome load -> restrain-
ing straps prevent 
dome from falling off 
the self-driving plat-
form 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer/me-
chanic, no direct control over in-
verse kinematics model or volt-
age provided to actuators, service 
engineers and mechanics are in-
structed to stand back of WMDS 
when HV is switched on, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
actuators and sensors ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
3.6.1 
Linear ac-
tuator's 
tempera-
ture sen-
sor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
signal 
Power electronics re-
duce maximum actua-
tor force or shuts ac-
tuator down -> 
demanded hexapod 
motion cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored and 
compared, rescue enabled by 
provided ladder, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
actuators and sensors ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
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3.6.2 
Linear ac-
tuator's 
tempera-
ture sen-
sor deliv-
ers no/too 
low/high 
signal 
Power electronics 
fails to reduce maxi-
mum actuator force or 
to shut actuator down 
-> overheating of ac-
tuator -> IMD cuts 
power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored and 
compared, mitigation possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
actuators and sensors ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
3.7.1 Power 
electron-
ics pro-
vide 
no/too 
low/too 
high 
power to 
linear ac-
tuator 
No/too low/too high 
force from one linear 
actuator -> motion of 
the linear actuators 
does not match the in-
verse kinematics 
model -> tension 
within hexapod may 
lead to fracture of ac-
tuator -> other actua-
tors cannot support 
static and dynamic 
dome load -> restrain-
ing straps prevent 
dome from falling off 
the self-driving plat-
form 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer/me-
chanic, no direct control over in-
verse kinematics model or volt-
age provided to actuators, service 
engineers and mechanics are in-
structed to stand back of WMDS 
when HV is switched on, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
power electronics accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
3.7.2 
Too high force from 
all linear actuators -> 
acceleration of the 
hexapod above de-
manded acceleration 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may be in-
jured 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over actuators, no mitiga-
tion possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
power electronics accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
3.7.3 
Overvoltage at linear 
actuator -> IMD cuts 
power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over actuators, no mitiga-
tion possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
power electronics accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
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3.8.1 
Linear ac-
tuator be-
comes too 
hot 
Power electronics re-
duces maximum actu-
ator force or shuts ac-
tuator down -> 
demanded hexapod 
motion cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, rescue 
enabled by provided ladder, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its actuators and sen-
sors according to 
applicable standards 
a 
3.8.2 
Power electronics 
fails to reduce maxi-
mum actuator force or 
to shut actuator down 
-> overheating of ac-
tuator -> IMD cuts 
power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its actuators and sen-
sors according to 
applicable standards 
a 
3.9.1 
Power 
electron-
ics be-
come too 
hot 
Power electronics 
goes into safety shut-
down -> demanded 
hexapod motion can-
not be provided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, rescue 
enabled by provided ladder, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its power electronics 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
3.9.2 
Power electronics 
fails to go into safety 
shutdown -> over-
heating of power elec-
tronics -> IMD cuts 
power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its power electronics 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
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3.10 
The mo-
tion of 
one or 
more lin-
ear actua-
tors, de-
manded 
by the 
power 
electron-
ics, does 
not match 
the in-
verse kin-
ematics 
model 
Tension within hexa-
pod may lead to frac-
ture of actuator -> 
other actuators cannot 
support static and dy-
namic dome load -> 
restraining straps pre-
vent dome from fall-
ing off the self-driv-
ing platform 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineer/me-
chanic, no direct control over ac-
tuators, service engineers and 
mechanics are instructed to stand 
back of WMDS when HV is 
switched on, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
The supplier developed its 
power electronics accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
3.11.1 
Water in-
gress at 
linear ac-
tuator 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
3.11.2 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Mainte-
nance 
at hexa-
pod 
1 
Skilled service engineer and me-
chanic, water ingress can be ob-
served, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
3.11.3 
Emergency 
rescue 
2 
Test person 
might be se-
riously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
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3.11.4 
Water in-
gress at 
linear ac-
tuator 
Linear actuator is una-
ble to operate -> de-
manded hexapod mo-
tion cannot be 
provided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, rescue enabled by provided 
ladder, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
3.12.1 
Water in-
gress at 
power 
electron-
ics 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
3.12.2 
Power electronics is 
unable to operate -> 
demanded hexapod 
motion cannot be pro-
vided 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, rescue enabled by provided 
ladder, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
3.13 
Power 
electron-
ics pro-
vide 
no/incor-
rect/too 
late infor-
mation to 
IPG Road-
box 
IPG Roadbox is una-
ble to calculate cor-
rect WMDS state -> 
hexapod motion is un-
controllable 
Emergency 
rescue, 
dome fully 
tilted and 
poorly ac-
cessible 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Rare 
emer-
gency 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over power electronics, 
rescue enabled by provided lad-
der, mitigation is possible 
1 
The supplier developed its 
power electronics accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
M
o
ck
-u
p
 
4.1.1 
No or in-
sufficient 
power 
supply 
Test person is unable 
to give control inputs 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, energy 
cut is sudden and can hardly be 
detected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
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4.1.2 
No or in-
sufficient 
power 
supply 
Test person is unable 
to communicate with 
system operator and 
vice versa 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, test 
person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
2 
Skilled system operator, energy 
cut is sudden and can hardly be 
detected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
4.1.3 
Test person cannot re-
ceive system feedback 
through visual, audi-
tory, and tactile chan-
nels 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, energy 
cut is sudden and can hardly be 
detected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
4.1.4 
Test person cannot re-
ceive system feedback 
through visual, audi-
tory, and tactile chan-
nels -> test person 
gets motion sick and 
throws up onto 
E/E/PE element -> 
short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply -> 
test person must be 
rescued 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
3 
Test person 
and/or 
emergency 
personnel 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son can be monitored and driving 
simulation can be aborted prior 
to critical event, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
C.3 Revised Hazard List 
207 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENTS CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
S
IL
 
Hazard 
Situation C Justif. F Justif. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
M
o
ck
-u
p
 
4.1.5 
No or in-
sufficient 
power 
supply 
System operator is un-
able to monitor test 
person 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
might un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within move 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, energy 
cut is sudden and can hardly be 
detected prior to hazardous 
event, test person is instructed 
not to unbuckle unless he is told 
to do so, mitigation is possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
4.1.6 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, test 
person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
2 
Skilled system operator, energy 
cut is sudden and can hardly be 
detected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
4.1.7 
Air conditioning is 
unable to operate 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, ex-
tremely 
cold/hot en-
vironmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Unskilled test person, when 
dome gets too cold/hot test per-
son can leave DS, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut, ex-
treme temperatures ex-
cluded from environmen-
tal conditions 
a 
4.2.1 
Input 
power too 
high 
Control elements go 
into safety shutdown -
> test person cannot 
give control inputs 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
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4.2.2 
Input 
power too 
high 
Representation ele-
ments go into safety 
shutdown -> test per-
son cannot receive 
system feedback 
through visual, audi-
tory, and tactile chan-
nels 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
4.2.3 
Communication sys-
tem goes into safety 
shutdown -> test per-
son is unable to com-
municate with system 
operator and vice 
versa 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
4.2.4 
Surveillance system 
goes into safety shut-
down -> system oper-
ator is unable to mon-
itor test person 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
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4.2.5 
Input 
power too 
high 
Air conditioning goes 
into safety shutdown -
> air conditioning is 
unable to operate 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, ex-
tremely 
cold/hot en-
vironmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Unskilled test person, when 
dome gets too cold/hot test per-
son can leave DS, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage, extreme 
temperatures excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions 
a 
4.2.6 
Any of the subsys-
tem's elements fails to 
go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage, suppliers 
of subsystem's elements 
developed their compo-
nents according to appli-
cable standards 
a 
4.3 
Gear se-
lection is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong gear selec-
tion is forwarded to 
WMDS dynamics 
control subsystem -> 
false cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son and signals can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
gear selection system ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
4.4 
Steering 
wheel an-
gle is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong steering 
wheel angle is for-
warded to WMDS dy-
namics control sub-
system -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son and signals can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
steering wheel according 
to applicable standards 
a 
4.5 
Clutch pe-
dal posi-
tion is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong clutch pe-
dal position is for-
warded to WMDS dy-
namics control 
subsystem -> false 
cues are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son and signals can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its pe-
dal assembly according to 
applicable standards 
a 
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4.6 
Brake pe-
dal posi-
tion is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong brake pedal 
position is forwarded 
to WMDS dynamics 
control subsystem -> 
false cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son and signals can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its pe-
dal assembly according to 
applicable standards 
a 
4.7 
Accelera-
tor pedal 
position is 
not/not 
properly 
sensed 
No/wrong accelerator 
pedal position is for-
warded to WMDS dy-
namics control sub-
system -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son and signals can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its pe-
dal assembly according to 
applicable standards 
a 
4.8 
Steering 
wheel 
force 
feedback 
actuator 
gives 
no/too 
low/too 
high feed-
back force 
False cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, when false 
cues are represented test person 
can communicate with system 
operator and abort driving simu-
lation, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
steering wheel according 
to applicable standards 
a 
4.9 
Brake 
pedal's 
ABS 
shaker 
gives 
no/too 
low/too 
high feed-
back force 
False cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, when false 
cues are represented test person 
can communicate with system 
operator and abort driving simu-
lation, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its pe-
dal assembly according to 
applicable standards 
a 
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4.10 
Sound 
system 
gives 
no/wrong/
too 
early/too 
late audi-
tory feed-
back 
False cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, when false 
cues are represented test person 
can communicate with system 
operator and abort driving simu-
lation, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
sound system according to 
applicable standards 
a 
4.11 
Visual 
represen-
tation sys-
tem gives 
no/wrong/
too 
early/too 
late visual 
feedback 
False cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, when false 
cues are represented test person 
can communicate with system 
operator and abort driving simu-
lation, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its vis-
ual representation system 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
4.12 
Air condi-
tioning is 
set at too 
high/low 
air tem-
perature 
Temperature within 
dome is too low/high 
-> health hazard to 
test person 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Unskilled test person, when 
dome gets too cold/hot test per-
son can communicate with sys-
tem operator and abort driving 
simulation and leave DS, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Skilled system operator 
sets temperature, supplier 
developed its air condi-
tioning according to appli-
cable standards 
a 
4.13.1 
Any of the 
represen-
tation ele-
ments be-
comes too 
hot 
Representation ele-
ment goes into safety 
shutdown -> test per-
son cannot receive 
system feedback 
through visual, audi-
tory, or tactile chan-
nels 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the suppliers de-
veloped their representa-
tion elements according to 
applicable standards 
a 
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4.13.2 
Any of the 
represen-
tation ele-
ments be-
comes too 
hot 
Representation ele-
ment fails to go into 
safety shutdown -> 
short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its power electronics 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
4.14.1 
Any of the 
control el-
ements 
becomes 
too hot 
Control element goes 
into safety shutdown -
> test person cannot 
give control inputs 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures and test person's control 
input and behaviour can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the suppliers de-
veloped their control input 
elements according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
4.14.2 
Control element fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the suppliers de-
veloped their control input 
elements according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
4.15.1 
Commu-
nication 
system be-
comes too 
hot 
Communication sys-
tem goes into safety 
shutdown -> test per-
son is unable to com-
municate with system 
operator and vice 
versa 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its communication 
system according to appli-
cable standards 
a 
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4.15.2 
Commu-
nication 
system be-
comes too 
hot 
Communication sys-
tem fails to go into 
safety shutdown -> 
short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its communication 
system according to appli-
cable standards 
a 
4.16.1 
Surveil-
lance sys-
tem be-
comes too 
hot 
Surveillance system 
goes into safety shut-
down -> system oper-
ator is unable to mon-
itor test person 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, test 
person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son can communicate with sys-
tem operator, temperatures can 
be monitored, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its surveillance sys-
tem according to 
applicable standards 
a 
4.16.2 
Surveillance system 
fails to go into safety 
shutdown -> short cir-
cuit -> IMD cuts 
power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its surveillance sys-
tem according to 
applicable standards 
a 
4.17.1 
Air condi-
tioning 
system be-
comes too 
hot 
Air conditioning goes 
into safety shutdown -
> air conditioning is 
unable to operate 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, ex-
tremely 
cold/hot en-
vironmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its air conditioning 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
4.17.2 
Air conditioning fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its air conditioning 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
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4.18.1 
Water in-
gress at 
visual rep-
resenta-
tion sys-
tem 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.18.2 
Visual representation 
system is unable to 
operate -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person's control input 
and behaviour can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.19.1 
Water in-
gress at 
sound sys-
tem 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.19.2 
Sound system is una-
ble to operate -> false 
cues are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person's control input 
and behaviour can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.20.1 
Water in-
gress at 
steering 
wheel 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.20.2 
Steering wheel force 
feedback actuator is 
unable to operate -> 
false cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person's control input 
and behaviour can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
C.3 Revised Hazard List 
215 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENTS CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
S
IL
 
Hazard 
Situation C Justif. F Justif. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
M
o
ck
-u
p
 
4.20.3 
Water in-
gress at 
steering 
wheel 
Steering wheel angle 
sensor is unable to op-
erate -> false cues are 
generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person's control input 
and behaviour can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.21.1 
Water in-
gress at 
pedals 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.21.2 
Brake pedal ABS 
shaker is unable to 
operate -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person's control input 
and behaviour can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.21.3 
Brake and/or clutch 
and/or accelerator pe-
dal sensor is unable to 
operate -> false cues 
are generated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person's control input 
and behaviour can be monitored, 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.22.1 
Water in-
gress at 
communi-
cation sys-
tem 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
C Safety Analysis 
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4.22.2 
Water in-
gress at 
communi-
cation sys-
tem 
Communication sys-
tem is unable to oper-
ate -> test person can-
not communicate with 
system operator and 
vice versa 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.23.1 
Water in-
gress at 
surveil-
lance sys-
tem 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.23.2 
Surveillance system is 
unable to operate -> 
system operator can-
not monitor test per-
son 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, test 
person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.24.1 
Water in-
gress at 
air condi-
tioning 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
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4.24.2 
Water in-
gress at 
air condi-
tioning 
Air conditioning is 
unable to operate -> 
health hazard to test 
person 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, ex-
tremely 
cold/hot en-
vironmental 
conditions 
2 
Frost-
bite/Heat 
stroke 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, temperatures can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
4.25 
Commu-
nication 
system 
does 
not/other 
than/too 
late for-
ward the 
test per-
son's input 
to external 
command 
device's 
communi-
cation sys-
tem 
System operator can-
not/too late react to 
the test person's input 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, test 
person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son can be monitored, mitigation 
is possible 
2 
Wireless data transmis-
sion, supplier developed 
its communication system 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
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4.26 
Surveil-
lance sys-
tem does 
not/other 
than/too 
late for-
ward its 
infor-
mation to 
the exter-
nal com-
mand de-
vice's 
communi-
cation sys-
tem 
System operator can-
not/too late react to 
the test person's be-
haviour/condition 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, test 
person has a 
health issue 
2 
Test per-
son's condi-
tion might 
worsen be-
cause rescue 
is impeded 
1 
Regular 
use 
case, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son can communicate with sys-
tem operator, mitigation is possi-
ble 
2 
Wireless data transmis-
sion, supplier developed 
its surveillance system ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
4.27 
Driver in-
put not/in-
cor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
IPG Road-
box 
False cues are gener-
ated 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, test per-
son and signals can be moni-
tored, mitigation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
components according to 
applicable standards 
a 
E
x
t.
 c
o
m
. 
D
ev
. 
5.1.1 
No or in-
sufficient 
power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, LV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation possible 
1 
Power cut from stationary 
power socket very un-
likely 
a 
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5.1.2 
No or in-
sufficient 
power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Manual 
drive, maxi-
mum manu-
ally adjusta-
ble driving 
velocity 
3 
Test person 
and/or by-
standers 
and/or sys-
tem operator 
may be in-
jured and/or 
killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, LV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, system operator is in-
structed to reduce the driving ve-
locity when driving close to the 
workspace boundaries 
1 
Power cut from stationary 
power socket very un-
likely 
a 
5.1.3 
External command 
device is unable to 
operate -> communi-
cation with and sur-
veillance of test per-
son impossible 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, LV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, test person is instructed 
not to unbuckle unless he is told 
to do so, mitigation is possible 
1 
Power cut from stationary 
power socket very un-
likely 
a 
5.2.1 
Input 
power too 
high 
External command 
device goes into 
safety shutdown -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage in stationary power sup-
ply only possible with lightning 
which can be avoided by test per-
son (when a thunderstorm rises), 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Overvoltage stationary 
power socket very un-
likely 
a 
5.2.2 
External command 
device fails to go into 
safety shutdown -> 
short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person 
1 
System op-
erator may 
receive only 
minor inju-
ries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage in stationary power sup-
ply only possible with lightning 
which can be avoided by test per-
son (when a thunderstorm rises), 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Overvoltage stationary 
power socket very un-
likely 
a 
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5.2.3 
Input 
power too 
high 
External command 
device fails to go into 
safety shutdown -> 
short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Mainte-
nance 
1 
Service en-
gineer or 
mechanic 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage in stationary power sup-
ply only possible with lightning 
which can be avoided by test per-
son (when a thunderstorm rises), 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Overvoltage stationary 
power socket very un-
likely 
a 
5.3.1 
Water in-
gress at 
external 
command 
device 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
System op-
erator may 
receive only 
minor inju-
ries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
5.3.2 
External command 
device is unable to 
operate -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
5.3.3 
External command 
device is unable to 
operate -> communi-
cation with and sur-
veillance of test per-
son impossible 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, 
rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, test person is instructed not 
to unbuckle unless he is told to 
do so, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
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5.4.1 
External 
command 
device be-
comes too 
hot 
External command 
device goes into 
safety shutdown -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its external com-
mand device according to 
applicable standards 
a 
5.4.2 
External command 
device fails to go into 
safety shutdown -> 
short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
System op-
erator may 
receive only 
minor inju-
ries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its external com-
mand device according to 
applicable standards 
a 
5.5 
Command 
inputs are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
the 
WMDS 
dynamics 
control 
subsystem 
System operator has 
no/wrong/delayed in-
fluence on DS trajec-
tory -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Secured wireless data 
transmission, supplier de-
veloped its external com-
mand device according to 
applicable standards 
a 
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5.6 
Commu-
nication 
system 
does 
not/other 
than/too 
late for-
ward the 
system 
operator's 
input to 
the mock-
up E/E/PE 
subsys-
tem's 
communi-
cation sys-
tem 
Test person can-
not/too late react to 
the system operator's 
input 
Driving 
simulation 
or emer-
gency res-
cue with un-
clear 
situation for 
test person, 
test person 
must not un-
buckle 
and/or move 
within dome 
2 
Test person 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tions 
1 
Unskilled test person, no com-
munication possible, test person 
is instructed not to unbuckle un-
less he is told to do so, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Secured wireless data 
transmission, supplier de-
veloped its external com-
mand device according to 
applicable standards 
a 
W
M
D
S
 d
y
n
a
m
ic
s 
co
n
tr
o
l 
6.1 
No or in-
sufficient 
LV power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, LV en-
ergy cut is sudden and can hardly 
be detected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
6.2.1 
LV input 
power too 
high 
IPG Roadbox goes 
into safety shutdown -
> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
6.2.2 
ADMA G-3 goes into 
safety shutdown -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), emergency braking is pos-
sible, mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
C.3 Revised Hazard List 
223 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENTS CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
S
IL
 
Hazard 
Situation C Justif. F Justif. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
W
M
D
S
 d
y
n
a
m
ic
s 
co
n
tr
o
l 
6.2.3 
LV input 
power too 
high 
IPG Roadbox and/or 
ADMA G-3 fails to 
go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
6.3.1 
Water in-
gress at 
IPG Road-
box 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
6.3.2 
IPG Roadbox is una-
ble to operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
6.4.1 
Water in-
gress at 
ADMA 
G-3 
Short circuit -> IMD 
cuts power supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
6.4.2 
ADMA-G3 is unable 
to operate -> posi-
tion/motion of DS un-
clear -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
6.5.1 
IPG Road-
box be-
comes too 
hot 
IPG Roadbox goes 
into safety shutdown -
> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
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6.5.2 
IPG Road-
box be-
comes too 
hot 
IPG Roadbox fails to 
go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
6.6.1 
ADMA 
G-3 be-
comes too 
hot 
ADMA G-3 goes into 
safety shutdown -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, open-
loop control still possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its ADMA G-3 ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
6.6.2 
ADMA G-3 fails to 
go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, open-
loop control still possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its ADMA G-3 ac-
cording to applicable 
standards 
a 
6.7 
ADMA 
G-3 sig-
nals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
IPG Road-
box 
Position/motion of DS 
unclear -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, open-
loop control still possible, emer-
gency braking possible, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
ADMA G-3 according to 
applicable standards 
a 
6.8 
IPG Road-
box sig-
nals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
steering 
unit sub-
system 
Incorrect steering an-
gle is provided -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, emer-
gency braking possible, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
IPG Roadbox according to 
applicable standards, self-
programmed dynamics 
control externally re-
viewed and thoroughly 
tested 
a 
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6.9 
IPG Road-
box sig-
nals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
drive unit 
subsystem 
Maximum wheel hub 
torque is provided -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
IPG Roadbox according to 
applicable standards, self-
programmed dynamics 
control externally re-
viewed and thoroughly 
tested 
a 
6.10 
IPG Road-
box sig-
nals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
hexapod 
subsystem 
Incorrect linear actua-
tor force is provided -
> false cues are gener-
ated and/or motion of 
the linear actuators 
does not match the in-
verse kinematics 
model -> tension 
within hexapod may 
lead to fracture of ac-
tuator -> other actua-
tors cannot support 
static and dynamic 
dome load -> restrain-
ing straps prevent 
dome from falling off 
the self-driving plat-
form 
Mainte-
nance at 
hexapod 
3 
Service en-
gineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) 
may be seri-
ously in-
jured or 
even killed 
1 
Rare 
use 
case 
1 
Skilled service engineers and 
mechanics, service engineers and 
mechanics are instructed to stand 
back of WMDS when HV is 
switched on, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Supplier developed its 
IPG Roadbox according to 
applicable standards, self-
programmed dynamics 
control externally re-
viewed and thoroughly 
tested 
a 
6.11 
IPG Road-
box sig-
nals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
mock-up 
subsystem 
Test person cannot re-
ceive system feedback 
through visual, audi-
tory, and tactile chan-
nels 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, dy-
namic driv-
ing situation 
1 
Motion 
sickness 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Supplier developed its 
IPG Roadbox according to 
applicable standards, self-
programmed dynamics 
control externally re-
viewed and thoroughly 
tested 
a 
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6.12 
IPG Road-
box sig-
nals are 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late for-
warded to 
external 
command 
device 
subsystem 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Secured wireless data 
transmission, supplier de-
veloped its IPG Roadbox 
according to applicable 
standards, self-pro-
grammed dynamics con-
trol externally reviewed 
and thoroughly tested 
a 
6.13 
ADMA 
G-3 posi-
tion 
and/or 
motion are 
not/incor-
rectly 
measured 
Position/motion of DS 
unclear -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, emer-
gency braking possible, mitiga-
tion is possible 
2 
sensor noise, sensor drift, 
GPS is blind 
a 
P
o
w
er
 s
u
p
p
ly
 
7.1 
Traction 
battery's 
manage-
ment sys-
tem cuts 
power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over battery management 
system, no mitigation possible 
1 
HV accumulator and 
safety-oriented battery 
management system with 
high availability 
a 
7.2 
Auxiliary 
battery's 
manage-
ment sys-
tem cuts 
power 
supply 
Safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over battery management 
system, no mitigation possible 
1 
Standard LV accumulator 
and standard battery man-
agement system make LV 
power cut more unlikely 
than HV power cut 
a 
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7.3.1 
Overvolt-
age from 
traction 
battery 
Steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems 
cannot operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over battery management 
system, no mitigation possible 
1 
HV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage 
a 
7.3.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems -> 
fuse blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over battery management 
system, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
HV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage 
a 
7.4.1 
Overvolt-
age from 
auxiliary 
battery 
Steering unit, drive 
unit, mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE sub-
systems cannot oper-
ate -> safety logic de-
tects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage 
a 
7.4.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at steering unit, drive 
unit, mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE sub-
systems -> fuse blows  
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage only possible with light-
ning which can be avoided by 
test person (when a thunderstorm 
rises), diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage 
a 
7.5.1 
Overvolt-
age from 
AC/DC 
converter 
Mock-up E/E/PE sub-
system cannot operate 
-> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over AC/DC converter, 
no mitigation possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage, sup-
plier developed its AC/DC 
converter according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
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7.5.2 
Overvolt-
age from 
AC/DC 
converter 
Possibly short circuit 
at mock-up E/E/PE 
subsystem -> fuse 
blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, no direct 
control over AC/DC converter, 
diodes and fuses avoid overvolt-
age, mitigation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator cannot 
provide more than its 
maximum voltage, sup-
plier developed its AC/DC 
converter according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
7.6.1 
Overvolt-
age from 
stationary 
power 
connec-
tion 
External command 
device E/E/PE sub-
system cannot operate 
-> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage in stationary power sup-
ply only possible with lightning 
which can be avoided by test per-
son (when a thunderstorm rises), 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Overvoltage from power 
socket very unlikely, di-
odes and fuses avoid over-
voltage 
a 
7.6.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at external command 
device E/E/PE sub-
system -> fuse blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
System op-
erator may 
receive only 
minor inju-
ries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, over-
voltage in stationary power sup-
ply only possible with lightning 
which can be avoided by test per-
son (when a thunderstorm rises), 
mitigation is possible 
1 
Overvoltage from power 
socket very unlikely, di-
odes and fuses avoid over-
voltage 
a 
7.7.1 
Overvolt-
age from 
steering 
unit/drive 
unit 
E/E/PE 
subsystem 
when re-
cuperating 
Traction battery goes 
into safety shutdown -
> steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems 
cannot operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, recuper-
ation can be avoided, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Recuperation current is 
limited in motor control-
ler, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, motor con-
troller is developed by its 
supplier according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
7.7.2 
Traction battery fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> short circuit -
> fuse blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, recuper-
ation can be avoided, mitigation 
is possible 
1 
Recuperation current is 
limited in motor control-
ler, diodes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, motor con-
troller is developed by its 
supplier according to ap-
plicable standards 
a 
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7.8.1 
Water in-
gress at 
traction 
battery 
Steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems 
cannot operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.8.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems -> 
fuse blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.9.1 
Water in-
gress at 
auxiliary 
battery 
Steering unit, drive 
unit, mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE sub-
systems cannot oper-
ate -> safety logic de-
tects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.9.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at steering unit, drive 
unit, mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE sub-
systems -> fuse blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.10.1 
Water in-
gress at 
AC/DC 
converter 
Mock-up E/E/PE sub-
system cannot operate 
-> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.10.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at mock-up E/E/PE 
subsystem -> fuse 
blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
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7.11.1 Water in-
gress at 
stationary 
power 
connec-
tion 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE sub-
system cannot operate 
-> safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.11.2 
Possibly short circuit 
at external command 
device E/E/PE sub-
system -> Fuse blows 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, if 
rain/snow etc. arises the system 
operator can take countermeas-
ures, mitigation is possible 
1 
Environmental conditions 
exclude high humidity and 
water 
a 
7.12.1 
Traction 
battery be-
comes too 
hot 
Traction battery goes 
into safety shutdown -
> steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems 
cannot operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
7.12.2 
Traction battery fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> Short circuit 
at steering unit, drive 
unit, and hexapod 
E/E/PE subsystems -> 
IMD cuts power sup-
ply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
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7.13.1 
Auxiliary 
battery be-
comes too 
hot 
Auxiliary battery goes 
into safety shutdown -
> steering unit, drive 
unit, mock-up, and 
WMDS dynamics 
control E/E/PE sub-
systems cannot oper-
ate -> safety logic de-
tects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
7.13.2 
Auxiliary battery fails 
to go into safety shut-
down -> possibly 
short circuit at steer-
ing unit, drive unit, 
mock-up, and WMDS 
dynamics control 
E/E/PE subsystems -> 
IMD cuts power sup-
ply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
7.14.1 
AC/DC 
converter 
becomes 
too hot 
AC/DC converter 
goes into safety shut-
down -> mock-up 
E/E/PE subsystem 
cannot operate -> 
safety logic detects 
failure -> emergency 
braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
7.14.2 
AC/DC converter 
fails to go into safety 
shutdown -> possibly 
short circuit at mock-
up E/E/PE subsystem 
-> IMD cuts power 
supply 
Driving 
simulation 
1 
Test person 
may receive 
only minor 
injuries 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
1 
Skilled system operator, temper-
atures can be monitored, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Extreme heat excluded 
from environmental con-
ditions, the supplier devel-
oped its Roadbox accord-
ing to applicable standards 
a 
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7.15 
Traction 
battery's 
SOC is 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late trans-
mitted to 
WMDS 
dynamics 
control 
system 
System operator is un-
aware of traction bat-
tery's SOC -> WMDS 
may run out of HV 
power -> safety logic 
detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its bat-
tery management system 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
7.16 
Auxiliary 
battery's 
SOC is 
not/incor-
rectly/too 
late trans-
mitted to 
WMDS 
dynamics 
control 
system 
System operator is un-
aware of auxiliary 
battery's SOC -> 
WMDS may run out 
of LV power -> safety 
logic detects failure -> 
emergency braking 
Driving 
simulation 
with test 
person, high 
velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected de-
celeration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, no miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Supplier developed its bat-
tery management system 
according to applicable 
standards 
a 
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7.17 
Incorrect 
measurement 
of any IMD 
Short circuit is 
not detected -> 
Possibly fire haz-
ard 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
test person must 
be rescued from 
dome 
3 
Test person 
and/or emer-
gency per-
sonnel may 
be seriously 
injured or 
even killed 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
no control over IMD, di-
odes and fuses avoid 
overvoltage, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its IMD 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards, self-diag-
nosis integrated 
a 
Short circuit must be reli-
ably detected by IMDs 
7.18 
No or insuf-
ficient LV 
power sup-
ply at any 
IMD 
IMD inoperable -
> no "OK"-signal 
to external emer-
gency braking 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem -> emer-
gency braking ac-
tivated 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) working 
at power supply 
subsystem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, system 
engineers and mechanics 
are instructed to stand 
back from operational 
emergency braking sys-
tem, V energy cut is sud-
den and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard battery 
management 
system make 
LV power cut 
more unlikely 
than HV power 
cut 
a 
LV power supply must 
not be cut 
7.19 
LV input 
power too 
high at any 
IMD 
IMD inoperable -
> no "OK"-signal 
to external emer-
gency braking 
E/E/PE subsys-
tem -> emer-
gency braking ac-
tivated 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) working 
at power supply 
subsystem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by system op-
erator (when a thunder-
storm rises), emergency 
braking is possible, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
LV power supply must 
not exceed nominal volt-
age 
7.20 
Any fuse 
does not 
blow alt-
hough it 
should 
Continuous short 
circuit -> possi-
bly fire hazard 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) working 
at power supply 
subsystem, Over-
voltage 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by system op-
erator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its fuses 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards, overvolt-
age in general 
unlikely 
a 
Fuses must reliably blow 
at threshold current 
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8.1.1 
No or insuf-
ficient LV 
power sup-
ply 
Programmable 
Logic Controller 
(PLC) cannot 
provide LV 
power to electric 
holding magnet -
> emergency 
braking activated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected decel-
eration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion  
2 
Skilled system operator, 
LV energy cut is sudden 
and can hardly be de-
tected prior to hazardous 
event, no mitigation pos-
sible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard battery 
management 
system make 
LV power cut 
more unlikely 
than HV power 
cut 
a 
LV power supply must 
not be cut 
8.1.2 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
2 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, energy 
cut is sudden and can 
hardly be detected prior 
to hazardous event, miti-
gation is possible 
1 
Standard LV ac-
cumulator and 
standard battery 
management 
system make 
LV power cut 
more unlikely 
than HV power 
cut 
1 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.2.1 
LV input 
power too 
high 
PLC goes into 
safety shutdown -
> no power pro-
vided to electric 
holding magnet -
> emergency 
braking activated 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by system op-
erator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.2.2 
PLC fails to go 
into safety shut-
down -> short 
circuit -> IMD 
cuts power sup-
ply -> no power 
provided to elec-
tric holding mag-
net -> emergency 
braking activated  
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
overvoltage only possible 
with lightning which can 
be avoided by system op-
erator (when a thunder-
storm rises), mitigation is 
possible 
1 
LV accumulator 
cannot provide 
more than its 
nominal voltage 
a 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
C Safety Analysis 
236 
S
u
b
sy
s.
 
No. 
HAZARDOUS EVENT CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD 
SIL Safety function Hazard 
Situation C Justification F Justific. P Justification W Justification 
Failure Consequence 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
em
er
g
en
cy
 b
ra
k
in
g
 s
y
st
em
 
8.3.1 
Water in-
gress at PLC 
PLC cannot oper-
ate -> no power 
provided to elec-
tric holding mag-
net -> emergency 
braking activated 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter 
a 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.3.2 
Possibly short 
circuit at PLC -> 
IMD cuts power 
supply -> no 
power provided 
to electric hold-
ing magnet -> 
emergency brak-
ing activated  
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
if rain/snow etc. arises the 
system operator can take 
countermeasures, mitiga-
tion is possible 
1 
Environmental 
conditions ex-
clude high hu-
midity and wa-
ter 
a 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.4.1 
Electric 
holding mag-
net malfunc-
tions/pro-
vides no or 
too low force 
Emergency brak-
ing is activated 
Driving simulation 
with test person, 
high velocity 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected decel-
eration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no influence on electric 
holding magnet, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its magnet 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards, contact 
surface cleaned 
and smoothed 
during mainte-
nance 
a 
Electric holding magnet 
must not provide no/too 
low force 
8.4.2 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no influence on electric 
holding magnet, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its magnet 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards, contact 
surface cleaned 
and smoothed 
during mainte-
nance 
1 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
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8.5 
Electric 
holding mag-
net provides 
too high 
force 
Clamping force 
higher than 
needed, emer-
gency braking ac-
tivation may need 
longer (<< 1 s) 
than usual 
Emergency situa-
tion, emergency 
braking is acti-
vated 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected decel-
eration 
2 
Regular 
applica-
tion  
2 
Skilled system operator, 
no influence on electric 
holding magnet, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its magnet 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards, contact 
surface cleaned 
and smoothed 
during mainte-
nance 
a 
Electric holding magnet 
must not provide too 
high force 
8.6 
Steel coil 
spring has 
not been pre-
loaded 
Brake pad has 
contact to under-
ground -> unde-
sired trajectory 
Driving simulation 
initialisation with 
high dynamic mo-
tion at beginning 
1 
Minor inju-
ries because 
of unex-
pected decel-
eration 
1 
Regular 
applica-
tion, rare 
event 
1 
Skilled system operator, 
state of external emer-
gency braking system can 
be checked visually be-
forehand, mitigation is 
possible 
1 
Human failure, 
conduct guide-
lines instruct 
system operator 
to check emer-
gency braking 
system 
a 
Steel coil springs must 
always be preloaded 
prior to driving simula-
tion initialisation 
8.7 
No/too late 
signal from 
IMD 
Sampling rate 
threshold is vio-
lated -> PLC acti-
vates emergency 
braking system 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
2 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, no control 
over IMD, no mitigation 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its IMD 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
1 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.8 
No/too late 
signal from 
motor con-
troller 
Sampling rate 
threshold is vio-
lated -> PLC acti-
vates emergency 
braking system 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
2 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, no direct 
control over motor con-
trollers, no mitigation 
possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its motor 
controller ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
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8.9 
No/too late 
signal from 
IPG Road-
box 
Sampling rate 
threshold is vio-
lated -> PLC acti-
vates emergency 
braking system 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
2 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, no direct 
control over IPG Road-
box, no mitigation possi-
ble 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its IPG 
Roadbox ac-
cording to appli-
cable standards 
1 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.10 
No/too late 
signal from 
external 
command 
device 
Sampling rate 
threshold is vio-
lated -> PLC acti-
vates emergency 
braking system 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
2 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, no direct 
control over external 
command device, no miti-
gation possible 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its external 
command de-
vice according 
to applicable 
standards 
1 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
8.11 
Unintended 
emergency 
signal by 
manual 
emergency 
stop 
Emergency brak-
ing is activated 
Maintenance, sys-
tem engineer(s) 
and/or me-
chanic(s) standing 
close to emer-
gency braking sys-
tem 
3 
System engi-
neer(s) and/or 
mechanic(s) 
might be seri-
ously injured 
or even killed 
1 
Rare ap-
plication 
1 
Skilled system engineers 
and mechanics, system 
engineers and mechanics 
are instructed to stand 
back from operational 
emergency braking sys-
tem, mitigation is possi-
ble 
1 
Supplier devel-
oped its manual 
emergency stop 
according to ap-
plicable stand-
ards 
a 
System engineer(s) 
and/or mechanic(s) must 
not be injured or even 
killed when emergency 
braking is activated 
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